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Abstract (English) 
This PhD dissertation seeks to deepen the current understanding of the European 
Union’s (EU) transgovernmental (TG) cooperation with its Eastern neighbours under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Scholars of Europeanisation and EU external 
governance have already pointed out the potential of EU TG cooperation to advance EU 
democracy promotion goals and regulatory standards to the ENP countries under the 
absence of EU membership perspective. The major instrument of such cooperation is 
Twinning, which fosters peer-to-peer, cross-border networks between civil servants and 
experts from EU member states (MS) and their ENP counterparts. Nevertheless, the existing 
literature overlooks several important aspects of EU TG cooperation, which pertain to the 
democratic substance, the role of MS, and the effectiveness of Twinning projects under the 
ENP. By drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship from EU studies and public administration, 
this dissertation addresses those gaps in four thematic articles. 
The first article provides the context for this study by presenting TG cooperation as a 
promising but little studied instrument, which may help the EU advance its democracy 
promotion agenda under the ENP. The second article introduces the concept of democratic 
governance substance and explores the presence and variation of democratic governance 
norms in Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. The third article discusses the 
added value that Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the older MS bring 
for Twinning cooperation in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. The fourth and last article explores to 
what extent Twinning projects in Ukraine have been effective and what conditions explain 
their (in)effectiveness. The overall geographical focus of this work are the countries of the 
EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, which are covered by the ENP framework. 
In such a way, this dissertation proposes a new concept of democratic governance 
substance, conceptualises the comparative advantages of EU MS for Twinning cooperation, 
and suggests an original way of understanding the effectiveness of Twinning projects. In 
contrast to the predominantly qualitative studies of EU TG cooperation under the ENP, it 
also seeks to make a methodological contribution by embracing mixed-method approaches 
to data analysis. Finally, it provides policy-relevant recommendations regarding Twinning 
implementation in the future. In doing so, it relies on an original analysis of 45 semi-
structured interviews, conducted with Twinning participants and experts from the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries, EU member states, and the European Commission between 
November 2014 and May 2016. Additionally, it uses a wealth of supplementary data from 
official Twinning documents, sectoral watchdogs, international organisations, government 
sources in the EU and the Eastern neighbourhood, and existing policy research. 
The findings reveal that, through its Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood, 
the EU promotes democratic governance substance, which varies by configuration and 
magnitude across policy sectors and countries. This variation is best explained by domestic 
variables, such as the country’s political liberalisation, sector politicisation, and sector 
technical complexity. In addition, the dissertation demonstrates that, during Twinning 
cooperation, CEECs manifest mostly country-specific comparative advantages, such as their 
recent transition and accession experience, socio-linguistic proximity, and shared historical 
legacies with the Eastern neighbourhood countries. In contrast, the older MS typically offer 
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sector-specific comparative advantages, owing to their institutional experience, sectoral fit, 
existing sectoral networks with the Eastern neighbourhood countries, and prior Twinning 
participation. Both types of comparative advantages are found to be complementary. 
Finally, a configurational analysis of the effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine 
indicates that a policy fit is the only necessary condition behind the legal and institutional 
convergence of the country with the EU’s policy recommendations. Thereby, institutional 
convergence occurs in parallel to or exceeds legal convergence in effective Twinning 
projects. This undermines the mainstream scholarly expectations of the wide gap between 
EU norm adoption and implementation (application) in EU TG cooperation under the ENP. 
 
 
 
Abstract (Nederlands) 
Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel de huidige kennis van de Europese Unie's (EU) 
transgouvernementele (TG) samenwerking met de oostelijke buurlanden in het kader van 
het Europees Nabuurschapsbeleid (ENB) te verdiepen. Onderzoekers van Europeanisering 
en EU external governance hebben al gewezen op het potentieel van EU TG samenwerking 
voor de bevordering van de EU’s democratische doelstellingen en regelgevende normen in 
ENB-landen in de afwezigheid van een EU-lidmaatschapperspectief. Het voornaamste 
instrument van een dergelijke samenwerking is Twinning, die peer-to-peer, 
grensoverschrijdende netwerken tussen ambtenaren en deskundigen uit de EU-lidstaten 
(LS) en hun tegenhangers in ENB-landen bevordert. Toch ziet de bestaande literatuur een 
aantal belangrijke aspecten van de EU TG samenwerking over het hoofd, die betrekking 
hebben op de democratische inhoud, de rol van de LS, en de effectiviteit van Twinning 
projecten in het kader van het ENB. Door te steunen op inzichten van EU-studies en 
openbaar bestuur richt dit proefschrift zich op deze hiaten in vier thematische artikelen. 
Het eerste artikel vormt de context voor deze studie door TG samenwerking te 
presenteren als een veelbelovend, maar weinig bestudeerd instrument, dat de EU kan 
helpen bij het bevorderen van haar democratieagenda in het kader van het ENB. Het tweede 
artikel introduceert het concept van democratic governance substance en onderzoekt de 
aanwezigheid en variatie van normen van democratisch bestuur in Twinningprojecten in de 
oostelijke buurlanden. Het derde artikel bespreekt de toegevoegde waarde die Centraal- en 
Oost-Europese landen en de oudere LS brengen voor Twinningsamenwerking in 
Azerbeidzjan en Oekraïne. Het vierde en laatste artikel onderzoekt in hoeverre 
Twinningprojecten in Oekraïne effectief zijn geweest en welke voorwaarden de 
(in)effectiviteit verklaren. De algemene geografische focus van dit werk zijn de landen van 
de oostelijke buurlanden, die vallen onder het ENB-kader. 
Bijgevolg stelt dit proefschrift een nieuw concept voor, meer bepaald democratic 
governance substance, conceptualiseert het de comparatieve voordelen van de EU-lidstaten 
voor Twinningsamenwerking, en stelt het een originele manier voor om de effectiviteit van 
Twinningprojecten te begrijpen. In tegenstelling tot de overwegend kwalitatieve studies 
over EU-TG samenwerking in het kader van het ENB, wil het proefschrift ook een 
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methodologische bijdrage te leveren door een mixed-method aanpak te gebruiken voor de 
data-analyse. Tot slot biedt het beleidsrelevante aanbevelingen in het licht van 
Twinningimplementatie in de toekomst. Het proefschrift baseert zich op een originele 
analyse van 45 semi-gestructureerde interviews, uitgevoerd met Twinningdeelnemers en 
experts uit de oostelijke buurlanden, EU-lidstaten en de Europese Commissie tussen 
november 2014 en mei 2016. Daarnaast werd er ook een grote hoeveelheid aanvullende 
gegevens geraadpleegd uit officiële Twinningdocumenten, internationale organisaties, 
officiële bronnen van de EU en de Oostelijke buurlanden, en bestaand beleidsonderzoek. 
De bevindingen tonen aan dat de EU door middel van haar Twinningprojecten in de 
oostelijke buurlanden democratisch bestuur bevordert die inhoudelijk variëren qua 
configuratie en omvang naargelang de beleidssectoren en landen. Deze variatie kan het 
beste uitgelegd worden door de binnenlandse variabelen, zoals politieke liberalisering van 
het land, sectorpolitisering en sectortechnische complexiteit. Daarnaast toont het 
proefschrift ook aan dat CEECs tijdens Twinningsamenwerking vooral landspecifieke 
comparatieve voordelen vertonen vanwege hun transitie- en toetredingservaring, socio-
linguïstische nabijheid, en gedeelde verleden met de oostelijke buurlanden. Oudere LS 
hebben gewoonlijk sectorspecifieke comparatieve voordelen, vanwege hun institutionele 
ervaring, sectorale fit, bestaande sectorale netwerken met de oostelijke buurlanden, en 
voorafgaande Twinningparticipatie. Tot slot geeft de configurationele analyse van de 
effectiviteit van de Twinning-projecten in Oekraïne aan dat policy fit de enige noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde is achter de wettelijke en institutionele convergentie van het land met de 
aanbevelingen van de EU. Daarbij treedt institutionele convergentie parallel op met of 
overtreft het wettelijke convergentie in effectieve Twinningprojecten. Deze bevinding gaat 
in tegen de mainstream wetenschappelijke verwachtingen dat er een brede kloof is tussen 
de goedkeuring en implementatie van EU-normen in de EU-TG samenwerking in het kader 
van het ENB. 
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2  INTRODUCTION 
1. Research problem 
Following a relatively successful integration experiment with the Central and East 
European Countries (CEECs), which became European Union (EU) members in 2004 
and 2007, the EU carried on with a similar foreign policy towards its new Eastern and 
Southern neighbours, yet eschewing the prospect of further enlargement. The EU 
crystallised this format of relations through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
seeking to create around the EU’s external borders a “ring of friends” with shared 
liberal values and commitment to economic and institutional reform.1 What the EU 
promised the ENP countries in return was gradual access to EU’s single market and 
visa liberalisation.2 However, the lack of membership perspective, the EU’s biggest 
carrot, has reportedly undermined the EU’s attempts at fostering desired political and 
economic reforms in the neighbouring countries.3 Under such circumstances, scholars 
advised that the EU might have better chances in promoting democracy and regulatory 
standards to the ENP countries when it does so at the sectoral level, as part of 
transgovernmental (TG) cooperation.4  
TG or sectoral cooperation refers to the cross-border sharing of administrative 
experience and best practices between government agencies from different countries 
in pursuit of policy harmonisation or coordination.5 EU TG cooperation programs such 
as Twinning were intensively used during the Eastern enlargement in order to 
transpose the relevant chapters of the acquis communautaire to the domestic systems 
of CEECs.6 With an arrival of the ENP, most EU TG cooperation programs continued 
virtually unchanged, albeit no longer attached to the rigid framework of EU accession 
                                                          
1 European Commission, “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern 
Neighbours” (Brussels, 2003), 4. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Judith Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood 
Policy,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 44, no. 1 (March 2006): 29–55; Karen E. Smith, “The Outsiders: 
The European Neighbourhood Policy,” International Affairs, no. May (2005); Esther Ademmer, “Interdependence 
and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood,” Journal of European Public Policy 22, no. 5 (2015): 
671–89; Emerson Gergana, Noutcheva Nicu, and Michael Emerson, “European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years 
on: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP Plus,’” 2007; 
Kataryna Wolczuk, “Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 2 (March 2009): 187–211. 
4  Tina Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU 
Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?,” in Democracy Promotion in the EU’s 
Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, ed. Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, vol. 18 (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013), 1–25; Tina Freyburg, Tatiana Skripka, and Anne Wetzel, “Democracy between the Lines? EU 
Promotion of Democratic Governance via Sector-Specific Co-Operation,” 2007. 
5 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” World Politics 
27, no. 1 (1974): 39–62; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
6 Lucie Königová, Elsa Tulmets, and Eliška Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ EU 
Member States and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic,” 2006; Court of Auditors, “Special 
Report No 6/2003 Concerning Twinning as the Main Instrument to Support Institution-Building in Candidate 
Countries Together with the Commission’s Replies,” 2003; Elsa Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of 
Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary,” 
European Law Journal 11, no. 5 (2005): 657–74. 
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any longer. Amidst the general scepticism about the effectiveness of EU democracy 
promotion and norm transfer under the ENP, scholars of Europeanisation and EU 
external governance have emphasised the technical and “co-optive” nature of EU TG 
cooperation as a way to trigger incremental change from within the public 
administration of the neighbouring states.7 They have already pointed out the potential 
of EU TG programmes to diffuse norms of democratic governance to the ENP countries, 
as well as trigger limited convergence with EU regulatory standards at the sectoral 
level.8 Nonetheless, the available studies on the functioning of EU TG cooperation in 
general, and within the ENP in particular, are rather scarce and selective. 
Therefore, on a broader level, this dissertation seeks to improve the current 
understanding of EU TG cooperation with the EU’s neighbours in the post-accession 
context. In particular, by drawing on interdisciplinary theoretical frameworks and 
methodologies, the present work fills several gaps in the current scholarship on EU TG 
cooperation under the ENP. First, it systematically evaluates the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG cooperation and explains its variation across the 
Eastern neighbourhood. Second, it takes on the role of EU member states (MS) by 
identifying the specific added value that CEECs and the older MS offer for EU TG 
cooperation in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. And third, it analyses to what extent the EU 
has been effective in accomplishing its goals in TG cooperation with Ukraine and what 
conditions account for the EU’s (in)effectiveness. The empirical focus of this 
dissertation is the EU’s institution- and capacity-building instrument Twinning in the 
EU’s Eastern neighbourhood (Table 1).  
Compared to the other tools of EU TG cooperation, like TAIEX, SIGMA, or CIB, 
Twinning fosters a long-term institutionalised cooperation forum between civil servants 
and experts from MS public institutions and their counterparts from the ENP countries. 
It relies on a joint commitment of the parties to a set of so-called mandatory results, 
pertaining to political and economic reforms in line with EU acquis communautaire and 
effective EU-third country agreements. 9  The Twinning manual stipulates that the 
Twinning project result in “a new or adapted system”, functioning under the sole 
responsibility and ownership of the beneficiary country (BC).10 Because of its strong 
emphasis on inputs by MS and a more comprehensive engagement with the BC than 
any other technical assistance program, Twinning is considered the EU’s main 
                                                          
7 Tina Freyburg, “The Two Sides of Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes: A Multi-Level Perspective 
on the Conflict of Objectives between Political Stability and Democratic Change,” Democratization 19, no. 3 (2012): 
591; Sandra Lavenex, “The Power of Functionalist Extension: How EU Rules Travel,” Journal of European Public 
Policy 21, no. 6 (2014): 885–903; Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European 
Union and Its Neighbourhood; Julia Langbein and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The 
Impact of the European Union in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine,” Journal of European Public Policy 
19, no. 6 (August 2012): 863–81; Laure Delcour, “Multiple External Influences, Policy Conditionality and Domestic 
Change: The Case of Food Safety,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57, no. 1 (2016): 43–65. 
8 Ibid. 
9 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual,” 2012, 11. 
10 Ibid. 
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instrument for institution-building abroad and hence the most likely case of EU TG 
cooperation for the purposes of this study.11 Unfortunately, despite the importance of 
Twinning for the EU’s institution-building efforts abroad, the literature discussing the 
Twinning instrument is limited to the period of accession and to several singular policy-
oriented accounts and official documents under the ENP.12 My focus on the Eastern 
neighbourhood region has been mainly driven by a greater diversity in explanatory 
factors and better data access opportunities that it offers, as compared to the Southern 
neighbourhood of the ENP. 
In response to the research gaps outlined above, the body of the dissertation is 
divided into three parts (Table 1). The first part presents an overview of the literature 
on the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion and contextualises TG cooperation 
therein (Article 1). After establishing the promising role of TG cooperation for EU 
democracy and democratic governance promotion, I explore the democratic 
governance substance of Twinning projects in 117 Twinning projects fiches from all 
the Eastern neighbourhood countries (Article 2). The second part of the dissertation 
deals with the added value of CEECs and the older MS for Twinning implementation in 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine (Article 3). An analysis of 40 interviews with civil servants from 
the EU and the Eastern neighbourhood countries sheds more light on the sector- and 
country-specific comparative advantages that CEECs and older MS contribute to EU TG 
programs and paves the way for better coordination between different MS. Finally, in 
the third part, I investigate the effectiveness of 32 Twinning projects in Ukraine by 
exploring to what extent and under what conditions they lead to the legal and 
institutional convergence of Ukrainian public administration in line with EU standards 
(Article 4). The conclusions recap the main findings of this study and offer relevant 
policy recommendations on how Twinning projects may be improved for the future. 
The following sections of the introduction discuss major theories, concepts, and 
methodologies driving this study. Section 2 offers a brief outline of the ENP and broadly 
formulates the research problem in the context of EU TG cooperation in the post-
accession context. Section 3 proceeds with a historical discussion of TG cooperation 
and its location within EU studies, along with problematising of the relevant literature 
and specifying of my own inputs. Section 4 then zooms in on several specific concepts 
and theoretical debates of interest to this study, like democratic governance, politics-
administration dichotomy, MS comparative advantages, and EU normative power and 
effectiveness. Section 5 explicates the ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological issues of relevance to this work. In the final section of the introduction, 
                                                          
11 Court of Auditors, “Special Report No 6/2003 Concerning Twinning as the Main Instrument to Support Institution-
Building in Candidate Countries Together with the Commission’s Replies,” 23. 
12 Gérard Bouscharain and Jean-Bernard Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the 
Countries Covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report,” 2012; Tina Freyburg, “Planting the Seeds 
of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into Democratic 
Governance,” World Political Science Review 8, no. 1 (2012): 1–45; Elsa Tulmets, “Institution-Building Instruments 
in the Eastern Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement?,” Eastern Partnership Review, no. 6 (2011), 
http://www.eceap.eu/ul/Review_No6.pdf. 
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I introduce the reader to the articles and provide some personal reflections on the 
research process. 
 
Table 1. Structure and focus of the study 
 
Part I. Democratic substance 
of EU TG cooperation 
Part II. Role of 
MS for EU TG 
cooperation 
Part III. Effectiveness 
of EU TG cooperation  
 Article 1. 
Effectiveness of 
EU democracy 
promotion in the 
neighbourhood 
through the lens 
of foreign policy 
analysis (FPA) 
Article 2. The 
Substance of 
EU Democratic 
Governance 
Promotion  via 
TG Cooperation 
with the 
Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Article 3. The 
participation of 
CEECs in EU 
Twinning 
projects: offering 
specific added 
value for EU TG 
cooperation in the 
Eastern 
neighbourhood? 
Article 4. Effectiveness of 
EU Transgovernmental 
Cooperation in the 
Neighbourhood: 
Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis of Twinning 
Projects in Ukraine 
Co
nc
e
pt
ua
l Democracy 
promotion 
Democratic 
governance 
substance 
MS comparative 
advantages & 
added value 
Effectiveness: legal & 
institutional convergence 
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 RQ1. What is the role of EU TG 
cooperation in the EU democracy 
promotion?13 
RQ2. What democratic governance 
substance is promoted by EU TG 
cooperation? 
RQ3. What determines the 
variation in democratic governance 
substance of EU TG cooperation? 
RQ4. What added 
value do CEECs 
and the older MS 
bring for EU TG 
cooperation? 
 
RQ5. To what extent is 
EU TG cooperation 
effective? 
RQ6. What conditions 
determine the 
(in)effectiveness of EU 
TG cooperation? 
M
et
ho
do
l
og
ic
al
 Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
Multivariate 
regression 
analysis and t-
tests 
Alter-Ego-
Researcher’s 
analysis 
Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis 
Em
pi
ric
al
 European 
Neighbourhood 
Policy 
Twinning 
projects  in the 
Eastern 
neighbourhood 
Twinning projects 
in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine 
Twinning projects in 
Ukraine 
                                                          
13 Unless indicated otherwise, research questions apply to the countries of the Eastern neighbourhood under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), covering the period of 2006-2016. 
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2. The European Neighbourhood Policy 
Since the signing of the Treaty of the European Union, policymakers and scholars 
have taken a growing interest in the EU’s international role and impact beyond its 
borders. A particularly interesting development to watch in that regard was the fourth 
round of enlargement, which expanded the EU further to the East in 2004 and 2007. 
These events gave rise to the Europeanisation and EU external governance literatures, 
studying the impact of EU integration on the domestic politics, policies, and polities of 
member states and beyond.14 This set of literature will be the main theoretical domain 
and area of contribution of this dissertation.  
One of the most prominent assumptions of the Europeanisation and EU external 
governance scholars is that a credible offer of EU membership is capable of triggering 
political and economic reforms in would-be members, in line with the EU’s demands.15 
Even more so, making domestic reforms conditional upon prospective membership in 
the EU has been considered the most successful instrument for the promotion of EU 
norms in post-communist CEECs.16 As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier put it, “The 
desire of most CEECs to join the EU, combined with the high volume and intrusiveness 
of the rules attached to its membership, have allowed the EU an unprecedented 
influence on the restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire range of public 
policies in these countries.”17 In addition, the promise of EU accession was regarded 
as a sufficient legitimising vehicle for the EU to get involved in the domestic affairs of 
non-members.18 Finally, some works viewed growing EU membership as promoting 
stability and security of the EU and its external borders,19 a sentiment increasingly 
                                                          
14 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change,” European 
Integration Online Papers 4, no. 15 (2000): 1; Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, “Europeanization, 
Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania,” JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004): 619–39; Isa Camyar, “Europeanization, Domestic Legacies and 
Administrative Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Hungary and the Czech Republic,” 
Journal of European Integration 32, no. 2 (2010): 137–55, doi:10.1080/07036330903274664. 
15 Camyar, “Europeanization, Domestic Legacies and Administrative Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of Hungary and the Czech Republic”; Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood 
Policy.” 
16 Janine Reinhard, “EU Democracy Promotion through Conditionality in Its Neighbourhood: The Temptation of 
Membership Perspective or Flexible Integration?,” no. May 2001 (2010): 196–213; Andrea Gawrich, Inna 
Melnykovska, and Rainer Schweickert, “Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine,” JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 5 (2010): 1209–35; Gwendolyn Sasse, “The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 2 (2008): 295–316; 
Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism, Oxford 
University Press on Demand, 2005. 
17 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 661. 
18 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe. 
19 Christopher Browning and George Christou, “The Constitutive Power of Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Eastern Dimension,” Political Geography 29, no. 2 (2010): 112; Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy, “The 
European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries,” Journal of Common Market Studies 
37, no. 2 (1999): 220. 
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shared by works looking at the domestic situation in some of the EU’s current 
neighbours aspiring to join the EU.20 
Once the expansion had taken place, the EU faced a so-called “enlargement 
fatigue”, associated with the political and structural challenges of integrating CEECs.21 
The EU’s previously powerful membership conditionality has lost its bite for the new 
MS. As a result, some of them stagnated or even backtracked in their democratic and 
institutional approximation with the EU. 22  While the question of acquiring new 
members was taken off the table, the EU was contemplating a suitable framework of 
relations with the new neighbouring countries in the East and the South. It was 
important for the EU to not only secure its external borders and pre-empt a potential 
surge in transnational crime but also foster liberal democratic and economic systems 
in neighbours.23 In such a way, the EU wanted to avoid drawing new dividing lines in 
Europe and foster “close, peaceful, and co-operative relations” with its new 
neighbours.24 
The ENP represented the EU’s attempt to address those challenges.25 While 
excluding the possibility of a membership in a short- and medium-term perspective, 
the EU offered the neighbouring countries a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and 
further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, 
services and capital (four freedoms).26 Therefore, short of EU membership, the ENP 
framework offered the neighbours the possibility of a “privileged relationship” with the 
EU, as based on mutual commitment to the common values, such as human rights and 
democracy. 27  In 2008 and 2009, the ENP was complemented by two regional 
initiatives, Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Union for Mediterranean (UfM), covering the 
EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, respectively. 
Despite its different strategic agenda, the ENP was predominantly modelled on 
enlargement conditionality.28 The ENP country’s progress in democracy and adaptation 
                                                          
20 Lyubov Zhyznomirska, “Security Concerns in the EU Neighbourhood: The Effects of EU Immigration and Asylum 
Policy for Ukraine,” in The Boundaries of EU Enlargement, ed. Joan DeBardeleben (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 147–
64; Anja Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26, no. 2 
(2010): 171. 
21 An Schrijvers and Eline De Ridder, “European Union Accession Policy,” in The European Union and Global 
Governance, ed. Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David Bailey (London: Routledge, 2011), 166–76. 
22 Antoaneta Dimitrova, “The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do New European 
Rules Remain Empty Shells?,” Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 1 (2010): 137–48; Jan Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, 
“The Durability of EU Civil Service Policy in Central and Eastern Europe after Accession,” Governance 24, no. 2 
(2011): 254. 
23 Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy.” 
24 European Commission, “Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern 
Neighbours,” 4. 
25 The ENP included Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia 
(Southern neighbourhood) and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine (Eastern 
neighbourhood). 
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Kelley, “New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood 
Policy.” 
28 Ibid. 
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of the acquis was to be measured against the priorities for political and structural 
reforms, as listed in bilateral Action Plans (AP) between the EU and the country 
concerned.29 Similarly to those with accession conditionality, the benefits for successful 
implementation of the Action Plans have followed a quid pro quo strategy, whereby 
access to the EU’s market and visa liberalisation have been contingent upon the 
country’s progress in relevant policy sectors.30 Nevertheless, because of the main 
carrot of EU membership missing, the ENP has come under criticism among scholars 
and practitioners for failing to satisfy the membership aspirations of EU’s neighbours 
and, for that matter, failing to motivate them for reforms in line with EU standards.31 
Apart from the lack of a membership perspective, another widespread reason behind 
the criticism of the ENP has been the inadequacy and insufficiency of the other rewards 
the EU has attached to the fulfilment of priorities from the APs. The ENP has produced 
no clear blueprint detailing which rewards follow which of the many reforms proposed, 
when and what happens in the case of non-compliance, as well as how the process of 
evaluation is to be conducted.32 The launch of the EaP and UfM brought some clarity 
into these problems by introducing regional stratification of the ENP countries. The 
Association Agreements (AA) and the on-going bilateral dialogues on visa liberalisation 
with the Eastern neighbourhood countries produced even more measurable 
benchmarks in relevant policy sectors.33 However, in many other sectors the EU has 
reportedly not made its rewards credible or strong enough for the neighbours to reform 
their systems. 
In this context, it should be mentioned that the response to the ENP has not been 
identical across the EU’s neighbours in question. For example, some Eastern 
neighbourhood countries, like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, known as the most 
aspiring for EU membership and with the best record of EU integration so far, have 
criticised the multilateral approach of the ENP because they ended up in the same 
basket with the MENA states of the Southern neighbourhood, which were not even 
eligible for EU membership as they were not considered to be geographically part of 
the European continent.34 Other Eastern neighbourhood countries, like Azerbaijan and 
Belarus, have mostly distanced themselves from the ENP because of political reasons 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 35. 
31 Frank Schimmelfennig and H. Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political 
Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange,” European Union Politics 9, no. 2 (June 1, 
2008): 187–215; Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Cambridge, 2014); Tanja Börzel 
and Bidzina Lebanidze, “European Neighbourhood Policy at the Crossroads Evaluating the Past to Shape the Future,” 
MAXCAP Working Paper No.12, Berlin, no. 12 (2015): Freie Universität Berlin; Elena Korosteleva, The European 
Union and Its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a More Ambitious Partnership? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
32 Smith, “The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy.” 
33 Syuzanna Vasilyan, “The ‘European’ ‘Neighbourhood’ ‘Policy’ A Holistic Account,” in The European Union and 
Global Governance, ed. Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David Bailey (London: Routledge, 2011), 177–86. 
34 Marcin Łapczyński, “The European Union’s Eastern Partnership: Chances and Pespectives,” Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2009): 141. 
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or the generally low interest in the EU.35 In fact, Belarus was excluded from most ENP 
programmes due to its authoritarian system and political isolation from Europe.36 
Armenia was at first responsive to the EU’s demands by demonstrating a commendable 
level of reform in line with the EU’s requirements, but in 2013 it reneged on its 
commitment to signing an AA with the EU.37 
Besides failing to account for diversity in political systems and preferences in the 
Eastern neighbourhood, the ENP has also largely ignored the influence of Russia. 
Several scholars have already pointed out complex interdependencies between the EU, 
Russia, and the Eastern neighbourhood countries as interfering with EU’s foreign policy 
under the ENP.38 In most cases, the Russian factor has been an inhibiting force to 
reforms in the Eastern neighbourhood countries; however, sometimes Russia has 
paradoxically pushed its neighbours into the EU’s embraces, as the latter offered an 
alternative market and geopolitical project.39 Recent wars in Georgia and Ukraine, as 
well as a network of Russian-orchestrated zones of frozen conflicts in the region, have 
put an additional strain on the EU as a normative power in general, and the ENP in 
particular.  
Because of those problems, the relevant literature concurs that the 
transformative power of the EU under the ENP has been rather marginal and 
selective.40 Even more so, some political actors in the neighbourhood, under the veil 
of advancing EU-driven reforms, may have used the EU’s assistance to consolidate 
their grip on power .41  
However, not all the EU studies have been so pessimistic. A group of EU external 
governance scholars have suggested that, by transferring the acquis to the 
neighbouring countries, the EU also has subtle democratisation tools at its disposal. By 
drawing on the concept of democratic governance, these authors revealed the EU’s 
potential to diffuse democracy at the level of individual policy sectors by using the 
                                                          
35 Laure Delcour and Hrant Kostanyan, “Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and 
Their Consequences for the Area That Lies in between,” 2014. 
36 Gergana, Nicu, and Emerson, “European Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP European 
Neighbourhood Policy Two Years on: Time Indeed for an ‘ENP Plus,’” 25. 
37 Laure Delcour and Kataryna Wolczuk, “The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s 
Europeanisation,” Journal of European Integration 37, no. 4 (2015): 491–507. 
38 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance: Interdependence with Russia and 
the CIS as Limits to the EU’s Rule Transfer in the Ukraine,” Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (September 
2009): 853–72; Ademmer, “Interdependence and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood”; 
Delcour and Wolczuk, “The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s Europeanisation.” 
39 Esther Ademmer, Laure Delcour, and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Beyond Geopolitics: An Introduction to the Impact of 
the EU and Russia in the ‘contested Neighborhood,’” Eurasian Geography and Economics 57, no. 1 (2016). 
40 Börzel and Lebanidze, “European Neighbourhood Policy at the Crossroads Evaluating the Past to Shape the 
Future,” 6; Tom Casier, “The EU’s Two-Track Approach to Democracy Promotion: The Case of Ukraine,” in 
Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, ed. Sandra Lavenex and Frank 
Schimmelfennig, vol. 18 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 72–93. 
41  Esther Ademmer and Tanja A. Börzel, “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 4 (2013): 581–608; Freyburg, “The Two Sides of Functional 
Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes: A Multi-Level Perspective on the Conflict of Objectives between Political 
Stability and Democratic Change.” 
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mechanisms of norm transfer and socialisation.42 Thus, they argued that the broader 
democratisation of a political system may be a long-term result of a shift towards a 
system of public administration that is more transparent, accountable, and inclusive.43 
In addition, some countries of the Eastern neighbourhood have shown moderate 
progress in acquis-related administrative and economic reforms, arguably as the result 
of the existing ENP carrots, such as the prospect of a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA) or a visa-free regime.44 Several studies of Europeanisation beyond 
accession demonstrate that those incentives have been strong enough to trigger 
moderate levels of convergence with EU acquis in several sectors of the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries. Some examples include technical, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS), and environmental sectors in Ukraine; 45   SPS, 
migration, and competition sectors in Armenia;46 and migration and border control 
areas in Georgia.47  
The common thread running through those more optimistic strands of EU 
external governance and Europeanisation literature is the sectoral character of norm 
transfer from the EU to the ENP countries. Such sectoral transfer has usually occurred 
via TG networks between the EU and the ENP countries concerned. At the theoretical 
level, those studies have also made a shift from the explanations favouring the 
hierarchical effects of EU accession conditionality towards the network-based 
approaches, focusing on the cross-border links between specific public ministries and 
agencies from the EU and its neighbours. Thus, it was no longer fitting to evaluate the 
ENP by only looking at the macro-level factors, such as membership conditionality or 
pro-EU aspirations by the neighbours, while underestimating the micro-level dynamics 
of norm transfer at the sectoral level.48 As Langbein and Wolczuk rightfully noted, “It 
is only at a sectoral level that the domestic configuration of actors and their 
preferences can be fully assessed in the context of non-accession.”49 Even though, in 
most cases, convergence with EU norms via sectoral cooperation has been selective, 
                                                          
42  Tina Freyburg et al., “Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy,” in Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, ed. 
Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, vol. 18 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 142–70. 
43 Anne Wetzel, “Governance Perspective: Democratic Governance Promotion Through Functional Cooperation,” in 
The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases, ed. Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 58–67. 
44 Börzel and Lebanidze, “European Neighbourhood Policy at the Crossroads Evaluating the Past to Shape the 
Future,” 8. 
45  Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine”; Aron Buzogány, “Selective Adoption of EU Environmental Norms in 
Ukraine. Convergence Á La Carte,” Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 4 (2013): 609–30; Delcour, “Multiple External 
Influences, Policy Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Case of Food Safety.” 
46 Delcour and Wolczuk, “The EU’s Unexpected ‘Ideal Neighbour’? The Perplexing Case of Armenia’s 
Europeanisation.” 
47 Laure Delcour, “Meandering Europeanisation. EU Policy Instruments and Policy Convergence in Georgia under 
the Eastern Partnership,” East European Politics 29, no. 3 (2013): 344–57. 
48  Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine.” 
49 Ibid., 878. 
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partial, and somewhat random, I view this as a call for broader empirical investigation 
of EU TG cooperation across a wider swath of countries and policy areas in the Eastern 
neighbourhood.  
3. History of EU TG cooperation 
The following sections offer a historical overview of the phenomenon of TG 
cooperation and fit it within recent debates in the Europeanisation and EU external 
governance literatures. Hereby, I also provide deeper grounding for the specific 
research questions pursued by the study. 
3.1. TG cooperation in International Relations 
TG cooperation refers to peer-to-peer relationships and sharing of expertise 
between governments of different countries in the process of policymaking. The 
various forms of TG relations include both contacts between state leaders and, often 
as their result, a collaboration between the specific governmental agencies of two or 
more participating states. The idea of TG cooperation can be traced back to good 
neighbourly relations between states from the distant past. The Bible relates an 
account of Queen Sheba who came to visit the kingdom of Solomon and discover 
secrets of his wise governance, which was widely known among the contemporaries. 
In later epochs, TG partnerships were a manifestation of growing diplomatic and 
commercial ties, which naturally required a certain level of mutual regulation and 
coordination of trade among states. Medieval rulers, kings, and princes looked up to 
their more well-off neighbours for inspiration and guidance in governing their own 
kingdoms and empires. They also often used support from foreign governments to 
quench internal dissent or stand against a common enemy. In the times of 
industrialisation and birth of liberal economics in the 19th century, TG collaboration was 
becoming a precursor to free trade and economic growth. In the modern times of 
globalisation, the internet, and a more affordable international travel, TG cooperation 
is reaching out to more countries and unveiling more opportunities for exchange of 
best practices. 
In light of that, studying TG cooperation appears a worthwhile research subject 
from the development and historical point of view, as it helps states become more 
integrated economically, culturally, and politically in a diverse world. Nonetheless, 
while being widespread around the globe in one form or another for many centuries, 
TG cooperation has received relatively little coverage in scholarly literature. 
The first scientific conceptualisation of TG cooperation belongs to Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, who defined it as “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the 
12  INTRODUCTION 
cabinets or chief executives of those governments”.50 These sub-units of governments 
may be represented by public ministries, specialised agencies, services, 
administrations, and affiliated bureaucratic personnel, who engage in working 
relationships with their counterparts from abroad. By introducing the term TG relations, 
the scholars pursued two purposes. First, they sought to relax the traditional realist 
approach to state as a homogenous unit of international relations by acknowledging 
the possibility of cross-border partnerships occurring directly between public 
bureaucracies in a specific policy area. And second, they intended to make a break 
with the existing concept of transnational cooperation, dealing primarily with support 
to non-governmental organisations and civil society actors in less developed 
countries.51  
Keohane and Nye split TG cooperation into two major types: TG coordination and 
TG coalition-building. TG coordination, a more common phenomenon and the primary 
focus of this study, is concerned with a smooth process of policy making, adjustment, 
or implementation, which comes through sharing of expertise and solutions across 
borders. TG coalition building, which is less common for the Eastern neighbourhood 
countries, is a political tool that may be used by public institutions to rally support from 
counterpart institutions abroad in a bid to alter the balance of powers inside their own 
administrative system.52 
The idea of TG relations seemed to be forgotten in over 20 years before Anne-
Marie Slaughter picked it up and presented as a promising way to address pressing 
problems of international governance, such as spreading democracy, combatting 
transnational crime, or mitigating environmental pollution. In contrast to liberal 
institutionalists, who maintained that the state as a unit of international relations was 
losing ground to international organisations, Slaughter suggested that the state was 
not disappearing, but instead disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct 
parts, such as regulatory agencies, courts, and legislatures, which engaged in a dense 
web of networks with their counterparts abroad. 53 These networks of bureaucrats, 
responding to global policy challenges, are more flexible than international institutions 
or states.54 Owing to this, Slaughter argues, TG networks contribute to the creation of 
a new, TG order, and simultaneously offer an effective mode of international 
governance.55  
Slaughter also puts forth a typology of TG cooperation by drawing on its source 
and function. Depending on their source, TG networks may arise either spontaneously, 
because of the need to solve a current policy problem, or officially, owing to formal 
                                                          
50 Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organisations,” 43. 
51 Ibid., 41. 
52 Ibid., 44. 
53 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Real New World Order,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 184. 
54 Ibid., 185. 
55 Ibid., 184. 
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agreements concluded by heads of state. 56  Slaughter talks of information, 
enforcement, and harmonisation networks as depicting various functions of TG 
cooperation. As their name suggests, information networks refer to a cross-border 
exchange of information and advice in response to a particular policy problem. 
Enforcement networks are meant to facilitate the implementation of specific laws and 
norms of interest to the public sector in both sides of the border. Finally, harmonisation 
networks are created in a bid to approximate the legislation of partnering governments 
up to a jointly agreed standard. 57 
While making a valuable contribution to Keohane and Nye’s understanding of TG 
cooperation, Slaughter also brings on some confusion to the concept by also adding 
non-state actors, businesspeople, and even transnational criminal networks as possible 
actors in TG cooperation. While those seem to belong to transnational cooperation, 
from which these writers seek to distinguish themselves, I will consider TG relations 
as only limited to peer-to-peer cooperation between government bureaucracies from 
different countries. Similarly, TG networks will be distinguished from the related 
concepts of epistemic communities and principled-issue networks, which function 
either within the state or at the transnational level and involve non-governmental 
actors. Epistemic communities, for example, refer to a network "of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim 
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area". 58  While also 
encompassing the cross-border dimension, epistemic communities, according to Peter 
Haas, are not the same as TG networks (which he coins bureaucratic networks) 
because of the absence in the latter of shared interests, beliefs, and knowledge base.59 
As regards principled-issue networks, they are also commonly found within the 
transnational and policy advocacy literature, involving international civil society, rather 
than public bureaucracies.60  
Another strand of literature relevant for our understanding of TG cooperation 
focuses on the process of international policy and norms diffusion, which can be 
broadly defined “as one government’s policy choices being influenced by other 
government’s policy choices”. 61  Several aspects of this literature relevant for the 
context of this study is social learning, socialisation, and lesson-drawing, which refer 
to various ways in which norms and policies may be borrowed from abroad. 62 While 
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not directly engaging the concept of TG cooperation, constructivists and 
institutionalists often allude to norm transfer mechanisms, which are applicable to TG 
cooperation.63 For example, the voluntary nature of TG partnerships makes them 
compatible with the so called “logic of appropriateness”, which stresses normative 
imperatives as a major explanation behind the behaviour of actors. 64 That is contrary 
to the “logic of consequences”, which suggests that actors mostly rely on their power 
and strategic calculations in the process of decision making and which applies better 
to more hierarchical types of international cooperation (as in the EU accession talks). 
The existing literature generally suggests a positive influence of TG cooperation 
on domestic policy making. Keohane and Nye claim, for example, that TG cooperation 
may be used by the bureaucracies of more powerful countries, like the US, as a means 
to influence the policy agenda of weaker governments.65 In his study of international 
securities regulation, competition policy, and environmental law, Kal Raustiala shows 
that TG networks are capable of exporting rules and practices from stronger to weaker 
states, as well as building the capacity of the latter to comply with their international 
obligations. 66  Through reinforcing the bureaucratic (institutional) capacity of 
participating states, he writes, TG networks may also improve a domestic regulatory 
environment in various policy sectors.67 Slaughter also suggests that, although TG 
cooperation between environmental officials, judges, or legislators “lacks the drama of 
high politics”, it can improve domestic compliance with international rules, produce 
convergence and informed divergence, and foster exchange of information.68 Using 
quantitative methodology, Bach and Newman also find that TG relations are associated 
with an increased domestic adoption and implementation of internationally recognised 
insider-trading regulations.69  
One shared characteristic of most existing literature on TG cooperation, beyond 
the initial conceptualisation of TG networks and several attempts at their empirical 
evaluation, is its almost exclusive emphasis on the US and its relations with the outside 
world. Literature on EU TG cooperation is growing, but still in its infancy. 
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3.2. TG Cooperation in EU Studies 
The available EU literature, dealing with TG cooperation, is mostly grounded in 
the Europeanisation and EU external governance frameworks and boasts of a mix of 
theoretically informed and policy-oriented works. The Europeanisation literature has 
generally been more interested in the political, economic, and institutional aspects of 
countries’ transformation in line with the EU’s demands.70 In contrast, the external 
governance literature, while being a subset of Europeanisation scholarship, focuses 
more narrowly on the extension of the regulatory scope of the acquis communautaire 
to the outsiders.71 The concept of TG cooperation as such only entered the EU studies 
after the enlargement and has been associated with several synonymous concepts, 
such as sectoral, sector-specific, or functional cooperation, all of which denote a 
process of transfer of EU norms to policy sectors and institutions of the recipient 
country.72 Because the minor differences between those concepts do not pose a major 
problem in the context of this study, they will be used interchangeably with the concept 
of TG cooperation in a discussion that follows. The literature focusing on EU TG 
cooperation and the relevant concepts can be roughly divided along two dimensions: 
timeframe of analysis (accession vs. the ENP) and object of analysis (democracy 
promotion vs. transfer of the acquis). 
The EU accession literature mostly engages concepts like capacity- and 
institution-building in reference to the integration of new members from CEECs into 
the EU.73 Some of those works treat institution-building as a dependent variable, as 
related to the character and measure of change in CEECs as the result of the EU’s 
influence. 74  However, in most cases, institution-building refers to the specific 
instruments the EU used to help its would-be members with the transposition of the 
acquis into their domestic systems.75 A majority of the literature on EU TG tools during 
the Eastern enlargement tended to be policy-oriented and empirical, with a stronger 
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focus on the transfer of the acquis and best practices from the EU, rather than on 
democracy promotion. 76  Unlike the enlargement literature, works on EU TG 
cooperation under the ENP touch on both EU democracy promotion and transfer of the 
acquis in the neighbourhood. In a discussion that follows, I will go over major debates 
in the accession and the ENP literature regarding the democratic substance, the MS 
dimension, and the effectiveness of EU TG cooperation. 
3.2.1. TG cooperation and EU democracy promotion 
EU TG cooperation under the ENP has increasingly been linked to democracy and 
democratic governance promotion. The first conceptualisation of TG cooperation 
belongs to EU external governance scholars, who hail it as a horizontal channel through 
which the EU could advance its democratisation goals to the neighbouring countries 
without a membership perspective.77 These scholars claim that the previous theoretical 
approaches, viewing the success of EU democracy promotion as a function of leverage 
(via accession conditionality) and linkage (via empowerment of domestic actors and 
civil society), should yield to the alternative approaches exploring democratisation in 
the functional and technical areas of EU-ENP cooperation.78 This sector-specific model 
of democracy promotion via TG cooperation is referred to as the governance model of 
democracy promotion.79  
At the heart of this model lies the democratisation of public decision-making 
practices and institutions in specific policy sectors, rather than the democratisation of 
the entire polity.80 In conceptualising EU democracy promotion via TG cooperation, 
scholars allude to the notion of democratic governance, consisting of three dimensions, 
or norms: transparency, accountability, and participation.81 An immediate benefit for 
the EU from promoting the norms of democratic governance via TG cooperation 
consists in greater subtlety when it comes to engaging the mainly authoritarian ENP 
countries in political reform. 82  This innovation in the understanding of EU TG 
cooperation has found its way in several empirical contributions by the scholars of EU 
democracy promotion and external governance. For example, Freyburg et al. find that 
the EU has generally succeeded in having the ENP countries formally adopt norms of 
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democratic governance via TG cooperation, but had limited impact when it came to 
the translation of the adopted norms into practice. 83 
Apart from the formal transfer of democratic governance, the intangible 
mechanisms of socialisation within EU TG cooperation have also been a subject of 
academic inquiry. In two of her stand-alone articles, Tina Freyburg examines the 
socialisation of Moroccan government officials into the EU’s norms of democratic 
governance as the result of Twinning cooperation. 84  Using a mix of qualitative 
techniques and regression analysis, she finds that EU Twinning projects lead to more 
favourable views on democratic governance among participating public officials, 
especially in less politicised sectors, like the environment. In such a way, she 
concludes, the democratic governance norms could penetrate the authoritarian 
governments from within and lead to invisible processes of democratisation. 
At the same time, other scholars have been somewhat sceptical over the 
effectiveness of the governance model of democracy promotion. First, according to 
Youngs, even the formal transfer of transparency, accountability, and participation to 
another country may require a prior degree of political liberalisation, civil society 
development, and autonomous public institutions, which is not the case in most ENP 
countries.85 Second, he suggests that such “democracy” projects (meaning functional 
cooperation – DP) usually pursue rather technical and specialised objectives, e.g., 
improving the efficiency of a court statistics system, and may have little to do with the 
independence of the judiciary.86 Third, Youngs avers with the other scholars in that 
the philosophy behind TG cooperation is first of all enhancing the administrative 
capacity (read: stabilisation) of public institutions, rather than decentralising political 
power. 
In that spirit, Casier makes a case for traditional intergovernmental tools of 
democracy promotion, which are de facto more effective in promoting formal 
democracy to Ukraine than are TG programs, which promulgate substantive 
democracy at the level of specific policy sectors.87  He concludes that, while Ukraine is 
overall willing to legislate according to the EU’s principles of liberal (formal) democracy, 
the country preserves some havens of power for its bureaucrats when it comes to 
adopting substantive, sector-level democracy. In addition, he claims, the EU could 
mainstream more democratic principles into its TG programmes in order to boost their 
democratisation potential. 
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Anne Wetzel also argues that the EU’s promotion of democratic governance via 
sectoral channels is vulnerable to the same patterns of inconsistency as the 
conventional methods of democracy promotion, relying on leverage and linkage.88 For 
example, she explores the EU’s provisions for participatory governance in the 
regulations on genetically modified organisms, water governance, and fisheries in the 
Eastern neighbourhood countries. She concludes that the EU promotes participatory 
governance only after it makes sure that no economic interests will be hurt, as is the 
case only with water management policy. In the case of genetically modified organisms 
and fisheries, the EU includes fewer provisions for participatory governance due to the 
overriding influences from lobby groups or other relevant actors inside the EU. In such 
a way, Wetzel suggests, EU sectoral cooperation does not always make use of its 
democratising potential.89 
Thus far, my survey of the literature suggests that the EU has reflexively or, more 
often, non-reflexively promoted democratic governance through its current TG 
programmes in the neighbourhood. Scholars have also identified some scope 
conditions, under which the EU’s promotion of democratic governance is more likely 
to happen, as well as discussed the inconsistencies that plague it. What is still missing 
in the literature is an analysis of substance, or the extent to which the norms of 
democratic governance are actually present in EU TG programmes. In other words, to 
what extent does the EU include democratic governance norms in its TG cooperation?90  
What determines the variation of those norms? While the existing studies indicate that 
EU TG cooperation contains references to democratic governance, its actual substance 
has been taken for granted. It is also known that this substance varies depending on 
the project and policy area concerned,91 but the sources of this variation remain 
obscure. Identifying those would allow for more nuanced understanding of EU 
democracy promotion via TG cooperation, as well as reinforce the image of EU TG 
cooperation as a channel of democracy promotion to the neighbouring countries at the 
sectoral level. 
In response to this gap, Article 2 examines to what extent the norms of 
democratic governance are explicitly present in EU TG projects in the neighbourhood 
and what factors account for variation in democratic governance substance across 
cases (Table 1, RQ2, RQ3). While being theoretically grounded in the current works 
on EU democratic governance promotion via TG cooperation92, this article goes a step 
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further by also including the variable of technical complexity in the overall explanation 
of democratic governance substance. This variable, inspired by the public 
administration literature, deals with the question of the extent to which bureaucrats 
and technocrats should exercise immunity from voter preferences and from the laws 
of democratic accountability. I will elaborate further on this debate in the section 
detailing the theoretical tools and concepts of the dissertation. 
3.2.2. Role of MS in EU TG cooperation 
Besides revealing a gap in the understanding of the democratic substance of EU 
TG cooperation, the review of the literature also turned my attention to EU MS as 
important but hitherto overlooked agents of EU TG cooperation in the neighbourhood. 
While being sponsored and supervised by the EU, TG programmes like Twinning rely 
almost exclusively on MS’ policy experts and their experience implementing EU 
directives and regulations. For example, during a bidding process for Twinning 
projects, the beneficiary country picks among several competing proposals by MS, 
predominantly on the basis of the comparative advantages of their administrative 
systems.93 However, the nature of these comparative advantages remains a blind spot 
in the existing literature. Several policy-oriented works focusing on the EU’s Eastern 
enlargement and the ENP have passingly touched on possible comparative advantages 
by MS during Twinning cooperation, such as the quality of expertise, country’s 
reputation, financial and administrative resources, knowledge of local socio-political 
contexts, and the lobbying activities by MS in partner countries.94 According to Elsa 
Tulmets, the comparative advantages of a MS could also be determined through the 
influence it had wielded on the making of EU directives and regulations at the 
supranational EU level.95 Furthermore, Tulmets highlights the personal qualities of MS 
experts and pre-existing bilateral cooperation and personal links between public 
administrations of the countries concerned as possible comparative advantages by 
respective MS.96 
While these bits and pieces of data provide valuable guidance on MS’ 
comparative advantages during the EU’s recent enlargement, they tell us little of the 
MS’ comparative advantages for EU TG cooperation under the ENP, especially as 
perceived by the ENP beneficiaries. This lack of studies is surprising, since the role of 
MS in such cases of EU TG cooperation as Twinning seems pivotal. According to 
Königová et al, one of the strategic lessons learned by Czech Republic during its 
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Twinning projects with the EU is defining and communicating the country’s 
comparative advantage and the unique area of expertise, as well as identifying and 
marketing the value that the country can offer for partner governments.97 One of my 
interviewees went as far as suggesting that, for MS, convincingly spelling out their 
comparative advantage is key to a successful Twinning proposal.98 
Identifying MS’ comparative advantages appears particularly relevant after 
CEECs joined the EU and began to funnel expertise and resources to EU TG 
programmes under the ENP, in tandem with the older MS. Owing to their recent 
transition and market reform experience and close geopolitical and cultural ties with 
the Eastern neighbours, the CEECs have arguably gained an upper hand in working 
with some Eastern neighbourhood countries, as compared to the older MS, the US, or 
other players in the region.99 In addition, most CEECs have been recipients of EU TG 
programmes and assistance by other donors in the past and still bear institutional 
blueprints of their reform paths. On the other hand, the actual ability of CEECs to take 
advantage of their transition experience and closer cultural and political links with the 
Eastern neighbourhood countries has been questioned by scholars.100 Possible reasons 
include the ambiguity of their transition experience and lack of resources for its 
promotion to the Eastern neighbours.101 
In this regard, very little has also been written about the older MS and what 
they can bring on the board for EU TG programmes in the ENP. It is not clear, for 
example, if their institutional reputation, leverage in bilateral cooperation, or former 
experience in transposing EU directives and regulations in their own systems actually 
matter for EU TG programmes in the neighbourhood. The subject has also been treated 
rather superficially by development scholars and EU official documents, looking into 
issues of aid coordination and cross-sector complementarity. 102  While the EU 
development literature has often blamed the lack of aid coordination and 
complementarity on organisational, financial, or national interests among the MS at 
the supranational level, identifying and acknowledging the comparative advantages of 
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MS may be pivotal to the alleviation of those problems not only for the EU’s 
engagement with the Eastern neighbourhood but also internationally. 
In response, I take a closer look at the comparative advantages (added value) 
of CEECs and the older MS for EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood (Table 
1, RQ4). By drawing on extensive interview data supplied by Twinning participants 
from Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the EU MS, Article 3 identifies the stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the comparative advantages by different MS in their respective Twinning 
projects. Thereby, in the course of analysis, I distinguish between CEECs and the older 
MS, as well as offer a novel typology of MS comparative advantages, based on the 
country- and sector-based characteristics of MS concerned. 
3.2.3. Effectiveness of EU TG cooperation 
There would be no rationale in declaring TG cooperation as a promising EU 
democracy promotion tool or a platform for MS to promulgate their sector- and 
country-specific comparative advantages if we had little idea of how effective EU TG 
programmes were in the first place. In addition, most TG cooperation programmes 
pursue policy-specific goals, related to the efficiency of the partner country’s regulatory 
environment. Therefore, it would be unfair to ask questions about the less obvious 
aspects of EU TG cooperation, like democratic governance substance or MS 
comparative advantages, and leaving out what is on the tip of an iceberg – the actual 
performance of EU TG programmes against their declared goals. 
The accession literature analysed EU TG tools as part of the Europeanisation 
scholarship or in stand-alone studies, mostly dealing with institution-building and 
transfer of the acquis to EU would-be members. During that period, the Twinning 
instrument was considered a major tool to reinforce the domestic institutions of CEECs 
in preparation for accession.103 On analysing this topic, Bailey and De Propris pointed 
out the absorption capacity of CEECs and their ability to maintain sustainability of 
results after project completion as two main hindrances to Twinning effectiveness at 
the time.104 They also testified to the low financial commitment of the country’s 
leadership to reform and the inadequate starting expertise of civil servants from CEECs, 
often making Twinning activities fall short of their ambitious agenda.105 Other authors, 
like Tulmets, attributed mixed results in the EU’s institution-building efforts in CEECs 
to the phenomena of “muddling through and institutional hybridisation”, which 
revealed itself in the institutional adaptation of EU acquis to the needs and preferences 
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of the beneficiary on the ground. 106 Moreover, Tulmets questioned the relevance of 
Twinning in the context of other similar tools at EU’s disposal.107 
Several other accession studies drew on the theoretical premises of the 
Europeanisation literature by evaluating the impact of specific EU TG tools on the 
approximation of CEECs to EU legal standards. For example, in her other article, 
Tulmets employed a sociological institutionalist perspective on Europeanisation and 
socialisation by discussing to what extent Twinning projects affected policies and 
institutions of CEECs during enlargement.108 In line with Bailey and De Propris’ and 
relevant Commission’s reports, Tulmets suggested that Twinning was weaker in 
reforming organisations in CEEC according to an almost non-existing European model 
of public administration than in transferring know-how to these countries. 109  In 
conceptually linking the Twinning instrument to the processes of Europeanisation in 
the “wider Europe”, Papadimitriou and Phinnemore discussed Twinning as a tool to 
export Europeanisation through reforming the administrative machinery of accession 
countries.110 In the context of Romania and Bulgaria, their case study, the authors 
pointed to the need for rigorous evaluation of the effectiveness of Twinning, as well 
as some of its perceived weaknesses, such as the politicised process of selection of 
Twinning partners or a lack of experienced PAAs (pre-accession advisers). 111  In 
addition, they blamed the inadequate design of the Twinning programme, high 
institutional fluidity, politicisation, and lacking commitment of the Twinning 
beneficiaries for the insufficient level of domestic change in Romania.112 In a similar 
vein to Phinnemore and Papadimitriou, Grabbe discussed Twinning as a policy advice 
tool the EU used to affect governance in CEECs, apart from other tools like gate-
keeping in negotiations, provision of legislative and institutional templates, 
benchmarking, and financial aid.113 She blamed the diversity between current EU MS 
and the interaction of Europeanisation with other confounding explanations for the 
diverse impacts of the EU in the region.114  
Following the Eastern enlargement, the scholarly interest in institution-building 
as a primary vehicle of Europeanisation has subsided. However, TG instruments made 
a comeback as part of the new theoretical understanding of the EU’s normative power 
and role in the near abroad. There has been a growing body of literature discussing 
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EU external governance, which draws on functional cooperation channels between the 
EU and the neighbouring countries as a medium of EU regulatory transfer. With an 
arrival of the ENP and the Wider Europe Initiative, the EU could use external 
governance to manage relations with its new neighbours as it did during the recent 
enlargement.115 Sandra Lavenex points out two rationales behind the EU extending its 
norms to the neighbouring countries. First, the EU seeks to improve the efficiency and 
problem-solving capacity of the recipient governments.116 And second, by extending 
its internal regulations to the neighbourhood, the EU may contribute to its major 
external policy objective for a stable and prosperous neighbourhood.117 
In that context, TG cooperation was associated with a shift from traditional 
membership conditionality tools towards so called network governance, drawing on 
horizontal, voluntarist, and inclusive approaches to rule transfer via sectoral 
channels.118 Under the ENP, studies on a hierarchical policy transfer by the EU have 
still been common due to the power asymmetries and interdependencies between the 
EU and its neighbours. At the same time, TG cooperation has been hailed as an 
alternative, network-based form of EU external governance that came to replace the 
hierarchical policy transfer, peculiar for the accession negotiations.119 Inspired by the 
neo-functionalist ideas, Lavenex argued that the effectiveness of EU external 
governance would be higher in more technical and less politicised areas of functional 
cooperation.120 Contrary to that, functional cooperation proceeding in highly politicised 
areas would resort to some form of hierarchical means or, as Delcour called it, the 
“shadow of hierarchy”.121 Subsequent contributions to the EU external governance 
scholarship have specified more conditions for an effective rule transfer via sectoral 
channels by conceptualising the effectiveness of TG networks through their ability to 
promote norms of democratic governance to the countries of the Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhoods. 122  They view rule adoption and application as a function of 
codification of rules, sector politicisation, costs of domestic rule adoption, and 
internationalisation.123 
In addition to the external governance scholarship, several studies in 
Europeanisation under the ENP have mentioned EU sectoral cooperation as a vehicle 
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of policy transfer to the non-candidate countries.124 For example, Börzel addresses the 
potential of the TACIS programme125 for good governance promotion in the areas of 
limited statehood.126 Langbein and Wolczuk also express reserved optimism over the 
EU’s ability to foster convergence of technical regulations in Ukraine via sectoral 
channels.127 Works by Delcour and Ademmer uncover examples of adoption and limited 
application of EU norms in the Eastern neighbourhood countries in response to the 
EU’s sectoral incentives. Several Commission’s reports and policy-related analytics 
have also evaluated the performance of Twinning, TAIEX, and SIGMA programmes in 
the EU’s neighbourhood. They have identified a variety of issues plaguing such 
programs, for example, low levels of political commitment of the beneficiary country, 
inflexibility of some TG instruments, and mismatch between expectations on the 
ground and what EU TG tools have to offer. 128  Interestingly, those issues seem 
common for both TG programmes in the accession period and under the ENP. That 
generally supports the proposition that an EU membership perspective may not 
necessarily be decisive in the effectiveness of EU norm transfer via TG cooperation. 
While the extant research has to a degree addressed general problems and 
shortcoming with EU TG programmes, studies of their effectiveness are few. Such lack 
of coverage stems in part from the methodological and empirical constraints accessing 
people and data related to EU TG cooperation, which are often unavailable or 
confidential. However, more importantly, the Europeanisation and external governance 
literature have failed to provide an adequate theoretical lens to approach the 
performance of specific TG programmes. First of all, the majority of the theoretically 
informed accounts on the issue have operated on the macro-level of analysis. While 
discussing EU TG cooperation with the ENP countries, they have usually positioned 
themselves within the entirety of EU foreign policy tools (like conditionality, diplomatic 
persuasion, budget support, and transnational involvement of civil society). Such an 
approach, while having a theoretical value for exploring the overall EU’s impact in the 
region, has little applicability to specific TG programs, such as Twinning. On the other 
hand, those few policy-oriented analyses that directly target Twinning and other TG 
tools have also not addressed the question “To what extent have EU TG programmes 
been effective?” (Table 1, RQ5). While delineating at some depth the most common 
shortcomings of those programs, those policy-oriented works are still lacking a viable 
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analytical tool, capable of determining whether a particular project has been effective 
or not. 
Secondly, the available literature has generated a comprehensive list of 
variables, which may facilitate or hinder the achievement of objectives and goals of EU 
TG cooperation in partner countries. Such works give us some initial understanding of 
how EU TG programmes are or should be performing. Yet, what conditions lead to 
effective and ineffective TG projects? What conditions result in the success or failure 
of a particular TG project? What should be considered a success or failure 
(effectiveness or ineffectiveness)? It is hard to answer those definitively only after 
reviewing the state of the art and the data that have so far been collected by 
researchers (Table 1, RQ6). Since EU TG programmes like Twinning operate at the 
level of specific public administrations, mainstream Europeanisation and external 
governance paradigms do not appear adequate to glean the full depth of factors at 
play in such cooperation. It makes it necessary then to look for insights in the public 
administration and management literatures in order to complete the existing 
theoretical frameworks dealing with the democratic governance substance and 
effectiveness of EU TG cooperation. Moreover, what should be questioned is the 
predominant view of TG cooperation as a mechanism of EU soft power via learning 
and socialisation.129 The priorities in EU TG cooperation projects like Twinning are 
clearly linked to the terms of APs, PCAs, and more recently the DCFTAs, which bring 
some EU conditionality back into the equation. I believe EU TG instruments should be 
considered in the most recent context of EU-Eastern neighbourhood relations, 
including the available incentives and costs of complying with EU norms, and not only 
as channels of intangible rule transfer. 
Those issues are not trivial, as they may and should constitute the policy-
relevant and academic evaluations of ongoing EU TG programs under the ENP or 
elsewhere. Methodologically sound and reliable answers to those questions will help 
the EU customise individual TG projects in the Eastern neighbourhood and spot 
recurring issues with its TG cooperation in other geographical regions. As of yet, 
empirical data are too patchy to make satisfactory conclusions about the performance 
of EU TG instruments in general or in specific regions under the ENP. I begin engaging 
those issues with the premise that, owing to the standardised, contractual nature of 
EU TG programmes, it should be possible to devise a replicable conceptual and 
methodological approach to analysing the effectiveness of current and future EU TG 
programmes. 
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4. Theoretical tools and concepts 
In order to address the research questions, discussed in the previous section, I 
draw on interdisciplinary insights from democracy promotion, development 
cooperation, and public administration literatures. This outward-looking approach will 
refine and complete the theoretical frameworks found in the Europeanisation and EU 
external governance scholarship, as well as contribute to a better dialogue among 
scholarly works pertaining to TG cooperation.130 The following sections review briefly 
several useful concepts and theories dealing with EU TG cooperation. First, I start with 
clarifying the various uses of the term “governance” and introducing the new concept 
of “democratic governance substance”, which will be used in the analysis of EU TG 
programs in the Eastern neighbourhood (RQ2 and RQ3). Second, one of the 
hypothesised determinants of democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation 
– technical complexity – is positioned within the politics-administration debate in the 
literature on public administration and EU politics (RQ3). Third, the notions and 
typologies of MS comparative advantages and added value are clarified with reference 
to the EU democracy promotion and development cooperation literature (RQ4). Finally, 
I take on the concept of the EU’s effectiveness, as used in Article 4, and link that 
concept with the on-going debate on Normative Power Europe and other approaches 
to viewing the EU’s role abroad (RQ5 and 6). 
4.1. From Governance to Democratic Governance 
Substance 
One puzzling, perhaps confusing, aspect that the reader may have found reading 
the formulation of the research problem is the multiple uses of the term governance. 
Democratic governance, good governance, external governance, network governance, 
and simply governance (to cite a few) are all the terms that are so frequently used 
and abused in the literature. The word “governance” comes from the Greek word 
“kybenan” and “kybernetes”, meaning “to steer” (cybernetics also come from it).131 
According to Rosenau, governance refers to governments’ activities in framing goals, 
issuing directives, and pursuing policies.132 Kooiman expands this definition to “all 
those activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as 
purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage societies”. 133  Just like TG 
cooperation, the concept of governance has come on a scholarly and policymaking 
arena to break up or revisit the idea of a government and nation-state by including 
into the equation a variety of non-state actors, domestic and international. It was also 
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called to revisit the existing boundaries of government-society interactions through 
developing new models of partnership like co-management, co-steering, and co-
guidance. 134  In their development assistance programmes, however, the Bretton 
Woods institutions and, later, the European Commission have generally continued 
placing the government in the core of governance.  
In order to foster market reform and fight corruption and inefficiency in the 
governments of less developed countries, the World Bank first introduced the concept 
of good governance to its structural adjustment policies in the late 1980s.135 In 2000, 
the EU included its first binding clause relating to good governance into the Cotonou 
Agreement with the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. This 
document defined “good governance” as “the transparent and accountable 
management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of 
equitable and sustainable development”. 136  Consequent to that, poor or bad 
governance stood for a lack of good governance. 
Following the “big bang” enlargement and the necessity to re-think its relations 
with the new neighbours under the ENP, the EU adopted an explicitly political meaning 
of governance by introducing the concept of “democratic governance” in its official 
communications.137 This represented a further shift from the World Bank’s technocratic 
approach to policy reforms towards those associated with democratic legitimacy and 
public accountability. Although the EU did not make an effort to clarify the resulting 
confusion between good and democratic governance in terms of conceptual 
boundaries, the democratic governance in the EU’s usage does seem, beyond the 
traditional focus on more effective public management, to imply a stronger emphasis 
on the transparency and accountability of the country’s authorities before the general 
public.138  
At about the same time, some scholars described EU relations with the new 
neighbours under the ENP as an extension of the EU’s internal governance beyond its 
borders and coined such an extension EU external governance.139  Those authors 
designated three institutional forms or modes in which the EU extended its governance 
abroad: hierarchy, markets, and networks.140 Hierarchical governance refers to the 
patterns of domination-subordination between the EU and the ENP countries, as seen 
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in the existence of precise rules, procedures, monitoring, and even sanctioning for 
non-compliance. 141  Hierarchical governance was more common under the rigid 
framework of accession; however, even under the ENP, some forms of hierarchical 
governance have prevailed, e.g., sectoral or policy conditionality. 142  The market 
governance relies on the market forces of competition among autonomous actors, 
which operate under the regulatory framework of the European Single Market.143 
Market governance is common among the countries of the European Economic Area 
and has little relevance for the ENP countries yet. Finally, the network governance is 
based on a relationship between two formally equal actors and refer to “a strongly 
institutionalised and unified system of ongoing horizontal co-ordination” between the 
EU and its neighbours.144 The network-type of EU external governance best describes 
EU TG cooperation programmes under the ENP.145 In sum, TG cooperation in the ENP 
is considered a tool of network governance, through which the EU may promote 
democratic governance and regulatory standards to the neighbours concerned. 
As for democratic governance, the ambiguity over its precise meaning still 
prevails among scholars, who have offered multiple definitions of the concept in order 
to match their analytical tools and theoretical approaches.146 According to Brinkerhoff, 
for example, “democratic governance combines features of a political regime in which 
citizens hold the right to govern themselves (democracy) with structures and 
mechanisms that are used to manage public affairs according to accepted rules and 
procedures (governance).”147 This definition resonates with the broad understanding 
of democratic governance by the EU and some authors.148 However, by including a bit 
of everything, such formulation breeds more conceptual vagueness than it eliminates. 
Börzel et al. adopt a clearer and narrower view on democratic governance by 
presenting it as an integral part of EU good governance promotion. It pursues input-
oriented objectives, such as inclusion of citizen preferences into public decision-
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making, and operates at the transnational level of relations between the EU and the 
partner country. 149  While deserving some praise for its succinctness, this 
conceptualisation of democratic governance has found little resonance among 
scholarly circles. 
My understanding of democratic governance has been inspired by EU external 
governance scholars, who view it as a tri-dimensional construct of transparency, 
accountability, and participation. 150  In other words, the governance of a public 
institution is considered democratic if it operates on the principles of transparency, 
accountability, and participation in its everyday decision-making, dealings with the 
general public, and the state. As mentioned earlier, the available literature provides a 
relatively good discussion of EU democratic governance promotion, its most common 
issues, typologies, and impacts. 151  However, what seems to be missing is the 
comprehensive analysis of the “what” or substance of EU democratic governance 
promotion in the neighbourhood. Democracy promotion scholars have already 
categorised and explored the substance of EU democracy promotion in the ENP 
countries.152 Börzel et al have also looked at the substance of EU good governance 
promotion and how it varied in response to domestic conditions in Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
and Georgia. 153  In line with those works, I decided to introduce a new concept 
pertaining to the substance of EU democratic governance promotion, or democratic 
governance substance. 
Democratic governance substance refers to the presence of democratic 
governance norms in a specific instance of EU foreign policy. According to its 
configuration (domination of specific norms), democratic governance substance may 
be transparency-oriented, accountability-oriented, participation-oriented, and mixed. 
According to its magnitude (overall degree of presence), democratic governance 
substance may be low, medium, and high.154 In explaining the variation of democratic 
governance substance across various EU TG projects, I mostly rely on variables 
commonly found in the EU external governance and Europeanisation literature, like 
sector politicisation and country’s political liberalisation. However, the third variable, 
sector technical complexity, hypothesised to be inversely related to the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG cooperation, has been inspired by a debate over the 
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politics-administration dichotomy. The next subsection briefly introduces the reader to 
this debate. 
4.2. Professionalism vs. democratic accountability 
The tension between expert rule and democracy goes back to the times of 
Woodrow Wilson and his seminal work “Study of Administration”, which deals with a 
fine balance between bureaucrats and politicians. Politics, Wilson wrote, are “the 
special province of the statesman, while administration [is] of the technical official.” 
155 Johann Bluntschli, a Swiss lawyer and politician, also argued that politics were state 
activity “in things great and universal”, while administration was “the activity of the 
state in individual and small things.”156 The politics-administration dichotomy implies 
there should be a way to separate politics and administration, in particular to single 
out administration and study it as a technical skill without getting bogged down with 
political complexities. Wilson illustrated this point by encouraging adoption of best 
practices in administration from other countries, while not necessarily embracing the 
political aspects thereof: 
If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of 
sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; 
and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn 
his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his 
king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well 
as he serves his.157 
The idea of politics-administration dichotomy has had a number of important 
implications for scientists and policymakers. First, it has introduced public 
administration as a distinct from political science field, concerned with the day-to-day 
running of the government. Second, it has pushed for civil service reforms across the 
globe in a bid to foster neutral, merit-based, and professional bureaucracies, which 
would serve the citizenry in an efficient and even business-like manner. However, as 
the discipline of public administration has evolved and various areas of governmental 
work have become more specialised and technocratic, the process of policymaking in 
certain policy sectors has grown increasingly isolated not only from political 
interference but also from the voter’s preferences. It is not clear anymore to what 
extent the activities of bureaucrats should be insulated not only from the undesired 
partisan influences but also from the citizenry, which those bureaucrats are expected 
to serve. 
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On the one hand, there are prominent examples of independent public 
institutions run by professionals, like central banks (including European Central Bank) 
or accreditation bodies, working with extremely specialised knowledge and precise 
technical regulations. There is a widespread view that the success and stability of those 
institutions lies precisely in their autonomy from the political perturbations, meaning 
in many cases exemption from accountability to the voter.158 On the other hand, the 
nature and degree of bureaucratic independence has been a bone of contention among 
public administration theorists and political scientists.159 For example, this debate has 
dominated a series of works on the EU’s democratic deficit and increasing 
independence of EU institutions from the electoral preferences of citizens.160 While 
generally concurring that the magnitude of the EU’s democratic deficit is a matter of 
the specific conceptual lenses employed, those works seem to also imply that such 
areas as market regulation, monetary and welfare policy, and other policy-specific 
domains should be the preserve of experts.161 
While recognising the importance of democratic legitimacy and accountability 
inside the EU or elsewhere, I rather side with Wilson in that some public institutions 
are and should be independent from political leadership and citizenry. If administration 
is a skill, like a doctor’s profession, it cannot be allowed to be meddled with by laymen. 
Based on this assumption, one of the hypotheses in Article 3 says that, with a rising 
technical complexity of a policy sector, we will see fewer democratic governance 
norms, as that policy sector will be less open to the outsiders. That is not to say that 
such technically complex sectors will be more prone to authoritarian tendencies, if only 
the political system in general has sufficient checks and balances in place. Everyday 
voters may simply not be interested in contributing to something they do not delight 
in or understand. Although somewhat commonsensical, the factor of technical 
complexity, to my best knowledge, has never been conceptualised by the studies of 
Europeanisation or EU external governance both in the period of enlargement and 
under the ENP. More importantly, introduction of the variable of technical complexity 
fine-tunes my theoretical expectations of the democratic governance substance of EU 
TG cooperation. 
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4.3. Comparative advantages of EU member states 
First introduced in writings by classical economists, the basic concept of 
comparative advantage refers to the country’s ability to manufacture a product or 
render a service at a lower rate than another country.162 In later writings, the concept 
of comparative advantage also included such factors as the varying efficiency of 
production by different players in the international economy.163 In the context of this 
work, a comparative advantage refers to the specific sectoral expertise offered by a 
MS or a group thereof to an ENP partner. An added value is then a composite of all 
comparative advantages of a MS or a group thereof. The European Commission, in its 
communication on development, has stressed the importance of understanding the 
comparative advantages by different MS in order to improve the efficiency and 
coordination of its foreign aid in less developed countries.164 EU development scholars 
have also argued for the consolidation of strengths and efforts by different MS in EU 
development cooperation abroad.165  
Therefore, Article 3 focuses on the comparative advantages of EU MS for EU TG 
programmes in the Eastern neighbourhood. There should be a small disclaimer here 
that TG programs are not development programs in a strict sense, though they bear 
some resemblance in that they help partner countries in building up public institutions. 
Nonetheless, because EU TG programmes like Twinning rely heavily on experts and 
best practices from EU MS, they present a salient case for the analysis of MS 
comparative advantages outside the EU development literature. To narrow it down 
even further, the comparative advantages of old MS and CEECs will be contrasted. The 
CEECs, who had themselves been recipients of Western development and democracy 
aid, including EU TG programmes during enlargement, have increasingly turned 
eastwards in a bid to pay it forward.166 Because of their recent democratisation and 
market reform experience, close geopolitical and cultural ties with the Eastern 
neighbours, and unique regional foreign policy priorities, CEECs have reportedly gained 
an upper hand in working with the Eastern neighbourhood countries, as compared to 
the old MS, the US, or other donors.167 In addition, most CEECs have developed 
substantial credibility in the eyes of their Eastern neighbours, something most other 
donors wish to have.168 
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However, the most contentious comparative advantage of CEECs is their recent 
transition experience. According to the European Transition Compendium (ETC), the 
process of transition involves a two-folded path from autocracy and centrally planned 
economy to democratic and market-based institutions. 169  In addition to 
democratisation and marketisation, some academicians also underscore the 
importance of building up a strong state.170 The ETC provides a list of self-reported 
areas of public policy and administration where CEECs have attained some success 
and can serve a useful starting point for understanding the comparative advantages 
of those countries. However, in their study of the Visegrad Four countries (Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic), Szent-Iványi and Tétényi report that none of 
the Visegrad countries have thus far factored in perceived comparative advantages in 
their foreign assistance policies.171 To add insult to injury, some of these self-reported 
comparative advantages display a significant degree of overlap among the different 
CEECs and ambiguity in definitions. Another conceptual problem with transition 
experience is that the process of democratisation and economic development is still 
well underway in most CEECs, and it would be unfair to consider it a finite destination, 
which the Eastern neighbourhood countries are scrambling to reach. Because of those 
problems, I was also originally sceptical over the significance of CEECs’ transition 
experience for EU TG cooperation. However, as the analysis in Article 3 will 
demonstrate, I was wrong. 
Although there is no document like ETC listing the comparative advantages of 
the older MS, the latter also contribute to EU TG projects in meaningful ways. Their 
contribution is largely seen in their more active participation in Twinning projects as 
compared to CEECs.172 For example, Königová writes, the older MS have accumulated 
considerable experience of both facilitating administrative reform in accession 
candidates and leading institution-building activities in the ENP countries with no 
membership perspective. 173  The older MS with their relatively well-developed 
bureaucracies may thus present a role model for the less developed administrations of 
the Eastern neighbourhood countries. There are also accounts that some older MS, 
especially the larger ones in terms of territory, may be in a better position to assist 
similar-sized neighbours in reforming their administrative systems.174 However, what 
the older MS seem to lack is the recent institutional memory of sectoral reforms, which 
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makes it more difficult for them to embrace the strikingly different administrative 
reality of many post-Soviet countries.  
Hence, in addressing RQ4 (Article 3), I assume that the older MS will mostly boast 
of sector-specific comparative advantages, related to their administrative reform 
experience, existing sectoral networks and sectoral fit with the ENP countries, and prior 
Twinning experience. In contrast, CEECs are hypothesised to mostly offer country-
specific comparative advantages, which present as recent transition and accession 
experience, socio-linguistic proximity, and shared historical legacies with the Eastern 
neighbourhood partners. 
4.4. EU Power and Effectiveness  
This manuscript directly or indirectly deploys the concept of “effectiveness” as 
referring to the EU’s normative power (Article 1) and as a micro-level structural 
characteristic of EU TG cooperation programmes (Articles 2, 3, 4). Any discussion of 
the effectiveness of EU TG cooperation links to the question of the EU’s actorness and 
international identity. One of the most prominent scholarly debates engaging the 
meaning of the EU’s identity on the global arena is one of Normative Power Europe 
(NPE).175 This debate focuses on what kind of power Europe is, both as a self-image 
and in the perception of others. Thus far, scholars converge on the point that the EU 
cannot be considered a typical nation state of the post-Westphalian order.176 In order 
to differentiate the EU from the idea of a traditional power in the state-centric system 
of coordinates, commentators have attached various conceptual labels to the EU’s 
actorness. For example, Duchêne viewed the European Community as a “civilian”, not 
military, power in international relations, especially as regards the preservation of 
peace.177 The fact that, since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, 
the EU has managed to keep peaceful relations between its member states imparts a 
degree of validity to that claim.178 
Other scholars criticised the notion of “civilian power” for its overlooking the 
importance of military capabilities and coercive means, particularly in the context of 
the Cold War.179 Bull and Hill, for example, were sceptical about the EU’s civilian power 
without a solid nuclear deterrence program and conventional armed forces. 180 
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However, with the dissolution of the USSR, this view lost its relevance and the debate 
shifted from what kind of power the EU was towards the power of EU norms. For 
example, Whitman argued that, even if the EU acquired military capabilities, it would 
not necessarily invalidate its image as a civilian power.181 Manners regarded the EU as 
a unique international actor with its specific historical path, hybrid polity, and 
constitutional configuration, which inform its normative behaviour on the international 
arena.182 Ever since Manners’ publication on Normative Power Europe, the EU literature 
has speculated over whether the EU has lived up to its self-imposed image.183 
These studies have concentrated, for example, on the extent to which EU norms 
are viewed as legitimate in other countries and how effective the EU power is. The 
normative power of the EU has mostly been found to depend on the EU’s ability to 
properly construct its normative image, practise consistency, factor in domestic 
contexts, and have the neighbourhood countries not only formally adopt the 
democratic norms but also institutionalise them in everyday government practices.184 
Empirical scholarship has demonstrated that the idea of normative power has proved 
inconsistent and lacking strength in cases where the EU used normative rhetoric to 
mask its own security interests.185 A way to summarise this debate would be to say 
that the EU’s power in spreading its norms depends on both the validity of those norms 
in view of the beneficiary and the EU’s tools in making such norm diffusion occur 
despite possible setbacks. Thus, in defining and analysing the effectiveness of EU 
democracy promotion in the neighbourhood (Article 1), I draw on the normative 
understanding of the EU’s power. I examine to what extent the EU’s power to advance 
its democratisation agenda in the neighbourhood has manifested itself in the policy 
contexts, agency, and instruments of EU democracy promotion in the ENP. 
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Another common way in EU studies to conceptualise the EU’s effectiveness is by 
evaluating several consecutive stages of EU norm transfer to the target country. Under 
the norm (rule) transfer, scholars have implied three consecutive stages: norm 
selection, norm adoption, and norm implementation.186 Norm selection determines 
whether and to what extent EU norms are viewed as “the normative reference point” 
in EU-third country relations.187 Norm adoption indicates whether and to what extent 
the selected norms are transposed into the domestic legislation of a country. Finally, 
norm application refers to the extent to which the adopted norms are effectively acted 
upon in political and administrative settings.188 Some observers also add the fourth 
stage – norm internalisation – which defines the acceptance of new rules among all 
stakeholders involved.189 These concepts can often be found in the available scholarly 
analyses of EU democracy and democratic governance promotion and transfer of the 
acquis.  
While not directly engaging the concept of effectiveness, Articles 2 and 3 shed 
more light on all the three stages of EU norm transfer. For example, Article 2, by 
exploring the democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation, deals with the 
first stage – norm selection. It finds that Twinning projects in politically liberalised 
countries, politicised and non-complex policy sectors tend to include more norms of 
transparency, accountability, and participation. As indicated in the concluding chapter, 
the EU may use these dynamics to make democratic governance promotion through 
TG cooperation more explicit and, perhaps, more effective as a consequence. Article 3 
implicitly engages both norm adoption and implementation by examining the perceived 
effectiveness, or added value, of different groups of MS for EU TG cooperation in the 
Eastern neighbourhood. This perceived effectiveness is derived from a number of 
country-and sector-specific comparative advantages, which CEECs and the older MS 
bring on the table. 
In contrast to Articles 2 and 3, Article 4 attends to the concept of the EU’s 
effectiveness in a more direct and structural manner by evaluating specific cases of EU 
TG cooperation, i.e., Twinning projects. It conceptualises effectiveness as a fact of 
legal or institutional convergence occurring in the beneficiary institution and country 
as the result of specific instances of EU TG cooperation and in accordance with its 
declared objectives. The concepts of legal and institutional convergence have mostly 
been inspired by the existing Europeanisation literature.190 Legal convergence refers 
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to the passage by the beneficiary country of a new law, secondary legislation, relevant 
amendments, or decrees, which draw on the EU acquis and bilateral agreements 
between the EU and the country in question. Institutional convergence stands for the 
organisational and policy changes in the beneficiary institution or policy sector in line 
with the EU’s policy recommendations. Interestingly, since EU TG cooperation 
encourages reforms at different levels of government, legal and institutional 
convergence normally present as two independent outcomes. That goes against a 
common view in the Europeanisation and EU external governance studies, suggesting 
that norm adoption precedes norm application (implementation). Indeed, findings from 
Article 4 confirm that the institutional convergence of the beneficiary institution occurs 
independently or in parallel to the legal convergence. 
Elsewhere throughout this work, when speaking about EU foreign policy in the 
ENP, I also resort to concepts such as influence, impact, effect, and their synonyms in 
reference to the EU and its norms. While presenting a pronounced variation in the 
semantic sense (Table 2), these concepts and their variation bear no analytical value 
in the context of this work and are mostly used interchangeably. 
 
Table 2. Semantic usage of power, effectiveness, and the related concepts191 
Concept Definition # uses 
effectiveness 1. Power to be effective; the quality of being able to bring about 
an effect; 2. [derived from adjective “effective”] productive or 
capable of producing a result. 
97 
impact 1. The act of one body, object, etc., striking another; collision; 
2. The impression made by an idea, cultural movement, social 
group, etc. 
61 
power 1. Ability or capacity to do something; 2. Political, financial, 
social, etc., force or influence; 3. A prerogative, privilege, or 
liberty. 
51 
influence 1. An effect of one person or thing on another; 2. The power of 
a person or thing to have such an effect; 3. Power or sway 
resulting from ability, wealth, position, etc. 
20 
ability 1. possession of the qualities required to do something; 
necessary skill, competence, or power; 2. considerable 
proficiency; natural capability. 
11 
effect 1. Something that is produced by a cause or agent; result; 2. 
power or ability to influence or produce a result; efficacy; 3. the 
condition of being operative (esp. in the phrases in or into 
effect). 
6 
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5. Philosophical background 
In reading about the philosophy of science and its importance for the social 
sciences in particular, I came across an interesting opinion by sociologist John Hughes, 
who likened the relationship between philosophy and the social sciences to the parable 
of the prodigal son. 
Like petulant adolescents, the social sciences, having been born and nurtured within the 
familial fold of philosophy, reject their parentage, squander their inheritance, only to 
return for refuge and succour when “the going gets tough”. Since developing as relatively 
autonomous disciplines, the social sciences have tended to re-examine, and seek support 
from, their philosophical foundations only during periods of crisis; when tried and 
hitherto trusted methods no longer seem to justify the faith originally invested in them, 
when researchers lose confidence in the significance of their findings, and when obvious 
and taken-for-granted principles no longer seem quite so clear and obvious.192 
Both in contrast and in addition to Hughes, I believe it ought to be possible to 
mitigate such scientific “crises” by acknowledging and staying close to “the familial fold 
of philosophy” in the process of social research. Normally, doing so requires some 
discussion of the philosophical aspects of ontology and epistemology. Ontology is 
concerned with the notion of reality and asks a question: “What kinds of things are out 
there?” Epistemology then inquires: “What is the character of your knowledge about 
the world?” These two facets of philosophy are interrelated, because the questions 
about reality almost automatically lead to questions on how to gain the knowledge 
about it. I position myself within the positivist approach to ontology, which argues that 
empirical knowledge can never penetrate to the “essence” of phenomena, but deal 
only with their surface appearances or indications.193 Positivists also believe that there 
is an independent reality out there, which is resistant to analysis and will never be fully 
understood.194 Epistemologically, however, I share in the view of the constructivist 
tradition, claiming that knowledge, in particular about social phenomena, is 
constructed by the researcher, his/her respondents, or the sources of data he/she 
uses.195 While acknowledging this subjective normative and ideational component in 
my epistemology, my aspiration and focus has been on neutral and objective 
observation, identifying causality, and producing limited generalisations. 
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6. Research design & methods 
Most of the articles comprising this dissertation follow a mixed-methods research 
design, accommodating both qualitative and quantitative forms of scientific inquiry.196 
Those choices are the result of my specific research questions and the philosophical 
assumptions described above. Mixed-method research “involves the use of both 
approaches in tandem” so that the overall strength of a study is greater than either 
qualitative or quantitative research.197  In bringing this research together I followed an 
iterative process, which involved multiple false starts, stepping back, re-evaluations, 
and readjustments in response to new empirical information and theoretical insights.198 
The following sections review such aspects of my research design as case selection, 
data collection, and analytical methods. 
6.1. Case selection 
Any case-based research confronts often uneasy choices about cases, what they 
are, and how to select them. As the result, any attempt to demarcate them follows an 
artificial process of drawing boundaries and making difficult choices of inclusion or 
exclusion.199 The selection of cases for my articles was tailor-made to the research 
questions being asked, along with the theoretical, empirical, and methodological 
challenges surrounding the research process. On a broader level, after the literature 
review on the effectiveness of democracy promotion, I decided to continue studying 
EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood and Twinning instrument as its most 
prominent case. I did not refer to Twinning as the most likely, most crucial, or the 
most typical case200 (though such formulation may often be true), because different 
research questions that I pursued would require a fresh perspective on what my cases 
were. Nevertheless, I had compelling reasons for considering Twinning as a case of 
high empirical salience for studying EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood.  
The Twinning instrument was introduced in 1998, in order to create a platform 
for MS ministries to give advice and assistance to CEECs in preparation for their EU 
membership.201 A typical Twinning project entails a long-term, full-time secondment of 
MS ministry officials and experts with a purpose of creating or reinforcing the 
administrative institutions of CEECs. The end goal is transposition and implementation 
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of the acquis communautaire in line with the EU accession criteria. 202  After the 
Twinning instrument was introduced to the non-candidate countries under the ENP, 
the European Commission attached its priorities to the bilateral Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), Action Plans (APs), and the prospects of a DCFTA 
between the EU and the respective countries.203 While at the core of a Twinning project 
is a Permanent Accession Advisor (or Resident Twinning Advisor under the ENP), who 
manages the project for its entire duration, Twinning also attracts medium- and short-
term experts from EU MS, who contribute to various project components. 204 The 
Twinning instrument emphasises the demand-driven approach and domestic 
ownership by the beneficiary. Since 1998, there have been close to 2,500 Twinning 
projects, with an average budget of one million euros each. Out of that number, 
approximately 250 projects have been implemented under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Twinning projects in the ENP region, by country, 2004-2016 205 
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Compared to the other, more expensive institution-building tools at the EU’s 
disposal, such as Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB), Twinning costs less, but it 
also provides no direct budget support or grants, as is the case with the CIB. The main 
focus of Twinning on joint problem-solving through a cross-border partnership 
between public agencies also makes it the most typical case of TG cooperation, 
according to the original conceptualisation by Keohane and Nye. 206  In addition, 
Twinning has a number of important distinctions from EU classical technical assistance 
(e.g., TACIS and TAIEX), like demand-driven approach and emphasis on public, rather 
than private, expertise in the process of cooperation (Table 3). However, the most 
important distinction of Twinning from similar tools by the EU lies in the peer-to-peer 
character of TG cooperation between civil servants, with the duration long enough to 
build meaningful interpersonal ties and effect a lasting change in the beneficiary 
administration. 
Table 3. Twinning versus classic technical assistance programs by the EU207 
Twinning Classic Technical Assistance 
? Peer-to-peer cooperation and direct EU 
MS public sector expertise 
? Twinning contracts with EU MS 
(originally called “covenants”) 
? “Mandatory results” jointly agreed upon 
? Approximation with the EU Acquis and 
best practices related to EU legislation 
and institutional capacity building 
? Political commitment highly desirable 
? EU MS selected upon quality of 
proposal with special focus on the RTA 
? Direct and active involvement of the 
beneficiaries required 
? High sustainability level due to prior 
capacity of beneficiary administration 
? Demand-driven approach 
? Private expertise 
 
? Service contracts with external 
consultants 
 
? Provision of outputs and deliverables  
? Any cooperation-related subject 
 
? Political commitment desirable, but 
not always necessary 
? Bid selected on the basis of quality 
and budget  
? Direct involvement of the 
beneficiaries less required in project 
implementation 
? Justified by beneficiary institution’s 
insufficient level of development 
 
The Twinning instrument also makes a good case for the research questions 
asked in this dissertation. Regarding MS comparative advantages (Article 3, RQ 4), for 
example, Twinning cooperation creates an “administrative market”, where 
beneficiaries can cherry pick the MS system that fits them best.208 For bidding, a MS 
institution shall specify clearly the comparative advantages it brings for the 
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beneficiary.209 This comparative advantage may come at several levels, for example: 
the sectoral experience of a MS in specific areas of policy making, the hands-on 
knowledge of EU acquis, the personal demeanour, expertise, and management skills 
of RTAs and other MS experts. According to my interviewee, communicating this 
comparative advantage clearly and convincingly may be key to winning a Twinning 
project.210 Therefore, Twinning projects may be the most likely case to reveal the 
comparative advantages of participating MS. No other EU instrument allows such a 
lengthy, institutionalised, and competitive process of MS selection and participation as 
Twinning does. In addition, the fact that MS often join in a consortium makes it 
extremely interesting to compare the comparative advantages that different MS 
contribute to Twinning projects (Article 3). Establishing the comparative advantages 
(added value) of CEECs and the older MS would also allow for some generalisation to 
other instances of MS participation in EU foreign and development policy, as well as to 
Twinning projects in other EU foreign policy frameworks.  
Another differentiating characteristic of Twinning from other EU TG tools is its 
emphasis on a jointly agreed set of objectives, or mandatory results. Every Twinning 
project is obliged to foster a new or adapted system, a process or a procedure in 
policymaking that will continue functioning under the sole responsibility and ownership 
of the beneficiary country.211 Since the mandatory results are jointly agreed upon with 
the beneficiary, they are expected to reflect the current needs and priorities of the ENP 
country. This fact, combined with the detailed contractual specifications of mandatory 
results and accompanying activities in a project fiche and other documents, makes 
Twinning an excellent case for analysing legal and institutional convergence in relevant 
policy areas and over an extended period of time (Article 4). The TG nature of Twinning 
cooperation also implies certain autonomy of project activities from central political 
leadership,212 thus making Twinning projects more likely cases of successful policy 
convergence, as compared to other more “politicised” EU’s instruments.  
The relatively low political risks that such instruments pose to the incumbent 
regime also make them the most likely case for the promotion of democracy and 
democratic governance at the sectoral level. Although the Twinning manual does not 
make any explicit references to democratic governance promotion, the Twinning 
instrument poses an interesting case for studying democratic governance for two 
reasons. First, the European Commission has committed to democratic governance 
norms in its sectoral cooperation and Twinning is an integral part of such 
cooperation.213 Second, Twinning projects have already been in the centre of a lively 
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academic debate, viewing them as a potent site of socialisation and transfer of 
democratic governance norms to the EU’s neighbours. 214  Finally, an analysis of 
Twinning has a clear empirical advantage over other EU TG tools, as each Twinning 
project fiche follows a strict formalised structure, which makes the projects easier to 
compare systematically across countries and policy sectors. 
Geographically, the present study focuses on the Eastern neighbourhood 
countries covered by the ENP. The differences in responses to the ENP by the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries and the varied nature of their political systems make the 
entire region a very interesting case for empirical analysis. The Eastern neighbourhood 
countries roughly split into two camps in accordance with their level and quality of 
engagement with the EU. The first camp is the “integration trio” of Ukraine, Georgia, 
and Moldova.215 Those countries have recently signed AAs and DCFTAs with the EU 
and generally displayed higher levels of convergence with EU standards in the 
region.216 The second camp, or a “balancers trio”, consisting of more authoritarian 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus have generally had a lower interest or poor records 
in EU integration.217 While coming from the former USSR and sharing many of its 
political, cultural, and administrative legacies, these countries display a noticeable 
variation in their attitude and proximity to the letter and spirit of the EU law. 
Each of the articles, while referring to the ENP region more generally, has a 
specific geographical focus, dictated by empirical and methodological considerations. 
Throughout this manuscript, this focus gradually narrows down from the whole ENP 
region to the Eastern neighbourhood and single-country studies. 
For example, Article 1 surveys scholarly works on the context, actors, and tools 
of EU democracy promotion in the entire ENP region. Since the literature review only 
required desk research, undertaking analysis of a larger area such as the ENP region 
seemed feasible and sufficiently inclusive to me. In contrast, Article 2, dealing with the 
democratic governance substance of Twinning fiches, develops a more narrow focus 
on the Eastern neighbourhood countries. The methodological tools it uses controls for 
variation across the different countries involved and allows for a modest degree of 
generalisation towards the Southern Mediterranean region of the ENP. This kind of 
generalisation was not an ambition in my analysis of the added value of CEECs versus 
the older MS in Article 3. It brings forth thick empirical evidence of Twinning 
implementation in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, two largest beneficiaries of Twinning 
cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood. While I did not find significant differences 
between those two countries (owing to their shared Soviet past) within the conceptual 
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framework of analysis, I should not assume that such differences would not manifest 
in the process of generalisation to other EU’s Eastern neighbours. All the same, most 
findings from Article 3 can be extrapolated to the other Eastern neighbourhood 
countries rather safely, owing to numerous similarities in their post-communist political 
and administrative needs.  
Finally, while presenting a multiple case study on Twinning effectiveness, Article 
4 develops an exclusive geographical focus on Twinning projects in one country – 
Ukraine. Drawing on a significant number of interviews (40), such a narrow empirical 
focus enabled me to tap into the micro level of Twinning implementation in Ukraine 
and observe the dynamics omitted by more inclusive research designs with more 
extensive case selection. Because the Ukrainian political environment has a number of 
distinct features (e.g., high institutional fluidity) setting it apart from not only the EU’s 
Southern neighbourhood countries but also other countries of the Eastern 
neighbourhood, my results should be generalised with more caution than those from 
Articles 2 and 3. However, solid background evidence from interviews and secondary 
data suggest that, in many important respects, Twinning implementation experience 
and common issues in Ukraine may well apply to other ENP countries, in the East and 
the South. 
6.2. Data collection 
There were several sources of data informing this research, such as expert 
interviews, official documents on Twinning and EU TG cooperation, and government 
sources in the EU and the Eastern neighbourhood countries. 
This study mainly relies on 45 semi-structured interviews, conducted between 
November 2014 and May 2016 with civil servants, experts, and public officials, who 
were involved in Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. The semi-structured 
interviews featured a mix of pre-determined and open-ended follow-up questions.218 
In order to locate interviewees, I relied on available reports and press-releases on 
Twinning, which publish contact information on people who were involved in the 
design, implementation, or evaluation of specific Twinning projects. Once the first 
interviews had taken place, it was convenient to use the “snowball” approach,219 
whereby I asked my respondents to refer me to their colleagues or friends, who worked 
in the same or other projects. The major criterion behind a selection of particular 
individuals was their hands-on involvement in one of the stages of a Twinning project 
or secondary expertise in the subject matter. 
The geographical distribution of respondents is fairly wide, spanning 13 EU 
member states (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland, 
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Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands) and two Eastern 
neighbourhood countries (Azerbaijan and Ukraine).220 According to their relation to 
Twinning projects, the respondents can be split into three major groups. The first and 
most numerous group are people who have been directly involved in the 
implementation of Twinning projects, that is, Project Leaders, RTAs, RTA counterparts, 
RTA assistants, and framework contract experts. The second group consisted of high-
ranking officials from the European Commission and the European Delegations, who 
assumed a supervisory role in the process of implementation of one or more Twinning 
projects in the countries concerned. Finally, the third group included experts and 
scholars who were not directly involved in Twinning but who developed significant 
expertise in the architecture and performance of the instrument. 
Data from interviews have been anonymised. In order to complicate the 
recognition, as was the concern with some interviewees, only the respondents’ 
nationality, general specialty (civil servant, official, or expert), and organisation are 
reported in the appendix (p. 168). Most interviews have been audio-recorded, except 
in cases where respondents chose to speak off the record or refused being recorded 
altogether. In that event, I relied on my notes. Sometimes, in order to get an 
interviewee acquainted with the content of the questions to be asked, I had them fill 
out a brief survey. Such a pilot survey was very useful for fine-tuning my questions 
during an actual interview and later with the operationalisation and coding of variables. 
The primary languages of the interviews were English (43%), Ukrainian (44%), and 
Russian (13%). It should also be noted that my familiarity with the socio-linguistic and 
political contexts in Eastern Europe, particularly in my home country Ukraine, was of 
great assistance in planning and conducting interviews. 
Each of my articles draws on distinct interview themes and sets of questions. 
Article 3, for example, mainly deals with the interviewees’ perceptions of the 
contribution by different groups of MS to Twinning cooperation. The interview 
questions pertaining to Article 4 had to do with the internal organisation of a Twinning 
project and the conditions that were identified behind its effectiveness. Sometimes, 
interview data from one article helped in the choice of conditions for another, like it 
happened with the potential added value of CEECs, which was later analysed as one 
of the conditions of the ultimate effectiveness of Twinning. A template with the typical 
questions that were asked is provided in the appendix (Table 27, p. 203). Article 1 
relies solely on the analysis of scholarly literature and relevant documents. 
In analysing the democratic governance substance of Twinning projects in the 
Eastern neighbourhood (Article 2), I mainly rely on the content analysis of Twinning 
fiches. A Twinning project fiche is a contractually binding document, created in the 
process of complex collaboration between the European Commission and the 
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beneficiary institution and detailing, among other things, the project’s expected 
outputs and related activities. I could access online 117 Twinning fiches, covering all 
projects completed or being implemented in the Eastern neighbourhood countries 
between 2006 and 2015. A content analysis refers to a “systematic, replicable 
technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories” and is 
particularly useful for examining documents for trends and patterns.221 In my case, 
the purpose of content analysis was to investigate the references to transparency, 
accountability, and participation in the text of each Twinning fiche, as well as to 
compute the values for democratic governance substance. I operationalised the 
categories of democratic governance substance in a deductive manner by staying in 
close association with the underlying theoretical premises.222 
In order to triangulate data on Twinning projects, refine my theoretical 
expectations about conditions and variables, and to facilitate measurement and 
operationalisation, I also used the European Commission’s reports and statistics on 
Twinning, official evaluations, press-releases, and the EU delegations’ websites. I also 
widely drew on information on Ukrainian governmental websites, like that of the 
Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine), Centre for Adaptation of the Civil Service, 
and relevant works by Ukrainian scholars.  
6.3. Methods of data analysis 
This study brings together both qualitative and quantitative approaches to data 
analysis, depending on a particular research question and the specifics of data. While 
appreciating the profound complexity of different methodological schools and 
approaches, I view a scientific method as a mere tool for pursuing a specific type of 
research goal. Some methods may be more universal and applicable to several types 
of research objectives, while others have applications that are more narrowly defined. 
For an illustration, if we want to drive a nail into a wall, we may use a hammer, a large 
brick, or a frying pan – depending on which particular tool we have an access to or are 
capable of operating. Yet, if we want to extract the same nail from the wall, none of 
those tools will do, because in that case we will have to use pliers only. Similarly, our 
choice of method is first of all determined by the problem at hand and, second, by 
considerations of the accessibility and versatility of a particular method. The factor of 
time also plays a role. Whereas we may consider using a hammer as the most versatile 
or commonsensical tool in that particular nail-wall situation, a frying pan may do 
sufficiently fine if we cannot afford to invest any time in searching for the hammer or 
learning how to use it. 
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In this close link with the research questions, I allowed myself to be a little 
explorative when it came to selecting the methods. Because of a rather narrow 
empirical focus on EU TG cooperation and Twinning instrument in particular, I wanted 
to cover not only as many underexplored conceptual areas as possible but also 
introduce multiple methodological perspectives and discover what kind of answers they 
will lead to. I decided to derive those various methodological approaches from the 
existing debates over the idea of causality. According to the assumptions about 
causality, the articles collected in this dissertation encompass deterministic and 
probabilistic approaches. 
6.3.1. Deterministic methods 
The deterministic causality implies that a cause can be considered a cause if its 
presence produces the identical effect every time that cause is present in one way or 
another.223 Works using the deterministic notion of causality are normally small-N 
qualitative studies, hypothesising only one cause and eschewing the ideas of a 
measurement error or interaction factors.224 For that reason, perhaps, determinism has 
earned some negative reputation in the world of social sciences and EU studies in 
particular, as it risks producing sweeping generalisations and omitted variable bias.225 
At the same time, Lieberson notes, a small-n case study design must embrace the 
deterministic rather than probabilistic notion of causality, simply by way of logical 
necessity.226 In such a way, he continues, the small number of cases, which defines 
deterministic research, simply makes it impossible to examine probabilities.227 Hence, 
the deterministic approach, shadowing all qualitative methods, is not necessarily 
inappropriate or inferior, as each scientific method means to arrive at some sort of 
generalisation of reality, reflected in a new or updated theory. What matters, however, 
is the rigidity with which data are collected and the quality of analytical inferences 
based on those data. Therefore, I use the deterministic understanding of causality to 
charter areas of scientific inquiry where probabilistic explanations are simply not 
feasible due to constraints with data and their operationalisation. 
Such deterministic approach to causality shows in my qualitative analysis of an 
added value of CEECs and the older MS for EU TG projects in the Eastern 
neighbourhood (Article 3, RQ4). Article 3 applies a qualitative tool, called Ego-Alter-
Researcher’s Analysis (EAR), originally used by Arts & Verschuuren for measuring 
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political influence in complex instances of public decision-making.228 This method rests 
on three pillars, or dimensions, which I have slightly modified from the original to fit 
my research questions. The first dimension, Ego-perception, denotes the view on a 
subject matter by one group of key stakeholders, whereas the second dimension, Alter-
perception, captures the views by another group of stakeholders in relevance for the 
same subject matter. In my case, Ego-perception refers to the perceptions of MS added 
value for Twinning by representatives of MS themselves, e.g., RTAs, whereas Alter-
perception has been derived from the views by Azeri and Ukrainian Twinning officials 
and experts. The third dimension, Researcher’s analysis, presumes a validity check of 
Ego- and Alter-perceptions on the basis of pre-established criteria,229 such as (using 
my own example) the dominant theoretical expectations of the nature of the added 
value by CEECs and the older MS in the EU’s Twinning and other cooperation with the 
Eastern neighbourhood countries.  
This methodological tool is particularly suitable for the qualitative nature of my 
data, mostly consisting of semi-structured expert interviews (Article 3), because of its 
strong emphasis on triangulation. By interviewing two or more respondents per 
Twinning project from the EU and its Eastern neighbourhood, who could comment on 
the comparative advantages of the MS concerned and by synthesising rather scarce 
literature on the subject, I arrive at several deterministic statements about the added 
value of CEECs compared to the older MS. The validity of those statements, or 
hypotheses, reflects the degree of consensus over them among the interviewees and 
in the existing literature. 
A special case of deterministic methodology are configurational, or set-theoretic 
methods, which are considered most suitable for intermediate-N studies. 230  The 
methods associated with the configurational approach to causality seek to identify 
specific conditions or combinations of conditions under which an outcome occurs.231 
The configurational methods of analysis are close to the deterministic philosophy in 
that they concentrate on fixed causal paths leading to specific outcomes, unlike the 
probabilistic methods concentrating on the likelihood of different variables to influence 
one another. Configurational methods are usually portrayed as describing set relations 
between conditions and outcomes: each case is either a member or a non-member of 
various sets related to conditions and outcomes. The most known method dealing with 
configurational causality is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), applied in Article 4 
to evaluate the effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine. 
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To illustrate how QCA works, let me use an empirical example of the Twinning 
project on the competitiveness of rail transport in Ukraine.232 That project sought to 
harmonise Ukrainian rail transportation authorities with relevant EU regulations in 
regards to competition and efficiency. Because the project participants prepared and 
had a new law passed, I considered this project effective in reference to its outcome, 
i.e., legal convergence. The four conditions, identified in Article 4 and that may lead 
to legal convergence, are composed of their own sub-sets. For example, each condition 
(set) in my analysis, like sector politicisation, EU sectoral conditionality, policy fit, and 
communication quality consists of two sub-sets – low (0) and high (1). Our project on 
rail transport, for example, belongs to sub-set 0 in politicisation, sub-set 1 in sectoral 
conditionality, sub-set 1 in policy fit, and sub-set 1 in the quality of communication. 
Therefore, in this particular case, legal convergence and, by extension, overall project 
effectiveness is a super-set of low politicisation, high sectoral conditionality, high policy 
fit, and good quality of communication.  
An interesting part about this causal mechanism is that, first of all, it is 
asymmetric. While that particular combination of conditions accounts for the positive 
outcome, its absence is not automatically assumed to lead to the negative outcome. 
Instead, the logic of QCA urges a separate analysis of cases with the negative outcome. 
Secondly, QCA allows the existence of multiple causality, or equifinality, whereby 
several (sufficient) combinations of conditions may lead to the outcome.233  Such 
possibility is excluded in most probabilistic methods, where equifinality may introduce 
serious bias to the purported associations between variables. And last but not least, 
the configurational analysis abandons the idea of each condition having its own 
independent effect on the outcome in favour of the joint causal combinations of 
conditions.234 
In that regard, QCA  makes a distinction between necessary and sufficient 
conditions. A condition, or combination, is considered necessary if it is always present 
when the outcome is present; otherwise, the outcome cannot occur. In contrast, a 
condition or configuration is considered sufficient if the outcome always occurs when 
the condition is present. However, the same outcome may also be a result of other 
(sufficient) conditions, which is consistent with the idea of multiple causality, described 
above.235 For example, if ALL effective Twinning projects were characterised by low 
politicisation, high sectoral conditionality, high policy fit, and the good quality of 
communication, that path would be considered necessary for Twinning effectiveness. 
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On the contrary, if only SOME effective Twinning projects contained that combination, 
but the others were characterised by high politicisation, high sectoral conditionality, 
high fit, and low quality of communication (for example) – then both combinations 
would be deemed as sufficient for a Twinning project to be effective.  
Once the number of cases in QCA increases, it is important to arrive at a 
parsimonious formula, or solution,236 tersely describing all sufficient and necessary 
combinations that lead to a given outcome. After all membership values associated 
with conditions and outcomes are listed in a “truth table”, a logical minimisation 
procedure summarises cases with the identical outcome and related conditions. This 
procedure results in one or more solutions listing configurations, which lead to the 
given outcome in the sample. For example, I find in Article 4 that policy fit with the 
needs and capacities of the beneficiary is the necessary condition for Twinning projects 
to be effective. Conversely, all Twinning projects that failed to produce either legal or 
institutional convergence lacked such policy fit. However, policy fit, while being the 
necessary condition, proved by itself not sufficient to result in the legal convergence 
of the beneficiary institution. Instead, it needed to be combined with either strong EU 
sectoral conditionality or low sector politicisation, which formed two alternative 
(sufficient) paths to legal convergence. In the cases of institutional convergence, policy 
fit was both the necessary and sufficient condition. 
Article 4 utilises the crisp-set variant of QCA (csQCA), which deals either with 
membership or non-membership in a set, or values 1 or 0 (true or false).237 csQCA is 
the original Boolean version of QCA, when the method was first introduced to the social 
sciences by Charles Ragin in 1987. At its core, it draws on the conventions of Boolean 
algebra, developed by a 19th century British mathematician George Boole and 
operating on two possible values – true or false.238 Boolean algebra was instrumental 
for the development of electronic circuits and computer engineering in 1950s, which 
in turn inspired the first proponents of QCA in late 1980s.239 One of the central 
procedures of csQCA is the dichotomisation of conditions, which implies their 
operationalisation on theoretical or case-oriented grounds along two dimensions only. 
This process involves setting a threshold, beyond which all conditions acquire values 
1, and below which – values 0. For example, in dichotomising communication quality 
in Twinning projects (Article 4), I checked to see if there existed serious communication 
problems among project participants in each particular case. The fact of presence or 
absence of such problems in interviewees’ reports determined the values for 
communication quality in respective projects. 
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However, for many phenomena in the social sciences, the process of 
dichotomisation is not so straightforward. Setting thresholds unavoidably runs into 
arbitrary decisions and often fails to account for complexity in messy real-world data.240 
That has become one of the most widespread criticisms of csQCA. In response, 
researchers developed a fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA), which supported more nuanced 
gradation of conditions by allowing inclusion of three or more categories during 
operationalisation. From a mathematical point of view, fsQCA was no longer based on 
Boolean algebra, but rather on fuzzy algebra, and used a more complex logical 
algorithm.241 For that reason, fsQCA is currently gaining more ground in political 
science scholarship and elsewhere; however, csQCA still remains a favoured choice of 
many scholars for its relative simplicity and intuitive approach. 242  Moreover, as 
Schneider and Wagemann note, if conditions and outcomes may, owing to the 
character of empirical data, better be represented by dichotomous values, csQCA 
would still be more appropriate.243 For example, Article 4 uses the crisp-set variant of 
QCA, because my conditions and outcomes could be represented more intuitively as 
binary values. In that case, and also with fsQCA, the authors warn, it is important that 
the researcher be transparent about the procedures and thresholds involved in 
dichotomisation.244 The justification of thresholds for my process of dichotomisation is 
described in the appendix (Table 24, p. 194) and in-text tables inside Article 4 (Table 
10, p. 127). 
6.3.2. Probabilistic methods 
In contrast to the deterministic understanding of a cause, a probabilistic cause is 
one that usually but not necessarily produces an effect.245 The probabilistic view on 
causality, as its name suggests, derives from the probability theory, maintaining that 
an event occurs with a certain probability, not as a pre-ordained fact. Under the 
probabilistic philosophy, a factor (independent variable) can be considered a cause if 
its presence increases the odds of a change in the outcome (dependent variable). 
Probabilistic approaches are most widely associated with the statistical methods of 
analysis, normally operating with variables on a continuous scale and a large number 
of cases. A typical probabilistic (statistical) analysis computes the degree to which 
values on the independent variables explain or predict change in values on the 
dependent variable. And more importantly, statistical tests let us estimate to what 
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extent that degree of relationship is non-random by also computing the significance or 
p-values attached to the coefficient of relationship.  
In my article on the democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation, I 
utilise two different statistical approaches: regression analysis and t-statistics. Both of 
these parametric tests focus on the measures of central tendency, rather than 
dispersion. Hence, they suit well my data on democratic governance substance, which 
have no significant outliers and may be represented more intuitively by the means, 
rather than the medians.246 The multivariate linear regression, relying on the principle 
of correlation between variables, predicts a dependent variable from multiple 
independent ones, measured on a continuous level.247 Regression analysis also enables 
one to determine the overall fit of the model by computing the relative contribution of 
each of the independent variables to the respective variance on the dependent 
variable.248 The regression equation basically models an optimal straight line in an XY 
coordinate system, plotting data points for the dependent and independent variables. 
In the example with four independent variables X1, X2, X3, and X4 (as is the case in 
Article 2), a multiple regression equation looks as follows: 
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4+ ε,  
where β0 represents the intercept (also known as the constant), β1 is the slope 
parameter or the partial regression coefficient for X1, and so forth, and ε represents 
the errors. 249  Each β, a partial regression coefficient, indicates the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable, while controlling for all other variables 
in the model.250 In such a way, for example, if a partial regression coefficient β3 equals 
zero, the independent variable X3 does not explain the dependent variable, as 
hypothesised. Alternatively, if β3 is not a zero, it shows the percentage of the variance 
explained in Y with a one-unit change in X, as well as signals the direction of 
relationship (depending on whether it is positive or negative). In order to estimate the 
prediction power of an entire equation (model), statisticians also use R2 (R Squared) , 
or the coefficient of multiple determination, which returns the value for the total 
variance explained in Y by X1, X2, X3, and X4 combined.251 The regression analysis also 
produces a p-value or significance level, indicating whether the derived coefficients are 
not different from zero merely by chance. 
While the multivariate regression analysis controls well for the combined effects 
of multiple continuous variables on the dependent variable, it does not always factor 
in the differences between the specific categories of independent variables, especially 
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if those categories are measured on a nominal scale.252 While it is interesting to know 
whether a level of country’s political liberalisation generally predicts the democratic 
governance substance of Twinning projects, it is even more insightful to glean how 
Armenia and Ukraine, for example, differ in terms of the democratic governance 
substance and whether that difference is statistically significant (i.e., greater than 
zero). To accomplish that research objectives, I complemented the multivariate 
regression analysis with independent-sample t-tests, which determined whether and 
how much the means of democratic governance substance of Twinning projects in 
Ukraine differed from those in Armenia, and other pairs of countries. Similarly, t-tests 
were used in each of the countries in order to confirm the differences in democratic 
governance substance in politicised and regular projects, those with EU sectoral 
conditionality and those without, technically complex and regular. 
An alternative approach to gauging the country- and sector-based dynamics in 
the sample of Twinning fiches would be to introduce a series of dummy variables for 
different countries and policy sectors. That would enable me to capture the 
unaccounted effects of those variables on the democratic governance substance of 
Twinning and its indicators. Upon closer inspection, however, I realised that the effects 
of countries and policy sectors on the dependent variables strongly correlated with the 
effects of political liberalisation and sector politicisation and technical complexity, 
respectively. That mainly manifested through a high degree of multicollinearity (VIF 
value) when all the above variables were tested together with the dummy variables 
within one model. 253 That led me to conclude that some of those variables simply 
duplicated one another and hence were redundant in the model. For that reason, 
variables such as sector and country were excluded from the actual regression analysis, 
and used instead for describing the data sample and clustering data during t-testing. 
However, political liberalisation, sector politicisation, and sector technical complexity, 
because of their deeper theoretical grounding, remained in the model. Finally, with the 
help of the dummy variables, I tested the time-series dimension of democratic 
governance substance in order to capture any effects occurring during the years when 
different Twinning fiches were created. 
To sum up, combining various methodological approaches allows me to look at 
the subject matter from unusual angles and produce specific types of inferences not 
accessible to any single approach. Moreover, the real-world data are often messy and 
do not readily lend themselves to a specific type of causal inference. In selecting the 
method for analysis, I was mainly guided by the specific research questions, the nature 
of my data, the hypothesised character of causality, and the type of results my reader 
would be interested in knowing. On a more pragmatic level, my methodological choices 
were determined by the sample size. Where the sample size was small (Article 3), I 
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resorted to deterministic methods, which depended epistemologically on the quality 
rather than the quantity of data collected. In the medium-size dataset of Twinning 
projects in Ukraine (Article 4), configurational approaches carried greater value, insofar 
as they offered a good level of parsimony and idiosyncrasy at the same time. Finally, 
in a large-N study of democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation, 
quantitative methods, relying on probabilistic causality, were the most suitable to 
address my research questions (Article 2). 
7. Presentation of articles 
In response to the research questions, this dissertation includes four articles, 
addressing different aspects of EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood (Table 
1, Table 4). While introducing the contents of the articles, the following paragraphs 
shed more light on the research process behind, as well as underlying motivations and 
setbacks.  
Upon beginning of my PhD programme in August 2013 and pondering the focus 
of my future research, I was significantly influenced by the political developments in 
my home country Ukraine. Since the then President Yanukovych came to power in 
2010, the country showed a great deal of democratic backsliding in basic freedoms. 
Nonetheless, the hopes were high that his government would eventually sign a long-
awaited AA with the EU during an EaP summit in Vilnius in November 2013. That 
decision would open a new chapter in EU-Ukraine relations and hopefully prevent the 
further slipping of the country into the semi-authoritarian Kuchma-style regime from a 
decade before. Therefore, I was very interested in what the EU was doing all those 
years for advancing democracy in Ukraine and in other countries. Was it effective and 
why? What instruments did it use and how did it compare with other international 
players promoting democracy in the region? 
To satisfy my curiosity, I decided to review the literature on the effectiveness of 
EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood. By deploying the foreign policy 
analysis (FPA) as an heuristic filter, I evaluate the policy context, actors, and 
instruments involved in EU democracy promotion in the ENP countries. With the help 
of this article, I identified several gaps, which were addressed in the subsequent parts 
of the dissertation in the context of EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
For example, I provided some context behind democratic governance promotion via 
TG cooperation, which later continued in an analysis of the democratic governance 
substance of EU TG cooperation (Article 2). Second, I found the gap in studies on the 
MS dimension of EU democracy promotion and hence steered into a discussion of MS 
added value for EU TG cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood (Article 3). Third, 
Article 1 determined my eventual focus on the concept of the EU’s effectiveness, which 
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surfaced later in an analysis of the effectiveness of EU TG cooperation in Ukraine 
(Article 4). 
However, the major consequence of the literature review from Article 1 was my 
shifting focus towards EU TG cooperation and the Twinning instrument in particular. 
That decision also coincided with the tumultuous events of the Euromaidan revolution 
in Ukraine. In late 2013, people took to the streets against the government’s last-
minute decision to renege on the AA with the EU. The protests grew into a full-scale 
revolution, after the special police forces brutally dispersed the peaceful gathering of 
students. Despite the thousands of protesters pouring in the main squares of Kyiv in 
December 2014, the Yanukovych government seemed to be standing firm and 
uncompromising in its resolve to hold on to power. In January, the Verkhovna Rada 
(Ukrainian parliament), controlled by the pro-presidential Party of Regions, voted on a 
series of draconian measures aiming to curb the rights of assembly and free speech in 
the country. The future of democracy in Ukraine was even less certain than before. 
Under those circumstances, I decided to switch my emphasis to TG cooperation 
between the EU and Ukraine, as such cooperation seemed less susceptible to the 
political storm unfolding in front of my eyes at home. Because TG cooperation 
proceeded at the middle-link of bureaucratic apparatus, I reasoned, it would become 
the last beacon of hope for the pro-European course of the country, should the 
revolution fail. In my decision, I was also very much influenced by the work of EU 
external governance scholars, who viewed EU TG cooperation as an alternative method 
of EU democracy promotion at the sectoral level.254 The rest was history. After an 
almost three months of bloody standoff, Yanukovych fled the country and was replaced 
by a more pro-democratic and pro-EU establishment. The new leadership had to deal 
with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and military aggression in the East. However, 
it also signed the AA with the EU and adopted an explicitly pro-EU vector of 
development. 
In pursuit of my research interest in EU TG cooperation, I initially confronted a 
problem with a lack of data, as there was not so much written on the subject of 
Twinning in the EU literature and elsewhere. The available research also offered a very 
patchy theoretical understanding of the functioning of EU TG cooperation. At one point, 
I even began thinking that such empirical focus was perhaps too narrow. Thinking of 
how narrow or wide an empirical focus should be, I came across a book by Umberto 
Eco “How to Write a Thesis”.255 “The more you narrow the field”, he wrote, “the better 
and more safely you will work”.256 That motivation drove my love at first sight with 
Twinning projects. While taking a relatively small share of the EU’s institution-building 
                                                          
254  Wetzel, “Governance Perspective: Democratic Governance Promotion Through Functional Cooperation”; 
Freyburg, Skripka, and Wetzel, “Democracy between the Lines? EU Promotion of Democratic Governance via Sector-
Specific Co-Operation.” 
255 Umberto Eco, How to Write a Thesis? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015). 
256 Ibid., 13. 
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assistance, this specific instrument interests me mainly because it fosters a long-term 
exchange between civil servants from different countries. As an undergraduate 
student, I also completed a three-month volunteer exchange programme with a 
Canadian youth organisation and learned from my own experience just how exciting 
and fulfilling such interactions may be. While the network and communication 
component of Twinning is no doubt important for the functioning of Twinning projects, 
observing how EU norms travelled across different sectors fascinated me the most. As 
I received the first glimpses about Twinning projects from people who spent years of 
their life on them, often away from their families and friends, I knew I would spend 
the remainder of my dissertation investigating these particular EU projects. 
As I delved deeper in related studies on EU TG cooperation, I did identify several 
areas of theoretical interest, like the democratic substance, the MS dimension, and the 
effectiveness of TG programmes, which inspired the subsequent articles of this 
dissertation.  
Indeed, analysing the democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation 
seemed to me a good starting point (Article 2). My focus on Twinning, besides the 
reasons above, was also inspired by the works of Tina Freyburg, who analysed the 
potential of Twinning projects to socialise the Arab civil servants into the norms of 
democratic governance.257 Thus, I became particularly interested in the extent to 
which the norms of transparency, accountability, and participation were actually part 
of Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. It was also not clear what factors 
accounted for possible differences across projects, countries, and policy sectors. These 
research questions form the core of my Article 2. In explaining the democratic 
governance substance of Twinning cooperation, I perform the statistical analysis of 
several domestic and EU-related explanations, i.e., the level of a target country’s 
political liberalisation, sector politicisation, EU sectoral conditionality, and sector 
technical complexity. I also provide some foundation to the concept of democratic 
governance substance and elaborate on its typology. My Master’s research on 
comparative administrative systems at Kansas State University in 2009-2011 provided 
valuable interdisciplinary insights, reflected in the variable of sector technical 
complexity. 
Article 2 mostly relied on the analysis of Twinning fiches and other documents, 
along with a couple of exploratory interviews. However, what I found even more 
fascinating while working on Articles 3 and 4, were the stories of people who knew 
about Twinning not from academic articles and policy reports, but from their own 
participation experience.  
                                                          
257 Freyburg, “Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and 
Socialization into Democratic Governance”; Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic 
Change? EU Functional Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials 
into Democratic Governance.” 
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With an accession of CEECs to the EU, the fabric of EU cooperation with the 
Eastern neighbourhood changed, but has not been sufficiently studied with respect to 
the contribution of CEECs and the older MS to EU TG cooperation in the 
neighbourhood. In response, Article 3 qualitatively explores and compares the added 
value of CEECs and the older MS for EU TG programmes in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
Focusing on EU Twinning projects in Ukraine and Azerbaijan, I hypothesise that civil 
servants from CEECs are perceived to offer specific added value thanks to their 
country-specific comparative advantages, such as recent transition experience, socio-
linguistic proximity, and shared historical legacies with countries of the Eastern 
neighbourhood. While seeking evidence for that hypothesis, I also investigate the 
added value of the older MS, which are hypothesised to offer the sector-specific 
comparative advantages, that is, institutional experience, existing sectoral networks 
and sectoral fit with the beneficiary, and prior Twinning cooperation experience. 
Having looked at the democratic governance substance of Twinning cooperation 
and the added value of CEECs and the older MS, I proceed with an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine. In such a way, I seek to provide greater 
legitimacy and empirical backing to my articles dealing with EU TG cooperation. For 
example, there would be no point in pronouncing the Twinning instrument a promising 
channel of EU democracy or democratic governance promotion or a platform for MS 
to advance their comparative advantages, if we knew little about the actual 
effectiveness of Twinning projects in accomplishing their objectives in the ENP 
countries. Viewing the EU’s effectiveness as a function of legal and institutional 
convergence of the beneficiary administration with EU regulatory standards, Article 4 
not only determines to what extent Twinning projects have been effective in Ukraine 
but also explores the sets of conditions under which the Twinning projects may or may 
not be effective in accomplishing their objectives. Article 4 performs the QCA of a series 
of domestic and EU-related conditions, accounting for the effectiveness of Twinning 
projects. Those conditions are sector politicisation, EU sectoral conditionality, policy fit, 
and quality of communication. 
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Table 4. Authorship and publication status of articles 
Title Author’s 
contribution 
Co-authors’ 
contribution 
Status 
1. Effectiveness of EU 
democracy promotion 
in the neighbourhood 
through the lens of 
foreign policy analysis 
(FPA) 
Dmytro Panchuk 
(80%): analysis of 
sources, literature 
review, writing up 
the narrative 
Fabienne Bossuyt 
(20%): substantial 
feedback, research 
framing 
Published in 
Democratization, 
2014, 21(7), pp. 
1341-1348. 
IF 0.779 
2. The Substance of EU 
Democratic 
Governance 
Promotion via TG 
Cooperation with the 
Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Dmytro Panchuk 
(70%): literature 
review, conceptual 
framework, data 
collection and 
analysis, 
methodology & 
operationalisation 
 
Fabienne Bossuyt 
(20%), Jan Orbie 
(10%): substantial 
feedback, research 
framing 
 
 
Published 
(online) in 
Democratization, 
2017.  
IF 0.779 
3. The participation of 
CEECs in EU Twinning 
projects: offering 
specific added value 
for EU TG cooperation 
in the Eastern 
neighbourhood? 
Dmytro Panchuk 
(50%): literature 
review, conceptual 
framework, 
formulation of 
research questions & 
hypotheses, data 
collection & analysis 
Fabienne Bossuyt 
(50%): conceptual 
framework, 
formulation of 
research questions 
& hypotheses, data 
collection & analysis  
Accepted for 
publication in 
East European 
Politics and 
Societies. 
IF 0.437 
4. Effectiveness of EU 
TG Cooperation in the 
Neighbourhood: 
Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis 
of Twinning Projects 
in Ukraine 
Dmytro Panchuk 
(80%): literature 
review, conceptual 
framework, 
formulation of 
research questions & 
hypotheses, data 
collection & analysis, 
methodology & 
operationalisation 
Fabienne Bossuyt 
(10%), Jan Orbie 
(10%): substantial 
feedback, research 
framing 
Currently under 
review in 
Europe-Asia 
Studies. 
IF 0.671 
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Article 1. Effectiveness of EU Democracy Promotion in the 
Neighbourhood through the Lens of Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The present review article takes stock of the scholarly literature on EU democracy promotion 
in the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. By deploying the criteria of foreign policy 
analysis (FPA), the article evaluates the policy context, actor identity, and the policy 
instruments of EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood. It argues that the literature 
still lacks a proper understanding of the role of other actors in the EU’s democracy 
promotion policy, pays insufficient attention to democracy promotion programmes by 
individual member states, and has the potential for expansion towards good governance 
promotion studies. 
 
KEYWORDS: EU democracy promotion, foreign policy analysis, democratic governance, 
foreign policies by member states, EU effectiveness, EU neighbourhood 
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1. Introduction 
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, scholars have been 
vigorously studying the European Union (EU)’s effectiveness in advancing 
democratic values to other countries. Existing literature on EU democracy promotion 
offers a full variety of approaches to evaluating the effectiveness of the EU in 
spreading democratic norms, mainly to the countries of the EU’s immediate 
neighbourhood, the analytical focus of this review article. Methodologically, these 
works range from purely qualitative accounts,1 which make up the majority of the 
literature, to mixed methods analysis. 2   The effectiveness of EU democracy 
promotion in its neighbourhood is mostly found to depend on the EU’s ability to 
properly construct its normative image,3 learn lessons from the past, 4 practise 
consistency,5 factor in domestic contexts,6 and have the neighbourhood countries 
not only formally adopt the democratic norms but also institutionalise them in 
everyday government practices.7 
In reviewing those and other factors at play in the effectiveness of EU 
democracy promotion in the neighbourhood, the present article borrows insights 
from foreign policy analysis (FPA), which offers a heuristic filter to classify the 
literature on the subject. In contrast to prevailing realist and institutionalist 
applications of FPA for state-centred analyses, we take on the call by Brian White 
to adopt and revisit FPA for exploring mixed actor systems like the EU.8 According 
to White, European foreign policy is the function of (i) policy context (internal and 
external), (ii) actors and the decision-making process, and (iii) policy instruments.9 
For the purposes of this article, we relate the “policy context” of EU democracy 
promotion to the constitutive impact of other geopolitical actors on the EU’s 
effectiveness, as well as to the role of recent revolutionary transitions in the EU’s 
neighbourhood.10 The “actors and the decision-making process” pertains to the 
“who” of EU democracy promotion, both on the donor side (the EU or its individual 
member states) and the target side (stakeholders in the neighbourhood countries). 
By “policy instruments”, we imply all foreign policy tools and modes of democracy 
promotion that the EU has deployed in the neighbourhood. By extrapolating those 
                                                          
1 Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt. 
2 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
3 Pace, “The Construction of EU Normative Power.” 
4 Stewart, Democracy Promotion and the “Colour Revolutions.” 
5 Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral 
Economic Interests?” 
6 Jonasson, The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours: Orientation, Ownership and 
Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey. 
7 Casier, “The EU’s Two-Track Approach to Democracy Promotion: The Case of Ukraine.” 
8 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 24. 
9 Ibid., 26. 
10 Due to the size constraints, we do not consider the internal context of EU democracy promotion policy. 
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variables of a foreign policy to EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood, we 
uncover existing gaps in the literature and suggest areas for improvement. With the 
help of the FPA framework, we also intend to bridge a divide between EU foreign 
policy and European foreign policy in accentuating the lacunas in research on 
member states’ foreign policies on democracy.  
As a departure point for reviewing the literature on the effectiveness of EU 
democracy promotion in the neighbourhood, we start from three recent books on 
the subject. In the first book, Rosa Balfour constructs a solid theoretical rationale 
behind EU actorness and draws on the “logic of diversity” in order to empirically 
show inconsistencies in the EU’s democracy and human rights performance in Egypt 
and Ukraine.11 Concentrated more on the domestic context of democratisation, Ann-
Kristin Jonasson identifies prerequisites for success of EU policy by exploring the 
notions of local ownership, orientation, and dialogue in current EU democracy 
programmes in Jordan and Turkey.12 Finally, the edited volume by Sandra Lavenex 
and Frank Schimmelfennig debates the effectiveness of linkage, leverage, and 
governance as the primary instruments the EU uses to advance its democratic 
values in the neighbourhood.13 
2. External Policy Context 
The literature only passingly touches on the impact of other geopolitical actors 
and recent revolutionary transitions on the effectiveness of EU democracy 
promotion in the neighbourhood. Although some works discuss the different 
approaches the EU and the US have adopted in their democracy promotion policies, 
there has been no systematic attempt to assess the potential influences of the US 
and other major players on the EU’s effectiveness.14 However, as Balfour suggests, 
despite its claim for responsibility towards the neighbourhood, the EU has tended 
to be reactive and to follow the lead of the US in responding to major political events 
in Eastern Europe and the South Mediterranean.15 Several other experts in EU 
democracy promotion similarly make references to the US-led war on terror in the 
Middle East that contributed to inconsistencies and “double standards” in the EU’s 
democracy policy towards countries there.16 However, as Jonasson argues, the EU 
                                                          
11 Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt. 
12 Jonasson, The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours: Orientation, Ownership and 
Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey. 
13 Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, eds., Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From 
Leverage to Governance? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 
14 Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 
(2010): 85–98. 
15 Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt, 145. 
16 Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta, “The EU’s Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean: A Critical inside-out 
Approach.” 
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has remained more trusted in the region than the US.17 As regards EU democracy 
promotion in its Eastern neighbourhood, the EU’s effectiveness has been 
considerably stifled by Russian geopolitical interests and imperialist policy in the 
region.18 The EU’s interests in Russia also adversely affect its democracy promotion 
policy towards Soviet successor states.19 
Popular revolutions in the EU’s neighbourhood have sparked an interesting 
debate on the two-way relationship between these events and the effectiveness of 
EU democracy promotion. Overall, the literature suggests that the EU’s impact on 
major domestic preconditions leading to the Colour Revolutions, the Arab Spring, 
and, most recently, the Euromaidan uprising in Ukraine has been negligent or non-
existent.20 Moreover, after each revolution the EU continued “doing business as 
usual” with the actors it had closest connections with for the sake of stability and 
preserving the status quo, which often had little to do with democracy.21 
3. Actors and Decision-Making 
In examining the effectiveness of democracy promotion through the lens of 
EU actorness, scholars have provoked a wide gap between the EU as an 
international identity, individual member states, and various, often conflicting, 
agents in the target countries. One of the most prominent conceptual debates of 
the 2000s theorised the EU as a unique international actor, which acts and should 
act as a “force for good” by diffusing its own democratic values among other 
countries.22 However, very soon, the normative image of the EU as a democracy 
promoter was severely challenged by Realist scholars and empirical data on the 
ground.23 In trying to explain the stark contrast between what the EU says and what 
it does, Balfour argues that the EU’s reactive and inconsistent response to 
democratic setbacks in Ukraine and Egypt stems from the necessity of full consensus 
among individual member states, who generally have different visions of how the 
EU should respond to democracy and human rights violations.24 Similarly to Balfour, 
other authors also suggest that the last say in EU democracy promotion policy 
belongs with individual member states, who may water down democracy promotion 
                                                          
17 Jonasson, The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours: Orientation, Ownership and 
Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey, 56. 
18  Iryna Solonenko, “External Democracy Promotion in Ukraine: The Role of the European Union,” 
Democratization 16, no. 4 (August 2009): 709–31; Dimitrova and Dragneva, “Constraining External Governance: 
Interdependence with Russia and the CIS as Limits to the EU’s Rule Transfer in the Ukraine.” 
19 Ibid. 
20 Stewart, Democracy Promotion and the “Colour Revolutions.” 
21 Ibid., 174. 
22 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 
23 Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique”; Federica Bicchi, “‘Our Size Fits All’: Normative 
Power Europe and the Mediterranean,” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (March 2006): 286–303. 
24 Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt, 141. 
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and other foreign policy initiatives to the lowest common denominator.25 Due to 
those and other predicaments with EU’s normative capacity, it is becoming 
increasingly relevant to look at the democracy agenda of individual member states. 
The literature has so far paid little attention to inputs by individual member 
states and other important stakeholders involved in EU democracy promotion in the 
neighbourhood. Meanwhile, nearly each EU member state has developed and run 
their own democracy promotion programmes, which they have administered either 
independently from or jointly with the European Commission. Thereby, the funds 
that the member states have committed to advancing democracy in certain 
countries of the EU neighbourhood have varied considerably,26 which hints at the 
different priorities on democracy that member states pursue in the EU 
neighbourhood. Those priorities, often based on closer historical, political, and 
cultural ties, lack systematic theoretical and empirical evaluation, which makes it 
more difficult to assess the overall EU’s effectiveness in the neighbourhood. Of 
especial interest here are the Central and East European countries (CEECs) that 
joined the EU only recently and that already initiated their own democracy 
promotion projects in their immediate Eastern neighbourhood and beyond.27 And 
again, only a limited number of studies analyse the democracy promotion policy by 
new member states,28 and almost none draw comparisons between old and new 
member states in their foreign policy on democracy towards neighbourhood. 
On the recipient side of the democracy promotion debate stands the literature 
which accords a prominent role to domestic actors in the democratisation process. 
For example, Jonasson finds that the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in 
the Mediterranean could be enhanced by putting the domestic actors “in the driver 
seat” and allowing them more say in implementing EU democracy programmes and 
monitoring progress.29 Despite many conceptual benefits, Jonasson’s criteria of 
ownership, orientation, and dialogue seem to carry little optimism for the EU in 
terms of democracy promotion through domestic NGOs and other policy 
entrepreneurs in authoritarian systems like Jordan and Turkey. Other studies of 
bottom-up democracy promotion point to daunting difficulties (like fraud, 
governmental interference, and red-tape) surrounding cooperation with NGOs and 
other civil society actors in third countries. 30  Nonetheless, it would still be 
worthwhile to check the explanatory potential of Jonasson’s framework in EU 
                                                          
25 Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2008). 
26  Richard Youngs, “Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?,” 2008, 3, 
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1653.pdf. 
27 Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton, “The Choices for Europe: National Preferences in New and Old Member 
States,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 2 (2009): 263–86. 
28 Petrova, “How Poland Promotes Democracy”; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Exporting Europeanization to 
the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond.” 
29 Jonasson, The EU’s Democracy Promotion and the Mediterranean Neighbours: Orientation, Ownership and 
Dialogue in Jordan and Turkey. 
30 Bicchi, “Dilemmas of Implementation: EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean.” 
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democracy promotion in  other neighbourhood countries with less restrictive political 
regimes and more vibrant civil societies, e.g., Georgia and Ukraine. 
4. Policy Instruments 
The literature indulges in all sorts of classifications and approaches to the EU 
democracy promotion tools, such as examining democracy clauses in bilateral 
agreements, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, policy of 
enlargement, socialisation, etc.31 For example, Balfour provides a visual table with  
democracy promotion tools which, in her view, the EU is using inconsistently.32 She 
puts forth a comprehensive analysis of whether or not the EU has deployed certain 
tools in response to democratic violations in Ukraine and Egypt. However, she could 
have enhanced her argument by also commenting on the effectiveness of the 
specific tools the EU did use in each country. The relative success of accession 
conditionality in democratising the CEECs prompted the EU to include this tool in its 
foreign policy towards other countries in the neighbourhood, albeit without a 
membership prospective. For this very reason, the effectiveness of conditionality to 
induce change without a prospect of accession has been continuously challenged 
by scholars in the field.33 In cases where it worked, conditionality required a set of 
other supporting factors beyond the accession prospect that intensified its impact, 
e.g., low costs of domestic change, credibility of rewards, domestic resonance, etc.34 
Nevertheless, an increasingly important body of literature asserts that the EU 
could have some marginal powers in democratising the neighbourhood even in view 
of a lacking membership prospective.35 For example, several contributors to the 
edited volume by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig discuss the potential of three main 
modes of democracy promotion for non-candidate countries: bottom-up (linkage), 
top-down (leverage), and democratic governance through socialisation. The 
contributions remain sceptical about the propensity of linkage and leverage to 
induce change, but accord increased attention to democratic governance promotion 
through socialisation. Processes of socialisation influence basic cognitive perceptions 
of democratic governance and democracy among elites and the public, thereby 
carrying some democratising potential even in circumstances of a closed political 
                                                          
31 Ibid.; Korosteleva, The European Union and Its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a More Ambitious Partnership? 
32 Balfour, Human Rights and Democracy in EU Foreign Policy: The Cases of Ukraine and Egypt, 39. 
33  Paul Kubicek, “Political Conditionality and European Union’s Cultivation of Democracy in Turkey,” in 
Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?, ed. Sandra Lavenex and 
Frank Schimmelfennig, vol. 18 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 26–47. 
34 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe; Fabienne Bossuyt and 
Paul Kubicek, “Advancing Democracy on Difficult Terrain: EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia,” European 
Foreign Affairs Review 16, no. 5 (2011): 639–58. 
35 Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine.” 
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regime or an absent membership offer.36 Proponents of democratic governance 
promotion through socialisation focus on accountability, transparency, and 
participation as less intrusive alternatives, which can democratise certain parts 
within the system while ignoring the wishful ambition of democratising the whole 
system. 37  However, democratic governance, like leverage and linkage, is also 
susceptible to formal institutionalisation, conflicts of interest, or high costs of 
implementation.38 Moreover, increasing administrative capacity does not necessarily 
result in more democratic government – it may be just the contrary.39 In sum, the 
problem of democratic governance promotion in the neighbourhood is worth 
exploring further, since certain forms of sectoral cooperation are capable of inducing 
desired change, at least at the level of attitudes. For that reason, the respective 
contributions to the edited volume by Lavenex and Schimmelfennig could be 
strengthened by a more interdisciplinary approach elaborating on why a change in 
attitudes may trigger change of behaviour. 
5. Conclusions 
The burgeoning literature on EU democracy promotion, although profound and 
multi-dimensional, has still a lot to accomplish in analysing the EU’s effectiveness in 
the neighbourhood. Drawing on insights from foreign policy analysis, this review 
article has taken stock of the literature on three dimensions of European foreign 
policy – external context, actors and decision-making, and policy tools – all of which 
contribute to the variation in the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in the 
neighbourhood. First of all, more studies should clarify the complex 
interdependencies between the EU and other major players, especially in light of 
recent popular revolutions in the neighbourhood. Second, although the EU’s unique 
normative identity has remained a subject of lively theoretical debate, numerous 
studies tend to ignore the “multiple realities” of the EU’s actorness and decision-
making, especially when it comes to democracy promotion initiatives by individual 
member states. And third, scholars are cautiously moving towards debating more 
subtle means of fostering democratisation, like socialisation and democratic 
governance, which bypass traditional pitfalls with top-down and bottom-up 
                                                          
36 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
37  Freyburg et al., “Democracy Promotion through Functional Cooperation? The Case of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy.” 
38  Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, Democracy Promotion in the EU’s Neighbourhood: From Leverage to 
Governance?, 12–13. 
39 Freyburg, “Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and 
Socialization into Democratic Governance.” 
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approaches to democracy promotion and are capable of inducing change even 
within closed political regimes. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Article 2. The Substance of EU Democratic Governance 
Promotion via Transgovernmental Cooperation with the 
Eastern Neighbourhood 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Existing studies of the European Union’s (EU) democratic governance promotion via 
transgovernmental cooperation in the EU’s neighbourhood seem to take the substance of 
what is being promoted by the EU for granted. In filling this gap, this article examines the 
substance of EU democratic governance promotion by assessing (1) to what extent norms 
of democratic governance appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, and (2) what factors account for differences in the presence of democratic 
governance norms across those projects. To explain possible variation, the article 
hypothesises that the democratic governance substance of Twinning projects will vary with 
the country’s political liberalisation, sector politicisation, sector technical complexity, and EU 
conditionality attached to reform progress in a given policy sector. Data are retrieved from 
a content analysis of 117 Twinning project fiches from the Eastern neighbourhood and 
analysed via standard multiple regression. The article finds that the EU mostly promotes 
moderate, mixed democratic governance substance, which varies across different projects. 
This variation may be best explained by the level of political liberalisation of the beneficiary 
country and the politicisation and technical complexity of the policy sectors and institutions 
involved in respective Twinning projects. 
KEYWORDS: democratic governance, European Union, Eastern neighbourhood, 
transgovernmental cooperation, Twinning, transparency, accountability, participation 
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1. Introduction 
Sectoral or transgovernmental (TG) cooperation refers to a cross-border peer-
to-peer partnership between public institutions in specific policy sectors in pursuit 
of policy coordination, coalition building, and other functional goals.1 In the context 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), various EU TG programmes have 
assisted the ENP countries in institutional reform and approximation of their 
legislation with EU acquis communautaire and relevant bilateral treaties. The 
scholarly literature has already pointed out the potential of EU TG cooperation to 
diffuse the norms of democratic governance to the public administrations of ENP 
countries.2 In its communication on a harmonised approach to development aid, the 
European Commission called on the integration of the concept of democratic 
governance “into each and every sectoral programme” in the neighbourhood 
countries and beyond.3  
While offering a good overview of how and how effectively the EU promotes 
the norms of democratic governance through TG cooperation,4 scholars seem to 
take for granted the democratic governance substance of such cooperation. In 
particular, existing research has neglected the extent to which the norms of 
participation, accountability, and transparency are actually being promoted through 
EU TG projects in the neighbourhood. For instance, the socialisation of ENP civil 
servants into norms of democratic governance has been examined without 
previously knowing the actual degree of presence of these norms in EU TG projects.5 
As a result, the literature on democratic governance also ignores the variation in the 
promotion of democratic governance norms across different projects and what 
causes it. Therefore, this article examines the substance of EU democratic 
governance promotion by assessing (1) to what extent norms of democratic 
governance are present in EU TG projects in the Eastern neighbourhood, and (2) 
what factors account for their variation. In filling that gap, it also seeks to contribute 
                                                          
1  Slaughter, A New World Order; Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International 
Organizations.” 
2 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance”; Freyburg 
et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its Neighbourhood; Szent-
Iványi, “The EU’s Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition 
Experience from the New Member States.” 
3 European Commission, “Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonized 
Approach within the European Union,” 6. 
4  Ibid.; Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by 
Sectoral Economic Interests?”; Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? 
EU Functional Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into 
Democratic Governance.” 
5 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance”; Freyburg, 
“Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization into 
Democratic Governance.” 
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to a greater appreciation of EU TG cooperation as a site and tool of democratisation 
of neighbourhood countries. 
We distinguish between several ideal types of democratic governance 
substance by configuration (transparency-oriented, accountability-oriented, 
participation-oriented, mixed) and magnitude (low, medium, high). In order to 
explain the variation in democratic governance substance, we test a series of 
country- and sector-based explanations, drawn from studies in public administration 
and EU external governance. In particular, we hypothesise that the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG cooperation in the region will vary with the 
beneficiary country’s level of political liberalisation, sector politicisation, sector 
technical complexity, and EU sectoral conditionality in a policy area where such 
cooperation occurs. 
The most relevant and empirically salient case of EU TG cooperation for the 
purposes of this study is the Twinning instrument. Initiated in 1998 as a major 
institution-building tool to facilitate the accession to the EU of the Central and East 
European countries (CEECs), Twinning was later extended to the ENP countries to 
promote political and economic reforms in the region.6 Twinning fosters a two- to 
three-year partnership between public administrations of EU member states (MS) 
and their counterpart institutions from the ENP in pursuit of a set of objectives, 
jointly agreed upon by the partners.7 As a rule, Twinning project objectives draw on 
EU policy orientations, as set out in the acquis and EU bilateral agreements with the 
beneficiary countries. Since those documents likely embrace the EU’s norms of 
democratic governance, Twinning projects are also expected to contain democratic 
governance substance in their objectives and planned results.  
Our sample includes 117 Twinning projects implemented in Armenia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine between 2006 and 2015. Each Twinning project 
fiche was analysed and coded according to the presence of clauses relating to 
transparency, accountability, and participation. This allowed us to provide an 
overview of Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood according to the 
configuration and magnitude of democratic governance substance. A multiple 
regression analysis, along with t-statistics across the different countries, uncovered 
statistically significant differences in democratic governance substance according to 
the degree of political liberalisation, sector politicisation, and sector technical 
complexity. The effects of these relationships varied across different categories of 
democratic governance substance and the beneficiary countries. We found no 
conclusive evidence for the impact of EU sectoral conditionality on the presence of 
democratic governance norms in Twinning cooperation. 
                                                          
6 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual,” 11. 
7 Ibid. 
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The next section offers a brief theoretical introduction to the concept of 
democratic governance and its substance, along with our research questions. The 
hypothesis section presents the variables potentially affecting the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG partnerships with the neighbourhood. 
Subsequently, we specify the parameters of data, case selection and methodology, 
along with the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variables of the 
study. The discussion section presents findings and their implications for our 
research questions. The conclusion recaps the contribution of the article and 
outlines limitations to be addressed in future research. 
2. Democratic governance in EU TG cooperation 
The literature focusing on EU democratic governance promotion defines 
democratic governance as a function of three interrelated, but analytically separate 
norms of transparency, accountability and participation, which refer to the 
administrative and institutional standards of a functioning liberal democracy.8 The 
resulting democratic governance model implies that the intensifying TG (sectoral) 
links between the EU public institutions and their counterparts in the neighbourhood 
comprise a new form of democracy promotion, whereby the ENP country embraces 
democratic governance via the legislative transfer or the socialisation of public 
personnel into the EU’s way of doing things.9 For example, in their study of EU 
democratic governance promotion to Moldova, Ukraine, and Morocco, Freyburg et 
al. conclude that the EU is capable of inducing the beneficiary countries to adopt 
provisions of democratic governance as a result of TG cooperation.10 In another 
study, EU TG programmes showed moderate socialising potential in having the Arab 
civil servants embrace more positive attitudes towards democratic governance.11  
In such a way, promotion of democratic governance norms through TG 
cooperation targets the middle level of public administration, for example, 
ministries, agencies, and relevant regulatory bodies, rather than the entire polity.12 
It is expected that the democratisation of decision-making in a specific policy sector 
                                                          
8 Freyburg, Skripka, and Wetzel, “Democracy between the Lines? EU Promotion of Democratic Governance via 
Sector-Specific Co-Operation”; Tatiana Zaharchenko and Gretta Goldenman, “Accountability in Governance: The 
Challenge of Implementing the Aarhus Convention in Eastern Europe and Central Asia,” International 
Environmental Agreements 4, no. 3 (2004): 229–51; Wetzel, “Governance Perspective: Democratic Governance 
Promotion Through Functional Cooperation”; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Democracy Promotion in the 
Neighbourhood: From Leverage to Governance?” 
9 Ibid. 
10  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood, 7. 
11 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
12 Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”; Slaughter, A New World 
Order. 
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or institution may in the long term trigger the overall democratisation of a political 
system from within.13 Thanks to that potential, democratic governance promotion 
through sectoral cooperation has been perceived as a new “backdoor” alternative 
to traditional linkage (support of civil society) and top-down (accession 
conditionality) methods of EU democracy promotion.14 Since the mid-2000s, the EU 
has also adopted the idea of democratic governance in its development cooperation 
by emphasising the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of 
governance in order “to improve management and encourage the authorities to 
account for their decisions to those they administer”.15 
While the democratic governance norms of transparency, accountability, and 
participation have been conceptualised rather clearly and demonstrated by the 
literature to penetrate the neighbouring countries’ institutions at the sectoral level, 
very little is known about the democratic governance substance or the input side of 
EU TG cooperation. In particular, we are interested in the “what” of democratic 
governance promotion and ask which democratic governance norms are being 
promoted and to what extent they are present in EU TG cooperation. Understanding 
the democratic governance substance and its explanations will allow for a more 
nuanced understanding of EU democratic governance promotion via sectoral means, 
as well as reinforce the image of EU TG cooperation as a channel of EU democracy 
promotion at the sectoral level.  
The literature on EU democracy promotion has already devoted some attention 
to the “what” aspect of the EU’s external democratisation efforts by conceptualising 
the substance of EU democracy promotion and its major factors.16 These authors 
postulate that the substance of EU democracy promotion matters and that it varies 
with the EU’s emphasis on liberal democracy (electoral regime, civil and political 
rights, horizontal accountability, and effective power to govern) or its context 
conditions (socioeconomic requisites, civil society, and stateness). 17  The EU’s 
differential focus on those aspects is derived from a range of domestic and power-
based explanations pertaining to the EU’s cooperation with the third countries.18 
                                                          
13 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
14 Ibid. 
15  European Commission, “Governance in the European Consensus on Development” 16; Carbone, “The 
European Union, Good Governance and Aid Co-Ordination,” 22. 
16 Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie, The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases (Governance 
and Limited Statehood) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
17 Wetzel, Orbie, and Bossuyt, “One of What Kind? Comparative Perspectives on the Substance of EU Democracy 
Promotion,” 23; Wetzel and Orbie, “Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU 
Democracy Promotion.,” 574. 
18 Ibid., 582–83. 
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The notion of substance can also be found in relevant studies on the EU’s promotion 
of good governance and the rule of law.19  
Some of the literature on EU democratic governance promotion, in turn, 
suggests that the democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation varies 
according to the policy sector. 20  For example, Freyburg argues that Twinning 
projects in the area of consumer policy will emphasise participation, those in 
competition and state aid, accountability, and those in the field of environment, 
transparency, and so on.21 Inspired by those works, we saw the need for a more 
systematic evaluation of the democratic governance substance of EU TG 
cooperation and of the sources behind its variation. Anne Wetzel has already 
undertaken a first attempt in filling this gap by exploring the impact of adverse 
economic interests on the extent to which the norm of participation (or participatory 
governance) is being promoted by the EU in several sectors of EU TG cooperation 
with the Eastern neighbourhood countries.22 The present article goes a step further 
in offering the first systematic analysis of the democratic governance substance of 
EU TG projects in the Eastern neighbourhood across multiple countries and an 
extended range of policy sectors. 
3. Hypotheses 
In explaining the variation of democratic governance substance of EU TG 
projects, we use a set of domestic and EU-related variables, based on insights from 
EU external governance and Europeanisation literatures, debates in public 
administration, and our knowledge of EU TG cooperation from documents and  five 
personal interviews with Twinning practitioners.23  
The normative substance of EU TG cooperation with the ENP countries is a 
result of a complex process of negotiation between the EU and the beneficiary 
country and institution, as well as a set of official documents and bilateral 
commitments. For example, a typical Twinning project outline (fiche), that is, the 
empirical focus of this article, emerges from a collaboration of up to 20 various 
actors, including but not limited to officials from the beneficiary institution, the EU 
                                                          
19 Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn, “The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in Its Near Abroad. 
One Size Fits All?”; Olga Burlyuk, “Variation in EU External Policies as a Virtue: EU Rule of Law,” JCMS: Journal 
of Common Market Studies 53, no. 3 (2015): 1–15. 
20 Freyburg, “Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and 
Socialization into Democratic Governance,” 19. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral 
Economic Interests?”. 
23 Interviews were conducted in the EU and the Eastern neighbourhood countries between November 2013 and 
May 2016. 
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delegation in the country, European Commission, and external consultants.24 On the 
substance side, the Twinning objectives link with existing bilateral frameworks of 
cooperation between the EU and the respective country, for example, Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements (PCA), Action Plans (AP), Country Strategy Papers 
(CSP), National Indicative Programs (NIP), and, more recently, Association 
Agreements (AA).25 Those jointly negotiated documents incorporate the specific 
administrative needs, priorities, and capacities of each ENP country and link them 
with the acquis communautaire.26 In line with the EU’s commitment to democratic 
governance in sectoral cooperation, those documents and agreements are expected 
to streamline norms of democratic governance, which eventually end up in the 
Twinning fiche. Because the EU in its TG programmes often emphasises the needs 
and preferences of the beneficiary as well as domestic ownership of subsequent 
reforms,27 we expect that the domestic factors will play a significant role in shaping 
the democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation. 
Following this logic, we explore three domestic variables, namely political 
liberalisation, sector politicisation, and sector technical complexity, which seem 
theoretically related to the presence of democratic governance norms in EU TG 
cooperation. We also factor in one EU-related variable – EU sectoral conditionality 
– which has to do with the EU’s greater bargaining power over the beneficiary 
country in a particular policy sector and hence the EU’s ability to streamline more 
democratic governance norms in that sector. In such a way, we seek to factor in 
the domestic ownership of EU TG cooperation and acknowledge the EU as a 
promoter of democratic governance norms. 
3.1. Domestic explanations 
First of all, the existing literature has noted that for a country to positively 
respond to democracy promotion by external actors, it already has to possess a 
certain base level of democratic freedoms or political liberalisation.28 The greater 
political liberalisation of the country makes its policymaking and public institutions 
more susceptible to the democratising influences by the EU. Even though TG 
cooperation proceeds in some autonomy from the incumbent leadership, inclusion 
of democratic governance norms on the agenda may compromise the hold on power 
                                                          
24 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual”; Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries 
Covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report.” 
25 Int. 14 with Dutch expert (fiche development), 08 April 2015.?
26 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual,” 11. 
27 Ibid. 
28  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood; Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint,” International Studies 
Quarterly 50 (2006): 539–59. 
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by the current regime. For that reason, we expect that less politically liberalised 
countries will be more averse to seeing democratic governance norms in their TG 
cooperation with the EU. Likewise, more politically liberalised countries will likely 
commit to more democratic governance substance in their TG cooperation with the 
EU. In other words: 
H1. With an increase in the level of a country’s political liberalisation, the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG cooperation in that country will be higher. 
Sector politicisation, defined as the susceptibility of a policy sector or an 
institution to political interference, conflicts of interest, or corruption, has also been 
mentioned by the literature as a factor potentially inhibiting cooperation and EU 
norm transfer to third states.29 Sector politicisation may intersect with such concepts 
as policy area securitisation,30 domestic costs of policy adoption,31 and presence of 
powerful veto players.32 Similarly to the level of political liberalisation, the high 
politicisation of a policy sector is expected to hinder relevant domestic institutions 
from committing to principles of transparency, accountability, and participation in 
their TG partnerships with the EU due to the perceived threat to existing corrupt 
schemes and adverse sectoral interests of the major players. On the contrary, TG 
cooperation in non-politicised settings will likely see more democratic governance 
norms on its agenda. Therefore, we also hypothesise that: 
H2.  With an increase in the level of politicisation of the policy sector, the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG cooperation in that sector will be lower. 
Technical complexity of the policy sector refers to the degree of knowledge 
and skills required to be able to contribute meaningfully to a given policy field. This 
variable feeds into a long-standing debate in public administration concerning the 
dichotomy between politics and administration and arguing that certain policy areas 
of public administration should remain the exclusive preserve of technocratic 
bureaucrats and be exempted from certain norms of democratic accountability and 
participation. 33  Possible reasons include the highly specialised nature of 
                                                          
29  Langbein and Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood”; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The 
Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania”; Pieter De Wilde, “No Polity for Old Politics? A 
Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration,” Journal of European Integration 33, no. 5 
(2011): 559–75; Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised 
by Sectoral Economic Interests?” 
30 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1998); Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1964). 
31 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe.” 
32 Dimitrova, “The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do New European Rules 
Remain Empty Shells?” 
33Charles Goodsell, The New Case for Bureaucracy (London: SAGE Publications, 2014); Gruber, Controlling 
Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance; Frank Goodnow, Politics and Administration: A Study in 
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competencies required to contribute to the policy field in a meaningful, efficient, 
and safe way. 34  On the other hand, certain policy sectors, like phytosanitary 
regulation or statistics, requiring advanced levels of qualification from civil servants, 
may simply be uninteresting for most of civil society.35 Based on these premises, it 
should be expected that EU TG cooperation will have less democratic governance 
substance in technically complex policy sectors. For that reason, it is hypothesised 
that: 
H3. With an increase in the level of technical complexity of the policy sector, the 
democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation in that sector will be lower. 
3.2. EU-related explanations 
Studies in Europeanisation and EU external governance have already noted 
the importance of EU sectoral (policy-specific) conditionality in the process of EU 
norm transfer in the Eastern neighbourhood.36  Such conditionality requires that the 
EU exploit power asymmetries in the neighbourhood and demand domestic reforms 
in exchange for policy-specific incentives, for example, access to segments of the 
Single Market or prospect of visa liberalisation. Besides the desirability of those 
rewards in the eyes of the ENP country, those asymmetries may also ensue from 
the greater dependence of the ENP country on the EU for energy, development aid, 
and/or security. 
Therefore, we assume that the presence of democratic governance norms in 
TG cooperation will rest with EU sectoral conditionality in the particular policy sector. 
Because the tasks and objectives of TG cooperation are normally the result of a 
complex process of reconciliation between the EU and the ENP country’s needs and 
demands, a clear set of sectoral rewards and incentives is likely to give the EU 
leverage in pushing for more democratic governance substance in TG cooperation. 
Conversely, if such sectoral rewards are missing, the beneficiary administration may 
afford to be pickier about often sensitive commitments to transparency, 
accountability, and participation in relevant TG projects. Alternatively, the EU, being 
aware of its lower bargaining power in a particular country, may shy away from 
                                                          
Government, Library of Liberal Thought (London: Transaction Publishers, 1914); Wilson, “The Study of 
Administration.” 
34 Robert Dahl, “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 1 (Spring, 1994) 109, no. 1 (1994): 23–34. 
35 Gruber, Controlling Bureaucracies: Dilemmas in Democratic Governance. 
36  Ademmer and Börzel, “Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood”; 
Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine”; Delcour, “Meandering Europeanisation. EU Policy Instruments and 
Policy Convergence in Georgia under the Eastern Partnership.” 
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insisting on more democratic governance substance, as suggested in studies of EU 
democracy and good governance promotion.37 Hence, 
H4. With an increase in the EU’s bargaining power over an ENP country, the 
democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation in that country will be higher. 
4. Data and methods 
The Twinning Instrument, or simply Twinning, is used in the present study as a case 
of EU TG cooperation under the ENP. Twinning was originally designed to facilitate 
the Eastern enlargement by boosting the administrative capacity of the EU’s would-
be members to transpose and implement required chapters of the EU acquis. 
Without further intention at enlargement, the EU continued its Twinning support for 
new neighbours in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood under the umbrella of 
the ENP.38 A typical Twinning project fosters a long-term partnership (up to 36 
months) between public officials from EU MS and their counterparts from the ENP 
country, working to reform a specific sector of policymaking of the ENP country in 
line with EU acquis, the MS’ best practices in a given policy sector, and applicable 
bilateral agreements. Each Twinning project features a set of components relating 
to the institutional reform, legislative changes, and training of public servants and 
is expected to generate a measurable outcome upon completion.  
Because of its primary emphasis on technical approximation with EU law and 
MS best administrative practices, the Twinning instrument as such does not aim to 
diffuse democratic governance norms.39 However, as mentioned before, the EU 
acquis communautaire and the bilateral treaties between the EU and the ENP 
countries, on which the Twinning programme dwells, do contain provisions for 
better transparency, accountability, and participation. In addition, scholars have 
already explored the Twinning instrument as a channel of diffusion of democratic 
governance norms to the neighbouring countries, both by way of socialisation and 
policy transfer.40 In light of that, Twinning projects are expected to explicitly embed 
democratic governance norms as part of their declared objectives. Given its depth 
of intervention, time scope, and budgets, Twinning clearly stands out among the 
                                                          
37 Wetzel, Orbie, and Bossuyt, “One of What Kind? Comparative Perspectives on the Substance of EU Democracy 
Promotion”; Börzel, “Transformative Power Europe? The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of Limited 
Statehood.” 
38 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual”; Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries 
Covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report.”. 
39 Ibid. 
40 For example, Freyburg, “Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian 
Regimes and Socialization into Democratic Governance”; Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts 
for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of 
Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
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EU TG tools, like TAIEX or SIGMA, which normally offer short-term technical 
assistance with a much less ambitious scope of activity and expected outputs. A 
standardised in-depth nature of Twinning project fiches, usually providing an 
extensive background and justification behind each component on a project’s 
agenda, also makes it superior to the other short-term TG tools, which are narrowly 
targeted and highly technocratic in nature. In light of that, the Twinning instrument 
is considered the most likely case of EU TG cooperation to carry democratic 
governance substance. 
 
Table 5. Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood, by country and policy sector, 
2006-2015 
 AM AZ GE MD UA Totals 
Employment and social affairs 1 6 1 0 4 12 
Energy 0 1 2 0 4 7 
Environment 1 0 2 0 2 5 
Finance 4 5 6 6 6 27 
Health & consumer protection 2 3 0 0 2 7 
Justice and home affairs 4 4 3 3 5 19 
Statistics 1 1 0 0 3 5 
Tourism 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Trade and industry 2 3 2 6 8 21 
Transport 1 1 1 0 8 11 
Totals 16 24 20 15 42 117 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, we examine data on 117 Twinning projects, 
implemented in Armenia (AM), Azerbaijan (AZ), Georgia (GE), Moldova (MD), and 
Ukraine (UA) between 2006 and 2015 (Table 5). These projects, with budgets of 
approximately one million euros each, cover policy sectors as diverse as justice and 
home affairs, trade and industry, finance, energy, and others.41 Selecting the full 
spectrum of Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood, spanning both 
consolidating democracies and outright authoritarian regimes and boasting of 
different levels of sector politicisation, technical complexity, and the EU’s sectoral 
conditionality provides rich variation on our variables of interest. The Eastern 
neighbourhood also presents the most likely case for the analysis of democratic 
governance substance of EU TG cooperation because it stands on average higher 
than the Southern neighbourhood in terms of democratic freedoms and civil 
liberties, as well as the importance for the EU. In such a way, for example, if the 
democratic governance substance of EU TG cooperation in the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries is low, it will likely be even lower in the Southern 
neighbourhood. In addition, such geographical selection offered better data access 
opportunities for the authors. 
                                                          
41 European Commission, “Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within the ENPI. ” 
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Data for the variables mainly come from Twinning fiches. These legally binding 
documents supply the policy background, management details, and expected 
outputs and activities of each project. The Twinning fiches are used in the tendering 
process among the MS, who submit their proposals in accordance with the 
objectives, or so called mandatory results, listed in the fiche. These mandatory 
results and related activities later become part of a Twinning contract (covenant) 
between the MS institutions on one side and the beneficiary institution on the other. 
The Twinning contract, which is confidential, expands the Twinning fiche with the 
procedural details of Twinning implementation, while leaving the original mandatory 
results and priorities of the Twinning fiche virtually unchanged.42 In fact, Twinning 
is often criticised for its rigidity when it comes to changing the priorities and 
mandatory results agreed upon in the project fiche.43 That is why we use these 
Twinning fiches, which are also available on the web, as the primary source of data 
informing the analysis. 
4.1. Dependent variables 
The democratic governance substance of Twinning projects consists of explicit 
references to transparency, accountability, and participation in the project fiche.44 
For the purposes of operationalisation, these norms are interchangeably referred to 
as norms, categories, or indicators of democratic governance substance. In the 
process of empirical analysis, they are also treated as dependent variables in their 
own right. 
Transparency denotes free access to and sharing of issue-specific information 
related to the beneficiary institution or policy sector for domestic civil society, media, 
the EU, or other international stakeholders.45 Twinning projects may include anti-
corruption initiatives, which are also considered instances of transparency. 
Accountability concerns public officials’ obligation to justify their decisions and 
actions before both public authorities and everyday citizens, including the possibility 
of appealing and sanctioning over misconduct. 46  In the context of Twinning 
cooperation, accountability is related to changes in organisational structure and 
patterns of subordination within the beneficiary institution or the relevant sector as 
envisaged by the project. Those changes should create avenues for redress of 
                                                          
42 Int. 14 with Dutch expert (fiche development), 08 April 2015. 
43 Int. 29 with Swedish civil servant (former RTA), 24 March 2016; Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the 
Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final 
Report,” 149. 
44 Full details of operationalization in Table 15 in the appendix, p. 173. 
45  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood. 
46 Janet Denhardt and Robert Denhardt, The New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2011); Zaharchenko and Goldenman, “Accountability in Governance: The Challenge of Implementing 
the Aarhus Convention in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.” 
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grievances and monitoring by civil society, authorised public entities, the EU, or 
other international stakeholders. Finally, if a Twinning project encourages 
participation of and feedback from civil society and media in the everyday activity 
of the beneficiary institution or the relevant sector, such a project is considered to 
promote participation.  
Depending on how explicitly the norms of democratic governance feature 
among the mandatory results of a Twinning fiche, each project has been assigned 
corresponding codes ranging from Low (0), Medium (1), to High (2) for 
transparency, accountability, and participation. An average of the codes for separate 
indicators comprised the democratic governance substance, which could be of low 
(0.0 – 0.6), medium (0.7 – 1.3), or high (1.4 – 2.0) magnitude. In terms of 
configuration, if any specific norm of democratic governance dominated in the 
Twinning fiche, we considered such a project as promoting transparency-, 
accountability-, or participation-oriented substance respectively. If no single norm 
dominated, such a project is said to promote mixed substance.47 
4.2. Independent variables 
In line with the hypotheses, this study considers four independent variables: 
political liberalisation, sector politicisation, sector technical complexity, and EU 
sectoral conditionality.  
In operationalising the country’s level of political liberalisation, we adopt the 
“Voice and Accountability” (VA) estimates, published annually as part of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank.48 The VA estimates, running 
from –2.5 to +2.5, capture the “perceptions of the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media”.49 For pairwise comparisons 
via t-statistics, the Eastern neighbourhood countries were ranked in the following 
order according to their average VA estimate between 2006 and 2015: 0 → 
Azerbaijan (–1.28); 1 → Armenia (–0.71); 2 → Moldova (–0.17); 3 → Georgia (–
0.12); and 4 → Ukraine (–0.08). However, in the course of regression analysis, we 
adjusted those values according to the country’s VA estimate for the year when a 
particular project fiche was drafted.  
In measuring sector politicisation, we relied on the content analysis of 
Twinning fiches, existing scholarly studies, and policy reports dealing with particular 
policy areas. In order to get a better glimpse into some policy sectors, we also held 
several interviews with civil servants and experts involved in respective Twinning 
                                                          
47 Table 15 in appendix. 
48 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology 
and Analytical Issues,” 2010, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports. 
49 Ibid., 4. 
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projects. If a majority of policy objectives listed in the project fiche were likely to 
expose political or commercial conflict of interest (including corruption) in the 
beneficiary institution or policy sector, such Twinning project would be considered 
“politicised” and ranked 1. Conversely, if most of the policy objectives on the project 
fiche did not seem to expose any political or commercial conflict of interest 
(including corruption), such a project would be considered “non-politicised”, or 0. 
Most politicised projects originate in sectors such as energy, finance, trade and 
industry, and justice and home affairs. Non-politicised projects normally come from 
sectors such as environment, employment, statistics, and transport.50 
As for technical complexity, a Twinning project is considered “technically 
complex” (1) if the respective policy sector requires an advanced knowledge of 
calculus, econometric models, and laboratory testing skills for proper daily 
functioning.51 Most technically complex projects belong to policy sectors such as 
finance, health and consumer protection, statistics, trade and industry, and 
transport. Twinning projects, viewed as “regular” (0), generally not requiring those 
particular scientific skills, come from sectors such as justice and home affairs, 
employment, social affairs, and environment. 52 Just as with sector politicisation, 
this variable was mainly derived from the content analysis of Twinning fiches in 
respective policy sectors and several personal interviews. 
Finally, EU sectoral conditionality is considered “high” (1) if policy reforms that 
the project refers to deal with the facilitation of trade or visa liberalisation with the 
EU.53 For example, for countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, such sectoral 
reforms may be part of the DCFTA or visa liberalisation plans with the EU. For others, 
like Armenia and Azerbaijan, EU sectoral conditionality would be considered high if 
the project generally sought to facilitate trade or a visa regime with the EU. In the 
case of Armenia, we also assume that, while the prospect of signing a DCFTA was 
still there, it served as a strong source of the EU’s bargaining power in related policy 
sectors in the country. Most projects with high EU sectoral conditionality belong to 
sectors such as finance, energy, trade and industry, and health and consumer 
protection. If the project objectives did not concern the DCFTA, visa liberalisation, 
or other trade-related frameworks with the EU, such a project was rated “low” (0) 
for EU sectoral conditionality.  
 
                                                          
50 Full details of operationalization of sector politicization are in Table 16 in the appendix, p. 174. 
51 Full details of operationalization of sector technical complexity are in Table 17 in the appendix, p. 174. 
52 Of course, this is a generalization to some extent. Some areas of the judiciary like forensic medicine are highly 
specialized and do deal with models or lab testing. However, in the process of operationalization, we assess 
whether the objectives of a particular project have to do with any of those advanced scientific skills.  
53 Full details of operationalization of EU sectoral conditionality are in Table 18 in the appendix, p. 174. 
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4.3. Control variables 
Because our sample of Twinning fiches involves a time-series dimension, 
spanning 10 years between 2006 and 2015, we also introduce nine dummy variables 
for each year, excluding a reference category of 2015. In such a way, we seek to 
control for the influence of unaccounted events that may have affected the 
democratic governance substance of Twinning fiches in those years. 
4.4. Methods 
This article adopts a mixed-method design, incorporating elements of 
quantitative research (statistical analysis) and qualitative study (content analysis of 
Twinning fiches and qualitative interpretation of results).54 The content analysis of 
Twinning fiches helped to compute the scores of democratic governance substance 
and its indicators for each Twinning project in the Eastern neighbourhood, as well 
as to obtain values for the independent variables (except political liberalisation). 
Then, in order to evaluate the hypotheses, we test four multiple linear regression 
models for democratic governance substance and also, separately, for the 
categories of transparency, accountability, and participation. Regression analysis is 
particularly suitable for our research objectives, as it enables us to quantify the 
relative impact of our independent variables on the dependent, determine the 
direction of the relationship, and evaluate the general fit of those four models with 
our data.55 In order to fine-tune the results and trace the dynamics between the 
variables in each country, the regression analysis is supplemented by multiple 
independent sample t-tests. The t-statistic determines to what extent the 
differences in the means between two groups (e.g., Ukraine vs Armenia) on a 
continuous dependent variable (e.g., democratic governance substance) are 
statistically significant.56 
5. Empirical Analysis 
The content analysis of Twinning fiches from the Eastern neighbourhood 
demonstrates that they do contain democratic governance substance, which varies 
according to both the configuration and magnitude. As for the configuration (Figure 
2), the largest fraction of the Twinning sample is represented by mixed-substance 
(MIX) projects, with transparency-oriented (TO) projects closely following behind. 
                                                          
54 Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori, “Overview of Contemporary Issues in Mixed Methods Research,” in 
SAGE Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research, ed. Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie, 
2nd ed. (London: SAGE Publications, 2010), 1–42. 
55 Kutner et al., Applied Linear Statistical Models; O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner, Research Methods for Public 
Administrators, 440. 
56 Ibid., 378; Lund and Lund, “Laerd Statistics.” 
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Twinning projects with the accountability-(AO) and participation-oriented (PO) 
substance take up a lower fraction of the sample.  
 
 
Figure 2. Configuration of democratic governance substance of Twinning projects, n = 
117 
 
 
In terms of the magnitude (Figure 3), Twinning projects mostly promote 
medium levels of democratic governance substance, with the average values 
approaching 1.0. As in the analysis of configuration, transparency on average also 
ranks higher on Twinning fiches than accountability or participation (also Figure 
4).57 Looking at the sectoral dynamics, we may note that policy sectors also vary by 
democratic governance substance and its categories. For example, projects in 
sectors such as environment, employment and social affairs, and justice and home 
affairs promote the highest substance, while those in transport and statistics are 
clearly lagging behind. As regards the magnitude of transparency, accountability, 
and participation, it also differs considerably across sectors. Transparency is highest 
in projects in the sectors of environment and finance, accountability is more 
prominent in the energy and finance sectors, and Twinning projects in tourism put 
a strong emphasis on participation.  
The following sections present the results of the statistical analysis testing 
the hypotheses behind variation in the means of democratic governance substance. 
 
 
                                                          
57 Mean value of transparency across all Twinning fiches is 1.3, accountability – 0.9, and participation – 0.8. 
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Figure 3. Magnitude of democratic governance substance of Twinning projects, by sector, 
n = 117 
 
The regression analysis (Table 6) provides confirmatory evidence for the 
hypotheses related to the level of political liberalisation (H1) and technical 
complexity (H3), which show relationships of varying strength with the democratic 
governance substance and its separate indicators. The variable “sector 
politicisation” is inversely related to the dependent variables, which is opposite to 
our claim in H2. Finally, EU sectoral conditionality (H4) does not seem to explain the 
variation in either democratic governance substance or its separate indicators. All 
the four regression models are statistically significant (p < 0.001) and fit the data 
moderately well, explaining around one-third of the total variance in the dependent 
variables, as based on the Adjusted R2 values. The time-series dimension was not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 6. Regression results, n = 117 
 Transparency Accountability Participation Democratic Gov. 
Substance 
Political 
liberalisation 
0.168 
(0.126) 
0.382*** 
(0.100) 
0.342** 
(0.130) 
0.297*** 
(0.082) 
Sector 
politicisation 
0.641*** 
(0.141) 
0.454*** 
(0.112) 
0.045 
(0.145) 
0.380*** 
(0.091) 
Sector technical 
complexity 
–0.129 
(0.126) 
–0.070 
(0.100) 
–0.715*** 
(0.130) 
–0.304*** 
(0.082) 
EU sectoral 
conditionality 
–0.006 
(0.149) 
–0.007 
(0.118) 
–0.299* 
(0.153) 
–0.100 
(0.096) 
Constant 0.987 
(0.477) 
1.134 
(0.377) 
1.479 
(0.491) 
1.200 
(0.308) 
Adjusted R2 0.238 0.301 0.302 0.350 
F (13, 103) 3.780 4.838 4.855 5.795 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Note: Model includes nine dummy variables (not shown in the table), controlling for the time-series aspect of 
the Twinning sample. None of the dummies differed statistically significantly from one another. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
* p-value between 0.1 and 0.05. 
** p-value between 0.05 and 0.001.  
*** p-value < 0.001. 
 
 
5.1. Political liberalisation 
The beneficiary country’s level of political liberalisation shows a statistically 
robust, positive relationship with the democratic governance substance of Twinning 
projects. The model with transparency as the dependent variable displays no 
apparent relationship (Table 6). This fact, along with the transparency-oriented 
substance of many projects, suggests that all the Eastern neighbourhood countries, 
regardless of their level of political liberalisation, commit themselves to a relatively 
high level of transparency provisions in their Twinning cooperation with the EU. 
Separate t-tests on pairs of countries reveal that democratic governance substance 
is statistically different between Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine on the one side and 
Azerbaijan and Armenia on the other (Figure 4, Table 7). The dynamics roughly 
correspond to these countries’ labels as “frontrunners” and “laggards” of political 
liberalisation in the Eastern neighbourhood. Most of statistically significant 
differences among the countries were uncovered in the category “accountability”, 
and fewer were in the categories of “transparency” and “participation”.  
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Table 7. Summary of t-tests on separate countries, n = 117 
 Transparency Accountability Participation Dem. Gov. 
Subst. 
Cross-
country 
comparisons 
AZ-GE** 
GE-UA** 
 
AM-UA** 
AM-MD*** 
AM-GE** 
AZ-GE*** 
AZ-MD*** 
AZ-UA** 
AZ-GE*** 
GE-UA** 
 
GE-UA** 
AZ-UA* 
AZ-GE*** 
AM-GE** 
AZ-MD** 
Sector 
politicisation 
GE** 
UA***  
AM** 
GE** 
UA** 
--- AM** 
UA** 
Sector 
technical 
complexity 
--- --- AM**  
AZ*** 
GE** 
MD** 
UA** 
AZ* 
UA* 
EU sectoral 
conditionality 
GR*  AZ* 
UA** 
GE* 
 
Note: summary of t-tests for cross-country comparisons indicate how significant differences between democratic 
governance substance between pairs of countries are. Countries with higher democratic governance substance 
are in bold. Countries and pairs of countries with insignificant values are not included in the table.  
* p-value between 0.1 and 0.05. 
** p-value between 0.05 and 0.001. 
*** p-value < 0.001. 
 
 
Figure 4. Average democratic governance substance of Twinning projects in the Eastern 
neighbourhood (sorted by democratic governance substance), N = 117 
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A somewhat surprising finding is that Twinning projects in Ukraine promote 
rather modest democratic governance substance, roughly in line with Armenia’s 
level (Figure 4). This puts Ukraine in some contrast to Georgia and Moldova, 
especially because Ukraine scores higher on the VA estimate than those two 
countries. Such a discrepancy may have to do with the overall level of administrative 
openness of the country, which was reported to be low in Ukraine, irrespective of 
its relatively high level of political liberalisation.58 The current results for our case 
countries seem to be explained more accurately by the European Integration Index, 
which measures levels of EU integration for each Eastern Partnership (EaP) country. 
A close proxy of political liberalisation in the EaP Index 2014 – Deep and Sustainable 
Democracy – places Ukraine and Armenia at about the same level, with an average 
score of 0.61, while Moldova and Georgia are ahead.59 However, it will take further 
comparative case studies to ascertain what the matter may be. 
5.2. Sector politicisation 
Although we find a robust relationship between the democratic governance 
substance of Twinning and sector politicisation, the direction of the relationship is 
positive, in contrast to the hypothesised negative one (Table 6). For example, 
politicised Twinning projects contain on average 0.5 points more of democratic 
governance substance (including transparency and accountability) than the non-
politicised do. When controlling for separate countries, the relationship between 
sector politicisation and democratic governance substance did not hold so well, 
especially in the cases of Azerbaijan and Moldova, where we did not find any 
significant differences between politicised and non-politicised Twinning projects. 
The variation in the mean scores for transparency in response to sector politicisation 
remained statistically significant only in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia. The lack 
of a relationship between participation and politicisation was confirmed in all the 
countries analysed, meaning that politicised projects are just as likely to include 
participation norms as non-politicised ones (Table 7). 
The positive direction of the relationship may suggest that policy sectors prone 
to political or commercial conflicts of interest are typically in a more pressing need 
for democratic governance than fields with low politicisation levels are. More 
importantly, that also implies that the EU’s role in shaping the democratic 
governance substance of a Twinning fiche may be stronger vis-à-vis the beneficiary 
                                                          
58 Int. with Danish civil servant, 23 March 2016; Int. 31 with French civil servants, 06 April 2016; Int. with 
Danish civil servant, 23 March 2016 
59 The concept of Deep and Sustainable Democracy encompasses elections, media freedom, association and 
assembly rights, human rights, independence of the judiciary, quality of public administration, the fight against 
corruption, accountability, and democratic control over security and law enforcement institutions. Source: 
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, European Integration Index 2014 for Eastern Partnership Countries, 
22–23, 73. 
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countries, despite the EU’s declared support of ownership by the beneficiary. The 
weakening significance of this tendency in Moldova is due to the generally low 
variability of politicisation in this country, whereby 15 out of 18 projects in the 
country belong to politicised sectors. As for Azerbaijan, the lack of a relationship 
between democratic governance substance and sector politicisation may have to do 
with the general lack of interest by Azeri authorities in democratic reforms or EU 
integration,60 which lowers the EU’s leverage as a result. Then, the EU seems to 
enjoy more power in having Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia accept more democratic 
governance norms for Twinning cooperation in politicised policy fields. Nevertheless, 
we must reject Hypothesis 2 because it is not supported by our analysis. 
5.3. Sector technical complexity 
In line with H3, the analysis shows a statistically significant difference between 
regular and technically complex Twinning projects in terms of democratic 
governance substance, especially in the category of participation (Table 6). An 
average difference of 0.7 points in the mean scores for participation between 
technically complex and regular projects is also the largest among the other 
independent variables analysed. This difference remains statistically significant in 
each country analysed, which also speaks for the uniform nature of the impact of 
this variable on participation substance (Table 7). Accountability substance also did 
not vary with sector technical complexity in the overall model and across the 
countries. Therefore, data provide sufficient support for H3, yet again with some 
reservations. 
These data generally corroborate our assumption that policy sectors requiring 
advanced scientific expertise are not normally open to inputs from the general 
public. 61  At the same time, the other categories of democratic governance 
substance are relatively unaffected by sector technical complexity. What this seems 
to suggest is that Twinning projects in technically complex policy fields may still 
focus on transparency and accountability, even though they tend to overlook the 
participation substance. This finding seems to support both parties in the debate on 
the politics-administration dichotomy in that, on the one hand, the public sector 
should seek democratic legitimacy and, on the other, certain specialised policy 
sectors may not be open to inputs by unqualified or uninterested outsiders. 
 
 
                                                          
60 Franke et al., “The European Union’s Relations with Ukraine and Azerbaijan,” 156. 
61 Int. 7 with Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014. 
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5.4. EU sectoral conditionality 
Tests of all the four models produced no conclusive evidence to suggest that 
EU sectoral conditionality predicted the democratic governance substance in 
relevant sectors (Table 6). Additional t-tests, however, hinted at a possible 
relationship between EU sectoral conditionality and participation substance in the 
cases of Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan (Table 7). However, most of those 
correlations are below the commonly accepted significance level and thus too 
inconclusive to argue that Twinning projects in sectors related to trade with the EU 
will include more references to participation. H4 is thus rejected. 
6. Conclusions 
EU TG, or sectoral, cooperation has been considered by the literature as a 
vehicle to diffuse norms of democratic governance, such as transparency, 
accountability, and participation in public institutions in the ENP countries. The EU, 
on its part, has also committed to promoting democratic governance in its sectoral 
cooperation abroad. Using 117 Twinning project fiches from the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries as cases, this article explored the democratic governance 
substance of EU TG cooperation in those countries and contemplated possible 
reasons behind its variation. We found that Twinning projects in the region mostly 
promote medium levels of democratic governance substance, which displays mixed 
configuration (with general domination of transparency) and varies across policy 
sectors. Twinning projects in the area of environment have the highest democratic 
governance substance, while those in transport and statistics have the lowest.  
In testing the hypotheses that the democratic governance substance of 
Twinning varies with political liberalisation, sector politicisation, sector technical 
complexity, and EU sectoral conditionality, the multivariate regression analysis 
produced mixed results. We found that the level of political liberalisation is positively 
related to the democratic governance substance of Twinning fiches. Indeed, 
Twinning projects in the front-runners of political liberalisation in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, namely Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, tend to include more 
democratic governance substance than democratic laggards, namely Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Such a conclusion points to the greater openness of more liberalised 
countries to embracing democratic governance in their Twinning cooperation with 
the EU. A somewhat low democratic substance of Twinning projects for Ukraine, 
and high for Georgia and Moldova, suggests that the current level of EU integration 
of the country (which is lower for Ukraine), and not the level of its political 
liberalisation, may better explain its willingness to see more democratic governance 
substance in their TG cooperation with the EU. It may also indicate that Ukraine, 
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while being generally more liberalised at the political level, remains relatively closed 
to change at the level of public administration. 
Contrary to our initial expectations, Twinning projects in politicised policy 
sectors demonstrate higher democratic governance substance of Twinning than the 
projects in non-politicised settings. This finding also suggests that the EU has some 
leverage over most Eastern neighbourhood countries when it comes to inclusion of 
democratic governance norms in TG cooperation. An unusual case is Azerbaijan, 
where no statistically significant relationship was found, which corroborates 
previous studies admitting low interest of this country in EU integration and, by 
extension, indicating the EU’s reduced leverage in Azerbaijan.  
The analysis offered some empirical backing for the claim found in the public 
administration literature, suggesting that more technically complex policy sectors 
are less likely to embrace norms of democratic governance. This inverse relationship 
was especially strong in the category “participation”. For example, Twinning projects 
in policy sectors requiring specialised knowledge of calculus and lab skills hardly 
ever encouraged input from civil society. While being at odds with the concept of 
democratic legitimacy, this finding reverberates with Woodrow Wilson’s belief in the 
specialised and somewhat isolated nature of public administration. 62  No such 
dynamics were present in the categories of “transparency” and “accountability”, 
however. 
We found no hard evidence to establish a relationship between EU sectoral 
conditionality and democratic governance substance of Twinning. Such 
conditionality may be related tentatively to the higher presence of transparency and 
participation in Twinning projects in Georgia, Ukraine, and also Azerbaijan. At the 
theoretical level, this article contributes to a better understanding of the normative 
substance of EU TG cooperation under the ENP. The methodological approach used 
here may also be replicated in analysing Twinning projects in other ENP countries. 
If we were right in pinpointing that, in less liberalised countries, the relationship 
between sector politicisation and democratic governance substance does not hold 
as well as in the more liberalised countries, we should only be expecting political 
liberalisation and technical complexity to play a significant role in countries like 
Jordan and Egypt. Although, in our model, the EU-related variable was not 
significant, it may be different in other countries and cases of EU TG cooperation. 
Also, it would be stimulating to delve deeper into the micro-level decision-making 
during project fiche formulation and try to uncover other possible factors of 
democratic governance substance in particular projects or policy sectors. 
In the process of selecting variables and formulating hypotheses, we also came 
across several competing explanations, which may be of relevance to our 
                                                          
62 Wilson, “The Study of Administration.” 
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phenomenon of interest. One of them is codification (also called density of rules)63 
or the degree to which norms of democratic governance are specified in EU acquis 
or other international codes of law.64 Owing to the EU’s overall commitment to 
democratic governance in sectoral cooperation abroad and the large number of 
documents involved in Twinning preparation, it will take further research to produce 
the uniform and precise measurement of codification at the level of individual 
Twinning projects. Other variables such as the pro-Europeanness of administrative 
and political elites65 should already be captured within the existing factors of political 
liberalisation and sector politicisation. Finally, it may be worthwhile for future studies 
to examine the prior adoption of democratic governance norms by the ENP countries 
before they began Twinning cooperation with the EU. 
This article also offers several policy-relevant points. Although the Twinning 
instrument was originally not conceived and exercised as a tool to advance 
democracy or democratic governance to the neighbouring countries, a starting point 
would be a greater awareness in the EU’s policy circles of the democratising 
potential of Twinning. Drawing on the EU’s current commitment to democratic 
governance in sectoral cooperation, the European Commission may consider 
promoting norms of democratic governance as an explicit objective for each Twining 
project. A typical Twinning fiche already features a section on cross-cutting issues, 
including democracy, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and HIV/AIDS. 
This list could be expanded with inclusion of transparency, accountability, and 
participation as requirements to the beneficiary institution in the process of 
Twinning implementation. Last but not least, the EU could try to capitalise on its 
greater bargaining power vis-à-vis some Eastern neighbourhood countries in the 
sectors pertaining to EU visa liberalisation and the DCFTA by streamlining more 
provisions for transparent and participatory governance in respective Twinning 
projects. Those considerations may be particularly relevant in light of the recent 
ENP review rollout, proposals for a new European Consensus on Development, and 
the implementation of the EU Global Strategy.  
 
 
                                                          
63 Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine,” 875. 
64  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood, 55. 
65  Isa Camyar, “On Domestic Determinants and Empirical Relevance of Government Preference for 
Implementing European Union Rules,” Journal of Politics and Law 4, no. 2 (2011): 13–24. 
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Article 3. The participation of CEECs in EU Twinning projects: 
offering specific added value for EU transgovernmental 
cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood? 
 
 
Abstract 
Focusing on European Union (EU) Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, this article 
explores whether EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) offer specific 
added value for the implementation of EU Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood 
compared to the older member states. An added value refers to the combined comparative 
advantages of a group of member states for the implementation of a Twinning project, as 
perceived by project stakeholders. The findings largely confirm our hypothesis that CEECs 
mostly offer country-specific comparative advantages, rooted in their recent transition and 
accession experience, socio-linguistic proximity, and shared historical legacies with the 
Eastern neighbourhood. In turn, the older member states are perceived to offer mainly 
sector-specific comparative advantages owing to their institutional experience, sectoral fit, 
existing sectoral networks in the Eastern neighbourhood, and prior Twinning experience in 
other countries.  
KEYWORDS: EU member states, CEECs, Twinning, EU transgovernmental cooperation, 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Eastern neighbourhood, comparative advantages, added value 
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1. Introduction 
European Union (EU) transgovernmental cooperation in the context of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is widely seen as a channel through which 
the EU can diffuse its regulatory standards and norms to neighbouring countries via 
sectoral transfer of the acquis and the subtle processes of socialisation.1 EU member 
states (MS) play a crucial role in EU transgovernmental cooperation, as they usually 
serve as immediate suppliers of expert knowledge and policy advice during the 
implementation of EU transgovernmental projects. However, the MS involvement in 
EU transgovernmental cooperation remains largely neglected in existing studies. 
Those few works that have touched on this issue are mainly policy-oriented or lack 
a solid theoretical lens.2 At the same time, there is a growing body of literature on 
the new MS, or Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), as emerging 
agents of change in the EU’s neighbourhood.3 Their recent transition experience to 
democracy and market economy, as well as close historical, geopolitical, and cultural 
ties with their Eastern neighbours have, according to some authors, endowed CEECs 
with a specific added value for EU foreign policy in the Eastern neighbourhood.4  
However, so far, this added value has not been examined systematically, and 
there is only patchy evidence about the particular relevance of the CEECs’ 
experience for the countries in the Eastern neighbourhood. Moreover, existing 
studies focus mostly on the area of democracy promotion. Hardly any research has 
delved into the area of EU transgovernmental cooperation, especially institution-
building instruments like Twinning, which explicitly encourage MS to share their 
institutional experience and best practices in implementing EU directives and 
regulations. This article seeks to narrow this gap by examining whether EU MS from 
Central and Eastern Europe offer specific added value compared to the older EU MS 
for the Twinning instrument in the Eastern neighbourhood, which is used as a case 
                                                          
1 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance”; 
Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise 
and Administrative Reform in Romania”; Tulmets, “The Introduction of the Open Method of Coordination in the 
European Enlargement Policy: Analysing the Impact of the New PHARE/Twinning Instrument”; Königová, 
Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ EU Member States and Evaluating 
Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic.” 
2 Ibid.; Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered 
by the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report”; Tulmets, “Institution-Building Instruments in the Eastern 
Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement?” 
3  Horký, “The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European ‘Transition Experience’ to the South: Myth or 
Reality?”; Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy among Postcommunist States; Szent-
Iványi, “The EU’s Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition 
Experience from the New Member States”; Pospieszna, Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish 
Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine. 
4 Ibid.; Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy among Postcommunist States; Szent-
Iványi, “The EU’s Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition 
Experience from the New Member States”; Katerina Kesa, “Le Partage de L’expérience Balte Envers Les Pays 
Du Voisinage Oriental de l’Union Européenne,” Politique Européenne, no. 4 (2014): 86–116.  
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of EU transgovernmental cooperation. To do so, it draws on the notion of 
“comparative advantage”, as used by the EU to refer to the specific strengths of MS 
in international development cooperation.5 Added value then refers to the perceived 
comparative advantages of a MS for the implementation of a Twinning project, as 
perceived by project stakeholders. Because of the nature and focus of our data, we 
do not seek to examine to which extent the involvement of CEECs increases the 
chances of successful implementation of Twinning projects or whether it positively 
affects – what is referred to in the external governance literature as – “rule 
adoption” in domestic legislation and “rule implementation” in domestic political and 
administrative practice.6 
In line with scholars viewing CEECs as emerging agents of change in the 
Eastern neighbourhood and based on insights from studies of Twinning in accession 
countries, we hypothesise that, in the Eastern neighbourhood, CEECs will be mostly 
perceived to offer country-specific comparative advantages, while the older MS will 
be perceived to have mainly sector-specific comparative advantages. In particular, 
we hypothesise that the involvement of CEECs in EU transgovernmental projects in 
the Eastern neighbourhood will be valued because of their recent transition 
experience, socio-linguistic proximity, and shared communist past with the 
beneficiary countries. In turn, the older MS – and to some extent also the CEECs - 
will be valued for their institutional experience, sectoral fit, existing sectoral 
networks with the beneficiary, and prior Twinning experience in other countries.  
To assess the hypotheses, we focus on Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine, which have so far been the major beneficiaries of Twinning cooperation in 
the Eastern neighbourhood.7 Our empirical analysis is based on data gathered 
through 40 semi-structured interviews with Twinning participants from Azerbaijan, 
Ukraine, CEECs, the older MS and the EU Delegations in Ukraine and Azerbaijan 
between September 2013 and July 2016. The data were gathered and processed 
using the EAR technique (Ego/Alter perception, Researcher’s analysis), a qualitative 
method of analysis and triangulation, developed by Arts and Verschuuren to 
determine the perceived influence of agents in decision-making processes.8 
The article is structured as follows. First, we briefly present the EU’s Twinning 
instrument as used in the ENP and explain ways in which Twinning engages inputs 
by MS. Second, we outline the country-specific and sector-specific comparative 
advantages that different MS are hypothesised to have for the implementation of 
Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. Third, we explain the methods for 
                                                          
5 European Commission, “Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy.” 
6 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European 
Politics.” 
7 European Commission, “Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within the ENPI. Activity Report.” 
8 Arts and Verschuren, “Assessing Political Influence in Complex Decision-Making: An Instrument Based on 
Triangulation.” 
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analysis and provide some background information on Twinning projects 
implemented in Azerbaijan and Ukraine to date and MS participation therein. The 
fourth part presents the empirical findings. The concluding section recaps the main 
points of the study, summarises the findings, and suggests areas for further 
research. 
2. Twinning in the ENP and the role of EU MS 
Originally designed to help the EU candidate countries acquire the necessary 
know-how and expertise to adopt, implement, and enforce norms of acquis 
communautaire, Twinning has also been used since 2005 to modernise the public 
administrations of the ENP partner countries in line with EU law and best 
administrative practices of MS.9 The Twinning instrument fosters a socialisation 
forum between MS bureaucrats and their counterparts from the beneficiary country, 
who work side-by-side on a daily basis for up to 36 months on a jointly agreed upon 
set of policy priorities, or mandatory results.10 Those priorities usually entail sectoral 
reforms in line with Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), Country 
Strategy Papers (CSPs), Action Plan (APs), or Association Agreements (AAs) in force 
between the EU and the ENP countries. A MS institution, after being selected by the 
beneficiary country, delegates an experienced civil servant, called Resident 
Twinning Adviser (RTA), to the beneficiary institution for an entire duration of the 
project. In turn, the RTA invites and coordinates other civil servants and experts 
from EU MS, who contribute on a short-term basis to training sessions, workshops, 
and awareness-raising events over the course of the project. Additionally, the civil 
servants from the ENP country go on study visits to the counterpart MS institution.11 
In such a way, MS play a crucial role in EU transgovernmental cooperation, as they 
serve as immediate suppliers of expert knowledge and policy advice during such 
cooperation.  
While discussing at some length the direct and indirect impacts of EU 
transgovernmental cooperation on the neighbouring countries, 12  the existing 
literature has overlooked the crucial role of MS in this process. Those few works 
that have touched on the involvement of MS in Twinning are mainly policy-oriented 
and lack a theoretical lens.13 Some of these studies have passingly touched on the 
                                                          
9 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual,” 10. 
10 Ibid., 11. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Freyburg, “Planting the Seeds of Change Inside? Functional Cooperation with Authoritarian Regimes and 
Socialization into Democratic Governance”; Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s 
External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral Economic Interests?” 
13 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report”; Tulmets, “Institution-Building Instruments in the Eastern 
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possible sources of added value of different MS for Twinning projects, and in 
particular on the reasons why specific MS get selected over the others. For example, 
in their work on Twinning in the Czech Republic, Königová et al. found that some 
MS had better chances to participate in Twinning owing to the larger financial and 
administrative resources, knowledge of local contexts, language, or lobbying 
activities in potential partner countries.14  In her case study of Twinning in Hungary 
and Estonia, Tulmets also found that the public expertise and personal qualities of 
MS experts, as well as previously existing bilateral cooperation and personal links 
were pre-conditions for the selection of specific MS for Twinning.15 While these bits 
and pieces of data provide valuable insights on possible reasons behind the selection 
of MS by the beneficiary, they tell us little about the actual comparative advantages 
or added value that these MS can offer for the implementation of Twinning projects. 
This is even more so given that the selection process is not always based on 
objective criteria and may be driven by personal preferences or interests of the 
evaluation committee members from the beneficiary institution.16 In the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries, where the EU Delegations jointly decide with the 
beneficiary administrations,17 the outcome of the selection process can even be the 
result of bargaining between EU officials and the beneficiary administration.18 
The question of the nature and quality of the comparative advantages of 
different MS has become even more relevant after CEECs joined the EU and began 
to participate in EU transgovernmental cooperation programmes. Because of their 
recent democratisation and market reform experience, as well as their close 
geopolitical and cultural ties with the Eastern neighbours, CEECs have arguably 
gained an upper hand in the region, as compared to the older MS, the US, or other 
international actors.19 However, most of the scholarly literature on CEECs focuses 
on democracy promotion in the Eastern neighbourhood, while very few works have 
touched on CEECs’ role for EU transgovernmental programmes in the region.20  
In further advancing these debates, this article examines whether CEECs offer 
specific added value for EU transgovernmental cooperation in the Eastern 
neighbourhood compared to the older MS. Added value in our analysis refers to the 
                                                          
Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement?”; Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing 
the Experience of ‘Old’ EU Member States and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic.” 
14 Ibid., 37–44. 
15 Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European 
Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary,” 665. 
16 Int. 32 with German civil servant, 11 April 2016; Int. 40 with Ukrainian expert, 21 April 2016. 
17 In the other countries where the Twinning instrument operates, e.g., the Southern Neighbourhood, the 
selection process is fully run by the beneficiary administration. See European Commission, “Institution Building 
in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning Manual,” 114. 
18 Int. 31 with French civil servants, 06 April 2016; Int. 14 with Dutch expert, 08 April 2015. 
19 Pospieszna, Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine; Petrova, 
“The New Role of Central and Eastern Europe in International Democracy Support.” 
20 Szent-Iványi, “The EU’s Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of 
Transition Experience from the New Member States.” 
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comparative advantages of an EU MS for the implementation of an EU Twinning 
project, as perceived by the stakeholders involved in the project implementation. A 
comparative advantage in this regard can be defined as a sphere of specialisation 
in which a MS is perceived – by both itself and the beneficiary countries, as well as 
by other MS – to be capable of cooperating more effectively and in a manner that 
is more useful to the beneficiary country than other MS.21 According to the nature 
of the comparative advantages, we distinguish between country- and sector-specific 
ones. Country-specific comparative advantages derive from general properties 
inherent to the country or public administration as a whole. Sector-specific 
comparative advantages are characteristics pertaining to specific sectors of policy-
making or public administration.  
3. Hypotheses 
Drawing on existing studies on Twinning cooperation in EU candidate 
countries22 and the works viewing CEECs as emergent agents of change in the 
Eastern neighbourhood,23 we hypothesise that CEECs will have mostly country-
specific comparative advantages for Twinning in the Eastern neighbourhood, while 
the older MS will mainly display sector-specific comparative advantages (Table 8). 
In particular, it is hypothesised that CEECs will offer country-specific added value 
for EU Twinning in the Eastern neighbourhood because of their recent transition 
experience, cultural-linguistic proximity, and shared communist and/or Soviet past 
with the beneficiary countries. In turn, the older MS will normally offer sector-
specific comparative advantages, such institutional experience in specific policy 
sectors, similarity of sectoral governance, prior Twinning experience, and density of 
sectoral networks with the beneficiary institutions in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
However, given their longer membership in the EU and long-standing (and well-
resourced) public administration, the older MS will have more sector-specific 
comparative advantages than CEECs. 
 
                                                          
21 See e.g., Nils-Sjard Schulz, “Division of Labour among European Donors: Allotting the Pie or Committing to 
Effectiveness?,” Development in Context (Madrid, 2007), 7, 
http://fride.org/descarga/BGR_Donors_Division_Labour_ENG_may07.pdf. 
22 Lovorka Jonic Kapnias, “Institutional Twinning: Undiscovered Effects of Administrative ‘Trinity,’” Croatian and 
Comparative Public Administration 13, no. 2 (2013): 434–66; Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of 
Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and 
Hungary”; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning 
Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania.” 
23 Petrova, From Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy among Postcommunist States; Pospieszna, 
Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine; Szent-Iványi, “The EU’s 
Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition Experience from the 
New Member States”; Kesa, “Le Partage de L’expérience Balte Envers Les Pays Du Voisinage Oriental de l’Union 
Européenne.” 
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Table 8. Comparative advantages of MS for Twinning in the Eastern neighbourhood 
Sector-specific comparative 
advantages 
 
? Institutional experience 
? Sectoral fit 
? Existing sectoral networks 
? Prior Twinning experience 
Country-specific 
comparative advantages  
? Recent transition and accession experience 
? Socio-linguistic proximity 
? Shared historical legacies 
3.1. Country-specific comparative advantages 
One of the most obvious comparative advantages that CEECs may offer for EU 
transgovernmental cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood is their transition 
experience, or rather, recent transition experience.24  The process of transition 
typically involves a two-folded path from autocracy and centrally planned economy 
to democratic and market-based institutions.25 The transition experience within the 
EU context refers to the institutional memory of democratic change and economic 
transformation of post-communist states of Eastern and Central Europe, most of 
which became members of the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds.26 
After having themselves been the beneficiaries of EU democracy promotion and 
transgovernmental programmes in the recent past, these new MS have acquired a 
baggage of experience related to their political and institutional reforms, as well as 
the related history of cooperation with the older EU MS and the United States.27 
Unlike the CEECs, most of the older MS cannot boast of their transition experience, 
because they underwent their transitions a very long time ago and their institutional 
memory carries no implementation blueprints anymore.  
The fact that the CEECs were themselves beneficiaries of the EU Twinning 
instrument, and thus have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses 
of this instrument as a channel to help induce reforms, adds further weight to the 
expectation that civil servants from CEECs will be perceived to be particularly well-
placed to implement such projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. In this regard, the 
experience of civil servants from CEECs who were themselves involved in the 
implementation of Twinning projects in the pre-accession period and now operate 
                                                          
24 For concrete examples of CEECs’ transition experiences, see European Commission, “European Transition 
Compendium.” 
25 David Stark, “Path Dependence and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe,” Transition to Capitalism, 
1994, 63–101; Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?” 
26 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States”; Petrova, From 
Solidarity to Geopolitics: Support for Democracy among Postcommunist States. 
27 Pospieszna, Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine; Szent-
Iványi, “The EU’s Support for Democratic Governance in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Role of Transition 
Experience from the New Member States”; Petrova, “The New Role of Central and Eastern Europe in 
International Democracy Support”; Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy 
Assistance after EU Enlargement; Horký, “The Transfer of the Central and Eastern European ‘Transition 
Experience’ to the South: Myth or Reality?” 
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in Twinning projects on behalf of the “sending partner” might appear especially 
valuable. As Königová et al. point out based on their assessment of the participation 
of EU MS in pre-accession Twinning projects in the Czech Republic, it is critical to 
“explain the philosophy of any aid programme to the beneficiaries in a 
comprehensive and clear way, being fully aware of cultural sensitivities and seeking 
the acceptance and commitment from the recipient country and its institutions 
first”.28 This brings us to the comparative advantages of socio-linguistic proximity 
and common historical legacies. 
As highlighted above, Twinning establishes a socialisation forum through the 
long-term secondment of bureaucrats and continuous direct contact between the 
respective bureaucracies and fosters interpersonal linkages across peer institutions. 
Under such circumstances, interpersonal communication plays an important role. 
Therefore, the socio-linguistic proximity and common historical legacies between 
civil servants from CEECs and their counterparts in the Eastern neighbourhood may 
help to build a relationship based on trust and mutual understanding, and, as a 
result, familiarise counterpart state officials with EU regulations and practices. Also 
the fact that civil servants in some of CEECs, and in particular the Baltic countries, 
are fluent in Russian is expected to offer an added value to their participation in the 
Twinning exercise in the Eastern neighbourhood.29 
As indicated by Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, in the case of Twinning, “the 
ability of the dispatched civil servants to develop good working relationships with 
local staff has a significant bearing on the full realisation of objectives”.30 Existing 
studies on Twinning projects in the former EU candidate countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe have shown that the implementation process, at a day-to-day level 
of cooperation, has often been hampered by communication problems due to the 
language barrier, as well as by difficulties experienced by MS civil servants in 
adjusting to the local administrative culture.31 Tulmets, for instance, indicates that 
“CEEC officials had difficulties to trust their future EU colleagues, who – they 
considered – had little knowledge of the candidate countries and were not always 
open to learning on the CEECs’ culture and past”.32 Therefore, it seems plausible to 
expect that the socio-linguistic proximity and common historical legacies between 
                                                          
28 Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ EU Member States 
and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic,” 12. 
29 Ibid., 40. 
30  Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning 
Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania,” 623. 
31Kapnias, “Institutional Twinning: Undiscovered Effects of Administrative ‘Trinity’”; Tulmets, “The Management 
of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European Union: Institutional Twinning in 
Estonia and Hungary”; Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ 
EU Member States and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic”; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative 
Reform in Romania.” 
32 Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European 
Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary,” 671. 
ROLE OF EU MEMBER STATES  99 
 
the CEECs and the Eastern neighbouring countries should make it easier for civil 
servants from CEECs to find common ground with their counterparts in the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries and build a relationship based on trust and mutual 
understanding. 
Indeed, decades of communist rule in the Eastern neighbourhood countries 
created a “Soviet identity” in those countries alongside their own national identities. 
It consists of certain habits, practices, social institutions, and socio-linguistic 
formulas, which linger on in the collective memory of all those who lived in the 
Soviet Union, and, by extension, the Soviet bloc. 33  Such commonalities may 
contribute to better mutual understanding and trust between CEECs and post-Soviet 
countries east of the EU. Related to this, and even more importantly perhaps, a 
specific public service culture and administrative tradition emerged throughout the 
former Soviet Union and the former Soviet bloc, which to varying degrees still 
persists across the region.34 Indeed, even in the new public administration practices 
of CEECs, influences from the communist heritage can still be seen.35 This is not to 
suggest that all CEECs had the same communist regimes and administrative systems 
and all followed identical patterns in reforming their public administration. The point 
is rather that compared to civil servants from other EU MS, civil servants from CEECs 
will find it easier to understand the local administrative culture of the post-
communist countries in the Eastern neighbourhood. Given the specific goals and 
context of the Twinning instrument, understanding the local administrative culture 
may play an important role in facilitating the implementation process at the level of 
day-to-day cooperation.  
3.2. Sector-specific comparative advantages 
Unlike the country-specific, sector-specific comparative advantages reflect 
strengths of MS institutions and civil servants in particular sectors of public policy-
making that are of relevance to the beneficiary. We look at four kinds of sector-
specific comparative advantages – institutional experience, sectoral policy fit, prior 
                                                          
33 Mark Bassin and Catriona Kelly, Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Mark 
Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin, Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Saltanat Liebert, Stephen Condrey, and Dmitry Goncharov, Public Administration in 
Post-Communist Countries, 2013. 
34 Martin Painter and Guy Peters, “Administrative Traditions in Comparative Perspective: Families, Groups and 
Hybrids,” in Tradition and Public Administration, ed. Martin Painter and Guy Peters (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 19–30; Petr Kopecký and Maria Spirova, “‘Jobs for the Boys’? Patterns of Party Patronage in 
Post-Communist Europe,” West European Politics 34, no. 5 (2011): 897–921; Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling and 
Kutsal Yesilkagit, “Differential Legacy Effects: Three Propositions on the Impact of Administrative Traditions on 
Public Administration Reform in Europe East and West,” Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 2 (2011): 
311–22. 
35 Tony Verheijen, “The New Member States of the European Union: Constructed and Historical Traditions and 
Reform Trajectories,” in Tradition and Public Administration, ed. Martin Painter and Guy Peters (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 217–33; Liebert, Condrey, and Goncharov, Public Administration in Post-Communist 
Countries. 
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sectoral cooperation and Twinning experience, which are hypothesised to be mostly 
– but not exclusively – a prerogative of the older MS.  
To begin with, institutional experience is understood here as a notable record 
of administrative or institutional accomplishment gained by a MS in a specific area 
of public policy or administration. In other words, this concerns a reputational 
feature, held by MS which are considered to demonstrate a “good example at home” 
in terms of their governance of a particular sector.36 Given that the older MS have 
been EU members for a longer time and, in many cases, have a more established 
administrative system, it is obvious to expect that this comparative advantage will 
apply more to the older MS than to CEECs. Indeed, the latter are in some cases still 
struggling themselves to overcome their communist legacies and consolidate their 
transition. 
Secondly, MS may be considered as valuable partners when their 
administrative system at the sectoral level displays a certain degree of sectoral fit 
or compatibility with the administrative structures of the beneficiary side. 37 As 
indicated by the Europeanisation literature, whereas some amount of misfit is 
important for policy diffusion to occur in the first place,38 it is important that the 
nature or magnitude of such incompatibilities do not clash with the organisational 
specifics of the beneficiary institution. In the context of Twinning, this comparative 
advantage implies that for projects in specific sectors (e.g., statistics, land 
ownership, or education), MS with a similar size or ministerial capacity as the 
counterpart organization in the BC may be preferred.  
A third comparative advantage is the prior existence of sectoral networks 
between the MS and beneficiary administration in a given policy area. Such sectoral 
networks may be part of established bilateral cooperation between the MS and the 
ENP country.  In her study of Twinning in Estonia and Hungary, Tulmets notes that 
these two countries preferred working with the MS that had been their cooperation 
partners for several years. 39  In such a way, the financial, administrative and 
personal connections emerging from the previous cooperation programmes in 
specific policy sectors are expected to create a conducive environment for 
Twinning.40 
A final sector-specific comparative advantage is prior Twinning experience. 
Certain MS have gained extensive Twinning experience in a particular policy sector 
                                                          
36 Bruno Vandecasteele, “The Influence of the Rotating Council Presidency on the European Union’s External 
Policies” 2015, 11. 
37  Peter Hille and Christoph Knill, “‘It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid’: The Implementation of the Acquis 
Communautaire in EU Candidate Countries, 1999-2003,” European Union Politics 7, no. 4 (2006): 540. 
38 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction,” West European Politics 
35, no. 1 (2012): 1–19. 
39 Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European 
Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary,” 665. 
40 BMUB, “Germany and the EU Twinning Instrument,” 2015, 4, www.bmub.bund.de/P840-1/. 
ROLE OF EU MEMBER STATES  101 
 
by participating in multiple Twinning projects in several countries. This may provide 
them with a “competitive edge” in EU transgovernmental cooperation in that 
particular sector, as compared to other MS with no such experience. Through prior 
Twinning experience, they may be better equipped to avoid common pitfalls and 
setbacks in the management and organisation of these projects in a given policy 
sector than the less experienced MS would.41 
4. Data collection and methods 
Owing to the strong emphasis of Twinning projects on policy contributions by 
MS, we selected Twinning as the most likely case for studying the added value of 
CEECs compared to the older MS for EU transgovernmental cooperation. In contrast 
to Twinning, other EU transgovernmental instruments, like TAIEX and SIGMA, 
provide less room for individual MS to promulgate their comparative advantages, as 
these instruments mostly draw on EU-level expertise or private consultancies.42 
The empirical focus is on EU Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, 
which are the two front-runners in the Eastern neighbourhood in terms of the 
number of EU Twinning projects that have been implemented to date. Due to time 
constraints and difficulties locating all relevant stakeholders, we did not examine all 
Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, but selected a sample for analysis,43 
which would allow us to sufficiently assess the added value of civil servants from 
CEECs in Twinning projects in Ukraine and Azerbaijan based on the characteristics 
that distinguish them from other EU MS: recent transition experience, socio-
linguistic proximity, and shared historical legacies with Ukraine and Azerbaijan. 
Empirical data were gathered through 40 semi-structured interviews, 
conducted with civil servants from CEECs, other MS, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, who 
have been closely involved in the implementation of the selected Twinning projects. 
Interview questions gauged the interviewees’ perceptions of the particular strengths 
and comparative advantages of the MS involved in the respective projects as 
manifested during the implementation of the projects. The process of data collection 
was driven by a snowball sampling procedure,44 which enabled us to get in touch 
with most Twinning officials through a network of relationships that we developed 
during our fieldtrips to Azerbaijan and Ukraine. While the majority of the 
                                                          
41 Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European 
Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary”; Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: 
Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ EU Member States and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech 
Republic.” 
42 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report”; European Commission, “Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within 
the ENPI. Activity Report.” 
43 For more info on project sample see appendix Table 19, p. 177. 
44 Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, 107–8. 
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respondents could comment on only one project, around one third of our 
interviewees could comment on two or more projects, which allowed us to cross-
check evidence on each project from the sample. The overall number of interviews 
and, by extension, the size of the project sample were mainly driven by the 
considerations of data accessibility and sufficiency. From the outset, we intended to 
maximise the variation of our data by policy sector, MS partner involved (CEECs 
versus older MS), and respondent’s origin (the EU versus the Eastern neighbourhood 
country). Once we were approaching the mark of 40 interviews, we arrived at a 
point of “saturation”, whereby we were not getting additional useful data to test our 
hypotheses. Because the total number of Twinning projects implemented in Ukraine 
(42) was slightly higher than that in Azerbaijan (33) in the period concerned, we 
kept this proportion in mind while selecting a sample of projects from each country 
(Table 9 below).45 
In order to control for preference bias in the interviewees’ assessments, we 
have triangulated our data using the EAR method (Ego/Alter perception, 
Researcher’s analysis).46 This qualitative tool combines the perceptions of agents in 
decision-making with an analysis of an external observer (researcher). Information 
on Ego and Alter perceptions, typically gathered during elite interviews, refers to an 
assessment by key agents of their own (Ego) or the other’s (Alter) influence in 
decision-making. The Researcher’s analysis is then a validity check of those 
perceptions. Using this method to assess whether civil servants from CEECs and the 
older MS are considered to offer specific added value during the implementation of 
EU Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood, information on Ego perceptions 
refers here to an assessment by the civil servants from MS of their added value in 
the project. Information on Alter perceptions regards an assessment of the added 
value of the MS involvement in the project by their counterparts from Ukraine or 
Azerbaijan and by their project partners from other EU MS (in case the MS was not 
the only one involved in the Twinning project), as well as by officials from the EU 
Delegations in Ukraine and Azerbaijan who oversee the projects. 
  
                                                          
45 See also Table 19 in the appendix, p. 177. 
46 Arts and Verschuren, “Assessing Political Influence in Complex Decision-Making: An Instrument Based on 
Triangulation.” 
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5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. MS participation in Twinning projects in 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine 
Between 2004 and 2016, about 33 Twinning projects were launched in 
Azerbaijan and 42 in Ukraine, which makes these countries frontrunners in the 
Eastern neighbourhood by the number of on-going and concluded Twinning 
projects.47 An overview of the participation of EU MS in these projects is illustrated 
numerically in Table 9 and Figure 5 below. The Twinning instrument in Azerbaijan 
is based upon the priority areas stipulated in the Country Strategy Paper, which 
include democratic development and good governance, socio-economic reform with 
an emphasis on regulatory approximation with the EU acquis, legislative and 
economic reforms in the energy sector, the transport sector, and the environment 
sector.48 The sectoral spectrum of the Twinning instrument in Ukraine covers a 
similarly diverse range of policy fields (Table 9) in line with the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement of 1998, the Action Plan of 2005, and most recently, the 
Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.49  
 
Table 9. MS participation in Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, by policy sector 
(2007-2016) 
 
Policy Sector Azerbaijan Ukraine CEECs* Older MS* 
Agriculture 1 2 2 4 
Employment & social affairs 7 4 3 14 
Energy 2 4 5 8 
Environment 0 2 2 2 
Finance 4 6 6 9 
Health & consumer 
protection 
2 1 2 4 
Justice & home affairs 5 5 8 8 
Education 1 0 1 1 
Statistics 2 3 3 7 
Telecommunications 0 1 1 2 
Trade & industry 7 5 2 16 
Transport 2 8 5 15 
Totals 33 42 40 90 
* This column indicates the total number of projects in which these MS participated in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. 
 
                                                          
47 European Commission, “Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within the ENPI. Activity Report.” 
48 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report,” 26. 
49 Ibid., 20–21. 
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Figure 5. MS participation as lead and junior partners in Twinning projects in Azerbaijan 
and Ukraine (2007-2016, n = 75) 
 
5.2. Country-specific comparative advantages of MS for 
Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine 
5.2.1. Recent transition and accession experience 
Most interviewees to this study concur that the recent transition and accession 
experience of MS partners from Central and Eastern Europe contributes to their 
added value during the implementation of Twinning projects.50 For instance, in 
discussing the benefits of Poland’s transition experience for Twinning programme in 
Ukraine, a Polish official noted that “it is their understanding [by Ukrainians] that 
we [Poland] have gone through a certain period and achieved stability and now we 
are moving forward.”51 
Evidence from several interviews shows that civil servants from CEECs are 
valued for Twinning in Azerbaijan and Ukraine because they have a recent memory 
of how their country has undergone certain reforms.52 As illustrated by a Swedish 
                                                          
50 Int. with EU Delegation official in Azerbaijan, 03 October 2013; Int. with Polish civil servant, 07 October 2013; 
Int. with Dutch civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. 2 with Ukrainian civil servant, 18 November 2014; Int. 4 
with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014; Int. 7 with Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014; Int. 8 with 
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51 Int. 12 with Polish civil servant, 02 April 2015. 
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civil servant who operated as RTA in a project in Azerbaijan in which Latvia was the 
junior partner, the Latvian team members were indispensable as they could “share 
their experiences, the steps of transformation, mistakes and recommendations on 
how to avoid them”.53 The fact that most CEECs can boast of a recent transition 
experience has two important implications for their added value in Twinning. First, 
Twinning officials from CEECs still carry their own professional experience and 
blueprints of recent reforms that they witnessed or spearheaded in their home 
administrations about a decade ago.54 As a Danish civil servant who was involved 
in a statistics project in Ukraine suggested,  
Officials from the new member states [CEECs] can relate well to how that decade has 
passed for them in statistics. The Danes do not remember that situation because 
there are already different generations. They do not know how it was 50-60 years 
ago when a certain [statistical] register was being created. It was just too long ago… 
Initially, we wanted to only cooperate with Germany and France; however, the 
experience of the new member states is simply invaluable. Their experts are around 
50 years old. 10-15 years ago they were implementing new technologies [in their 
country systems] and they perfectly remember what they did.55 
 
And second, because a majority of CEECs are still in the process of reforming 
their administrations and have not yet reached the level of the older MS, the gap in 
the institutional development between these CEECs, on the one hand, and 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine, on the other, is still within reach. As a Ukrainian respondent 
explained, “something that gets reformed in Germany or France is in fact not 
reformed, but adjusted. In our Ukrainian case, we need to build from scratch and 
therefore their experience is generally interesting, but not realistic.” 56 For that 
reason, Azerbaijani and Ukrainian officials simply find it easier to relate with the MS 
that have not gone too far off from their common starting point of institutional 
reform. In this respect, a Polish official noted that CEECs have a better 
understanding of “what is happening in the civil service system of Ukraine”.57 For 
example, he added, “the English have a better experience; however, it is so remote 
[from the Ukrainian conditions] that without a “translator” it is very difficult to 
implement something”.58  
For that reason, while often themselves being role models for CEECs, the older 
MS often struggle to get their message across because their administrative systems 
                                                          
Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014; Int. 14 with Dutch expert, 08 April 2015; Int. with British civil servant, 
06 July 2016; Int. with Swedish civil servant, 27 June 2016. 
53 Int. with Swedish civil servant, 27 June 2016. 
54 Int. 7 with Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014; Int. 6 with Ukrainian civil servant, 28 November 2014; 
Int. with British civil servant, 06 July 2016. 
55 Int. 7 with Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014. 
56 Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014. 
57 Int. 12 with Polish civil servant, 02 April 2015. 
58 Ibid. 
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or best practices in a given policy sector are too advanced and hard to stomach 
from the point of view of their partners from the Eastern neighbourhood.59 A Dutch 
civil servant highlighted that this is exactly why the Netherlands always tries to 
partner with CEECs in EU Twinning projects, because “they sense the counterpart 
better since they were beneficiaries of Twinning themselves only recently”. 60 
Similarly, a British civil servant explained that his department wanted to team up 
specifically with a CEEC for the Twinning project in Azerbaijan on technical barriers 
to trade, because – like Azerbaijan – they moved from a planned economy system.61 
Thereby, the transition experience of the Baltic countries is perceived as 
offering an even greater added value than the other CEECs from the former Eastern 
bloc, because the Baltics were a part of the Soviet Union and thus changed from 
the Soviet system to the EU’s system.62 According to one Ukrainian official, “they 
[Baltic states] come from the same political system and have similar issues, and the 
approaches they used are more suited for us as well.”63 In this respect, it is also 
interesting to note that, particularly in Azerbaijan, the Baltic countries tend to be 
seen as a best practice of de-Sovietisation and modernisation, at least in the 
perception of civil servants and technocrats – as opposed to senior government 
officials.64 However, beyond attesting to the value of transition experience, this 
appreciation also speaks to the relevance of socio-linguistic proximity and common 
historical legacies.  
5.2.2. Socio-linguistic proximity and common historical 
legacies 
Historical, cultural, and linguistic affinity of (some of) the CEECs with 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine are seen as an important factor facilitating the 
implementation of Twinning projects in those countries.65 After the collapse of the 
USSR, former communist societies found themselves in a state of institutional, 
social, and cultural homogeneity, 66  which allowed those societies, despite the 
different evolutionary paths adopted in the post-Soviet period, to have a more 
                                                          
59 Int. with EU Delegation official in Azerbaijan, 03 October 2013; Int. 6 with Ukrainian civil servant, 28 
November 2014. 
60 Int. with Dutch civil servant, 09 October 2013. 
61 Int. with British civil servant, 06 July 2016. 
62 Int. with Dutch civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. with Azerbaijani civil servant, 11 October 2013; Int. 2 with 
Ukrainian civil servant, 18 November 2014;  Int. with Swedish civil servant, 27 June 2016. 
63 Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014. 
64 Int. with Dutch civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. with Lithuanian civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. with 
Finnish civil servant, 24 June 2016. 
65 Int. with EU Delegation official in Azerbaijan, 03 October 2013; Int. with Polish civil servant, 07 October 2013; 
Int. with Dutch civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. with Lithuanian civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. with 
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66 Liebert, Condrey, and Goncharov, Public Administration in Post-Communist Countries, 5. 
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intimate understanding of political and administrative predicaments facing each 
other and thus enjoy more legitimacy in dealing with each other’s issues, as 
compared to outsiders, that is, the older MS. Respondents from both Ukraine and 
Azerbaijan expressed the view that civil servants from CEECs have a much better 
understanding of typical political problems and cultural context in the Eastern 
neighbourhood after having shared part of history together, both under the Soviet 
Union and before. As a Ukrainian civil servant notes, “countries of the former Soviet 
bloc are particularly effective, because we have in common some issues, shared 
history, and understanding of the current processes.”67  
Just like with transition experience, this is especially the case for the Baltic 
states who were formerly part of the USSR and have a unique understanding of the 
post-Soviet realities.68 The Swedish RTA of a Twinning project in Azerbaijan, which 
involved Latvia as junior partner, said that she “noticed that dialogues and 
discussions between the Latvian and Azerbaijani team members sometimes were 
more constructive [than between the Swedish and Azerbaijani team members]. For 
instance, when they discussed a new law based on a law from Soviet time, the 
Latvian and Azerbaijani team members easily understood each other”.69 This also 
indicates that recent transition experience and shared history are often seen as two 
sides of the same coin.70  
In terms of cultural proximity, respondents implied that affinity with the 
administrative culture rather than with the national culture of the beneficiary country 
contributed to the added value of CEECs. 71  For example, Dutch civil servants 
mentioned that the Netherlands prefers to work in a consortium with CEECs like 
Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia for Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood 
not only because of their recent transition experience but also because of their 
closer affinity with the local administrative culture.72  
Besides historical and socio-cultural legacies, command of local languages, in 
casu Russian (and/or Ukrainian in the case of Ukraine), was very often cited as a 
factor facilitating the Twinning implementation process. 73  This relates to the 
                                                          
67 Int. 2 with Ukrainian civil servant, 18 November 2014. 
68 Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014; Int. 17 with EU official, 11 June 2015; Int. with Finnish 
civil servant, 24 June 2016; Int. with French civil servant, 06 July 2016; Int. with Swedish civil servant, 27 June 
2016. 
69 Int. with Swedish civil servant, 27 June 2016. 
70 See e.g. Int. with Azerbaijani civil servant, 11 October 2013; and Int. with Polish civil servant, 07 October 
2013. 
71 See e.g. Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014; Int. 12 with Polish civil servant, 02 April 2015; 
Int. 14 with Dutch expert, 08 April 2015. 
72 Int. with Dutch civil servant, 09 October 2013; Int. 14 with Dutch expert, 08 April 2015. 
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importance in Twinning of interpersonal communication between the beneficiary 
country and the MS officials, whereby direct interaction without interpreters 
contributes to a better rapport between the sides. The high importance of 
demonstrating hard, measurable results in aftermath of each project makes the 
quality of communication (both in terms of language familiarity and interpersonal 
relations) between different members of project team a crucial component of 
Twinning success. For example, the French RTA of the Twinning project on 
competition policy in Ukraine was recalled and replaced because of the mounting 
communication difficulties with the beneficiary country’s officials.74 Interestingly, in 
the case of Twinning in Azerbaijan, a command of Russian only appears to be an 
asset with older civil servants. Since many of the younger civil servants in the 
country were educated in the EU or the US, communication in projects involving 
younger civil servants tends to be in English. 
5.3. Sector-specific comparative advantages of MS for 
Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine 
5.3.1. Institutional experience 
The interview data generally confirm our hypothesis that institutional and 
administrative experience constitutes mostly – but not exclusively – a comparative 
advantage for the older MS owing to their generally well-established governance of 
particular policy sectors. Several interviews have indicated that the division of 
objectives and tasks within Twinning consortia during project implementation occurs 
on the basis of institutional experience of each MS partner in the given policy 
sector. 75  And that experience is often judged against the quality of reforms 
undertaken and general reputation of the MS in that policy sector.76 
For example, in the Twinning project in Azerbaijan on standardisation and 
technical regulations, the long established experience of the UK and France in this 
area, in combination with the transition experience of Slovenia, was seen as the 
main strength of the consortium.77 In a project on metrology and consumer policy 
in Ukraine, the French and German systems were considered the most competitive 
in Europe, partly because of their strong role in such EU-wide standardisation 
institutes as AENOR.78 Also, our interviewee added, “they [France and Germany] 
are powerful and reputable players in the sphere of standardisation and lead many 
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75 Int. 40 with Ukrainian civil servant, 21 April 2016; Int. 7 with Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014. 
76 Int. 22 with Austrian civil servant, 11 March 2016. 
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technical committees in Europe, in addition to a well-functioning system at home”.79 
Similarly, France and Germany’s long and relevant experience in the field of disability 
care and social services was considered an important asset in Twinning projects in 
these areas in both Azerbaijan and Ukraine.80  
In a project on land sales and land cadastre in Ukraine, the Netherlands was 
valued for its long-time expertise in this field.81 Germany, a junior partner to that 
project, brought a more recent reform experience in that policy area, because 
Germans “experienced unification between Eastern and Western Germany and they 
are still in the process of selling state-owned land. And after 35 years the land 
market of Eastern Germany is still not complete. So they bring this tremendous 
value of how it is to sell public land and how you set up the cadastre of that area 
and what difficulties you encounter.”82 In a related Twinning project in Azerbaijan, 
both Sweden and Latvia were considered to have great experience in the field of 
land evaluation and cadastre.83 
In projects in Ukraine’s transport sector, France, Spain, Germany, and Poland 
were viewed to have strong administrative and institutional experience in 
multimodal, rail, road, and aviation transport, respectively.84 Estonia and Finland 
were perceived to have a good reputation in the field of higher education, and 
therefore the Azerbaijanis wanted to learn from their administrative and institutional 
experience in this field.85 During Twinning cooperation on police forces in Ukraine, 
the French gendarmes were viewed to carry a valuable home-based experience in 
that policy area.86 In the sector of budgetary forecasting in Ukraine, Sweden was 
perceived by Ukrainians to have a sophisticated, well-staffed debt management 
system.87  The German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), a senior project 
partner to a Twinning project with the Central Bank of Ukraine was viewed as “one 
of the most respectful central banks all over the earth.”88 The Netherlands, in turn, 
presents a role model in civil service reform and public personnel management,89 
while Poland’s financial and banking sector serves as a model thanks to Poland’s 
successes in building a stable currency and liberalising capital flows.90 
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5.3.2. Sectoral fit 
Besides institutional experience, it is also important that the MS administrative 
system and practices fit with those of the beneficiary’s during Twinning 
implementation. In the abovementioned project on standardisation in Azerbaijan, 
an additional advantage of the consortium was that Slovenia (unlike France or the 
UK) was a small country with a limited administrative capacity, like Azerbaijan. In 
the field of technical barriers to trade, the size of the country and especially the 
administrative capacity of the ministerial organisation matters. The Azeri side saw 
strong parallels with Slovenia in this regard.91 The participation of Austria in a 
project on tourism in Azerbaijan was also considered beneficial not only because 
Austria has a very good reputation in terms of managing and promoting tourism (cf. 
administrative and institutional experience), but also because it is comparable in 
terms of size and – like Azerbaijan – it has mountains with a significant touristic 
potential.92 
 In a project on phytosanitary issues in Ukraine, Germany’s involvement was 
considered very relevant because of the similar size of the countries and their 
comparable regional division (Germany has Länder and Ukraine – Oblasts).93 A 
Danish official involved in a project in the field of statistics confirmed this point by 
suggesting that France enjoyed a comparative advantage working with Ukraine 
because of the comparable regional structure of the statistical systems in both 
countries, whereby data are collected from below, processed locally, and then 
passed on to the centre.94 In a follow-up interview, our respondent emphasised a 
great importance of general sectoral fit between MS and beneficiaries’ system from 
the Danish point of view:  
Ukrainian statisticians think that the French system is very similar. For us, Northern 
member states, Denmark and Finland, we find this strange because we think that the 
French system is very old-fashioned and 20 years behind from ours. However, it turns 
out to be closer to the Ukrainian system.95 
In that respect, our interviewee also mentioned Poland as having the similar 
comparative advantage to France’s, as “it is a large country with regions”, which 
works very well for Ukraine in this and other policy fields.96  
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5.3.3. Existing sectoral networks with the beneficiary 
Only in a couple of projects, sectoral networks involving the MS and their 
counterparts from the beneficiary institution in Azerbaijan and Ukraine existed prior 
to the Twinning project. For example, the Estonian and Azerbaijani team leaders of 
the Twinning project on higher education in Azerbaijan already knew each other 
because they were the respective leaders of the Quality Assurance Agency of their 
countries.97 Ukraine hosted France with two Twinning projects in the field of law 
enforcement owing to an existing bilateral collaboration between the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Interior and French gendarmerie.98 There was a considerable density of 
such bilateral networks with the French in the early stages of Twinning in Ukraine 
(between 2007 and 2010), which was likely the reason why the French were 
selected for every second project during that period.99 While the existence of such 
sectoral networks contributes to building thrust and creates a conducive 
environment for Twinning,100 overall, we did not find enough evidence based on our 
sample to make robust claims about sectoral networks as a comparative advantage. 
5.3.4. Prior Twinning experience 
We found more evidence in support of prior Twinning experience as a sector-
specific comparative advantage. Given that CEECs generally participate less in EU 
Twinning projects than the older MS, it is not surprising that it is mostly the older 
MS that were mentioned to have this comparative advantage. For example, in the 
Twinning project in the Ministry of Taxes of Azerbaijan, Spanish and French 
participant organisations were valued for their extensive experience with previous 
Twining projects dealing with human resources.101 It was also considered an asset 
that most of the French and German experts involved in the implementation of a 
project on disability care in Azerbaijan had international experience in post-
communist countries, including in EU Twinning projects.102 Similarly, for a project 
on standardisation, the Azeri Twinning partners found it valuable that the French 
experts had previous experience with Twinning in the Balkans in the area of 
standardisation and technical regulations.103 
In the case of projects in Ukrainian statistics, Denmark had a comparative 
advantage because of its multiple involvement in similar Twinning projects in places 
as diverse as Turkey, Israel, and Armenia. 104  Ahead of the EU’s Eastern 
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enlargement, Denmark was also a great advocate of the CEECs and organised many 
PHARE projects in the region. As a result, this MS participates in almost every EU 
Twinning project in statistics, with 80% of cases as a leading partner.105 Our Danish 
interviewee also noted that “even if another country wins a project (like Germany 
did in Macedonia), it still invites Statistics Denmark as a junior partner”.106 An EU 
official involved with several projects at the National Electricity Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine suggested that Italy, the lead partner in the project, has 
always been at the forefront of EU Twinning cooperation in this field in Turkey, 
Lithuania, and other counties.107  
5.4. Consortiums of CEECs and the older MS as “perfect 
match” 
Although not hypothesised, it appears that the greatest added value for 
Twinning projects in Ukraine and Azerbaijan is offered when CEECs and the older 
MS operate together in a consortium, as suggested by a large number of our 
interviewees.108 As a result, the older MS are increasingly found to team up with 
CEECs and form consortiums because of the complementarity of their comparative 
advantages. Indeed, given that the older MS generally lack country-specific 
comparative advantages for Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood and 
CEECs tend to have fewer sector-specific comparative advantages, the older MS and 
CEECs collaborate in order to maximise the added value that the consortium can 
offer to implement the project. Therefore, this finding could be seen as an additional 
confirmation of our initial hypothesis concerning the specific nature of the added 
value that CEECs may offer for Twinning in the Eastern neighbourhood. 
For the project at the State Migration Service in Azerbaijan, for instance, the 
three consortium partners – the Netherlands, Latvia and Romania – agreed on a 
division of labour that neatly reflects each partners’ excellence and competence not 
only in terms of skills and experience but also in terms of familiarity with the local 
language and context.109 As such, the Dutch were responsible for providing training 
sessions, whereas the Latvians had a leading role in the practical implementation, 
helping the Azerbaijani civil servants to amend existing legislation and draft new 
legislation. Both the Latvian and Romanian civil servants shared their experience of 
harmonisation of national migration legislation with EU legislation and explained 
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how their organisations were reformed on the basis of European standards. Another 
example is the Twinning project in Ukraine’s civil service, implemented by a 
consortium of the UK and Poland. A Polish official associated with that project 
explained that the UK undertook all matters related to public service competencies 
and public relations, because the British had significant expertise in those areas, 
whereas Poland mainly handled the problems of implementation because of the 
proximity of political systems.110  
6. Conclusions 
While EU MS play an essential role in EU transgovernmental cooperation, and 
in Twinning in particular, their involvement remains largely understudied in the 
literature. Being aware of the added value that different EU MS can offer for the 
implementation of Twinning will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the 
strengths of different MS and make room for better programming of Twinning.  
Focusing on Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, the article explored 
whether CEECs offer specific added value for the implementation of EU Twinning 
projects in the Eastern neighbourhood compared to the older MS. Added value in 
our analysis referred to the perceived comparative advantages of a MS for the 
implementation of an EU Twinning project, as perceived by the project stakeholders. 
The article hypothesised that CEECs would mostly boast of country-specific 
comparative advantages, rooted in their recent transition experience, socio-
linguistic proximity, and shared historical legacies with the Eastern neighbourhood. 
In turn, the older MS were mainly expected to have sector-specific comparative 
advantages owing to their institutional experience, sectoral fit and existing networks 
with the beneficiary, and prior Twinning experience.  
The findings largely confirm the hypothesis that the participation of CEECs in 
Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood does offer a specific added value 
to the implementation of the projects, as compared to the participation by the older 
MS. And this added value is manifested predominantly in the country-specific 
comparative advantages, which CEECs bring for Twinning projects in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. According to most respondents, recent transition and accession experience 
and personal participation in democratic and market transformations in their home 
countries make civil servants from CEECs better equipped to induce similar changes 
in other post-Soviet systems. In addition, they have a better understanding of the 
local situation and can relate more to the cultural and administrative parameters of 
the Eastern neighbourhood countries. The Baltic countries are perceived to be best 
placed in this respect since they were once part of the Soviet Union. Because of the 
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centrality of interpersonal communication in the context of Twinning, the command 
of Slavic languages, especially Russian, is also seen as a strong comparative 
advantage of CEECs. 
In contrast to CEECs, the older MS mostly bring sector-specific comparative 
advantages on the board. Many of the older MS, including the Netherlands, 
Germany, or the UK could demonstrate exemplary administrative systems, as well 
as excellent international reputation in their areas of sectoral expertise. 
Compatibility with the administrative structures of the beneficiary side also appears 
to be an important asset of the older MS, in particular having a similar size, 
geography, or regional system. In addition, the prior Twinning experience of the 
older MS in the respective sectors was seen as valuable. For example, Denmark and 
Italy have been known for a substantial experience across Europe and beyond 
through participating in EU Twinning projects in specific sectors, such as statistics 
and electricity market. Some MS, like France or Finland, are tightly linked with 
beneficiary organisations in bilateral sectoral cooperation outside of Twinning, but 
we found too little evidence in our sample to fully support this comparative 
advantage. Although in several Twinning projects CEECs also boasted of sector-
specific comparative advantages, in particular institutional experience in relevant 
sectors and sectoral fit, these advantages were far more common for the older MS. 
Interestingly, although not hypothesised, our analysis also finds that the older 
MS increasingly tend to team up with CEECs and form consortiums because of the 
complementarity of their comparative advantages, which only further corroborates 
our results. Indeed, given that the older MS generally lack country-specific 
comparative advantages and CEECs tend to have fewer sector-specific comparative 
advantages, the older MS and CEECs often join hands in order to maximise the 
added value that the consortium can offer for EU Twinning in the Eastern 
neighbourhood. 
Despite the variation that Azerbaijan and Ukraine display on a number of 
factors, including attitude towards European integration, sectoral variation, and 
ethno-cultural differences between those two countries, we did not find any 
evidence of these factors playing a significant role. This suggests that our findings 
on the added value of CEECs and the older MS may possibly hold in other countries 
in the Eastern neighbourhood, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia.  
By raising the awareness of MS’ strengths, our research may contribute to 
better coordination and complementarity in EU Twinning and other programmes 
under the ENP. The understanding of MS comparative advantages also holds new 
avenues for research on the effectiveness of EU Twinning in the neighbourhood. 
Further research will have to determine whether the participation of MS based on 
their comparative advantages effectively increases the likelihood of successful 
implementation. 
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Article 4. Effectiveness of EU Transgovernmental Cooperation 
in the Neighbourhood: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
Twinning Projects in Ukraine 
 
 
 
Abstract 
EU transgovernmental cooperation with the neighbouring countries under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has triggered a growing academic interest among the 
Europeanisation and EU external governance scholars. A key instrument for such 
cooperation is Twinning, aiming to bring the public institutions of ENP countries in line with 
EU acquis communautaire and best practices of EU member states. While the existing 
literature has already touched on the functioning of the Twinning instrument during 
accession, it is still unclear to what extent Twinning projects are effective under the ENP 
and also what conditions lead to their effectiveness. Using a Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) of 32 Twinning projects in Ukraine as cases, the article identifies the 
necessary and sufficient conditions leading to either legal or institutional convergence in 
respective policy sectors. The article finds that a majority of effective Twinning projects in 
the country fit well with the needs and capacities of the beneficiary administration, with EU 
sectoral conditionality being more important for legal convergence, while the quality of 
communication and low politicisation – for institutional. Empirical analysis rests on interview 
data supplied by 45 civil servants and experts from the European Commission, the member 
states, and Ukraine, who have been involved in Twinning projects between 2007 and 2016. 
KEYWORDS: EU, transgovernmental cooperation, Twinning, effectiveness, legal 
convergence, institutional convergence, Ukraine 
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1. Introduction 
As a foreign policy actor and a “normative” power, the EU has used a wide 
variety of policy instruments in relation to the neighbouring countries. One of such 
instruments has been transgovernmental (TG) cooperation, which refers to 
horizontal partnerships between public experts and officials from two or more 
countries in a specific policy area, who share their professional expertise or work 
towards a specific policy goal.1 A notable example of EU TG cooperation has been 
the Twinning programme, which brings together officials from EU member states 
(MS) and the partner country to jointly reform specific areas of public policy and 
administration in line with EU acquis communautaire and best MS practices. 
Originally used to facilitate the EU’s Eastern enlargement, Twinning was extended 
to support the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in line with 
existing bilateral agreements with the EU. Twinning participants on both the EU and 
ENP sides commit themselves to the achievement of the so called mandatory results, 
which usually presume legislative and policy changes in the target country and 
institution, eventually resulting in the country’s access to segments of the EU Single 
Market or membership in EU regulatory bodies.2 Between 2007 and 2016, more 
than 300 projects have been implemented in the countries of the EU’s Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhood under the ENP.3 
Despite the ambitious agenda and a great importance during the Eastern 
enlargement, Twinning projects received only modest attention in academic and 
policy-related studies, even less so under the ENP. A limited number of 
Europeanisation studies and EU official documents produced selective evaluations 
of Twinning projects during the period of enlargement.4 Under the ENP, several 
aspects of TG cooperation have also been addressed. For example, it has been 
shown that EU TG cooperation is capable of promoting norms of democratic 
governance to the countries of the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood.5 It has 
                                                          
1 Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”; Slaughter, A New World 
Order. 
2 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual.” 
3 European Commission, “Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within the ENPI. Activity Report.” 
4 Court of Auditors, “Special Report No 6/2003 Concerning Twinning as the Main Instrument to Support 
Institution-Building in Candidate Countries Together with the Commission’s Replies”; Papadimitriou and 
Phinnemore, “Exporting Europeanization to the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform 
in the Candidate Countries and Beyond”; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and 
Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania”; Tulmets, “The Management 
of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the European Union: Institutional Twinning in 
Estonia and Hungary”; Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ 
EU Member States and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic.” 
5 Tina Freyburg et al., “EU Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood,” Journal of European 
Public Policy 16, no. 6 (September 2009): 916–34; Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for 
Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved 
State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
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also been found that, in many respects, EU TG cooperation was vulnerable to the 
same patterns of inconsistency stemming from adverse sectoral interests, like other 
types of EU cooperation in the neighbourhood.6 However, very few works have so 
far conceptualised the effectiveness of specific EU TG cooperation instruments 
under the ENP. In particular, with the main carrot of EU membership missing, it is 
not clear to what extent EU TG instruments like Twinning succeed in fostering legal 
and institutional convergence of the ENP countries in line with EU requirements. 
Even more importantly, we do not know under what conditions Twinning projects 
are successful or unsuccessful in triggering such convergence. 
In order to address those two aspects, this article examines data on 32 
Twinning projects implemented in Ukraine between 2007 and 2016 and covering 
sectors as diverse as justice and home affairs, trade, energy, social services, 
phytosanitary regulation, statistics, and finance. Data come from interviews with 45 
civil servants and experts from Ukraine, EU member states, and EU institutions, who 
were involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the selected 
Twinning projects. Narratives from the interviews were triangulated with a variety 
of secondary sources. Ukraine was selected for the study as the frontrunner under 
the ENP by the total number of completed Twinning projects and for offering rich 
variation across policy sectors and conditions behind Twinning effectiveness. 
Ukraine also presents a most likely case of legal and institutional convergence 
because of its relatively liberalised political regime and pro-EU aspirations. That 
means that the conditions hampering Twinning projects in Ukraine will also 
jeopardise EU TG cooperation in the other ENP countries that are less democratic 
or aspiring to join the EU. 
In explaining Twinning effectiveness, the article performs a Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) of four major conditions uncovered in the literature and 
during interviews, i.e., sector politicisation, sectoral conditionality, policy fit, and 
quality of communication. The emphasis of QCA on standardised computation 
procedures makes the process of comparison more rigorous, while at the same time 
preserving focus on individual cases. This methodology, along with the nature and 
depth of our data, allows for the most comprehensive evaluation of Twinning 
projects in a single country to date, as well as offers some room for replication and 
generalisation to other EU’s neighbours. 
In addition to providing an analytical and methodological tool for analysing the 
effectiveness of EU TG cooperation, this article challenges the mainstream 
theoretical accounts of the EU having a limited impact in the neighbourhood under 
the absence of membership conditionality. In particular, we find that norm 
application as the result of sectoral transfer of EU norms to the ENP countries occurs 
                                                          
6 Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral 
Economic Interests?” 
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to a greater degree than previously assumed.7 While addressing a dearth of studies 
on Twinning as the main EU’s TG instrument in general, we also seek enrich the 
Europeanisation and external governance frameworks with better understanding of 
EU norm transfer under the ENP via specific tools of EU TG cooperation. At the 
methodological level, we respond to the call by Papadimitriou and Phinnemore for 
more empirical research, which is “better placed to help us understand the differing 
meaning of Europeanisation across different sectors and countries as well as to 
locate the different mechanisms of its advocacy and the diverse domestic settings 
that mediate its success.”8 
The following section explains the theoretical underpinnings behind our 
research questions and conceptualises the effectiveness of Twinning cooperation. 
Using the available literature and interviews, we then identify a possible set of 
conditions of the (in)effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine. The data and 
methods section describes data collection strategies, operationalises outcomes and 
conditions, and introduces the method of QCA. The first part of the Discussion and 
Findings section reviews the effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine in terms 
of legal and institutional convergence. The second part discusses necessary and 
sufficient conditions of the (in)effectiveness of Twinning projects in the country. 
Conclusions recap the main points of the article, provide policy recommendations, 
and explore avenues for further research. Appendices provide additional data on 
QCA and other aspects of the analysis. 
2. Theoretical considerations 
The literature studying the transfer of EU norms to other countries under the 
European neighbourhood policy (ENP) came forth with a set of explanations 
facilitating or inhibiting such transfer, while leaving membership perspective out of 
the equation. 9  The formerly dominant top-down explanations of countries’ 
compliance with EU norms and regulations, attached to the condition of 
membership,10 yielded to more horizontal types of engagement, such as governance 
networks. These networks are capable of operating under the conditions of 
                                                          
7  Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine”; Börzel and Lebanidze, “European Neighbourhood Policy at the 
Crossroads Evaluating the Past to Shape the Future”; Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional 
Cooperation: The European Union and Its Neighbourhood. 
8 Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Exporting Europeanization to the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and 
Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond,” 17. 
9  Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by 
International Institutions”; Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 2014. 
10 Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration After Communism; Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe.” 
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symmetrical interdependence between the EU and ENP countries and a less 
ambitious set of rewards.11 One of such EU tools intending to harmonise the legal 
and regulatory environment of neighbours with the letter and spirit of EU law has 
been EU TG, or sectoral cooperation. 
In the post-accession period, several aspects of this network type of 
cooperation have already been addressed. For example, it was shown that EU TG 
cooperation is capable of promoting norms of democratic governance to the 
countries of the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood.12 While these and other 
works were generally optimistic about the potential of TG cooperation to result in 
legislative adoption of EU norms by the ENP countries, actual norm application or 
implementation clearly lagged behind.13 It was also shown that EU TG cooperation 
was in many respects vulnerable to the same patterns of inconsistency stemming 
from adverse sectoral interests, like other types of EU cooperation in the 
neighbourhood. 14  However, very few works have so far conceptualised the 
effectiveness of specific EU TG cooperation programs in the ENP. Those studies that 
did mainly originated in the pre-accession literature15 or lacked a solid theoretical 
lens by virtue of being policy-oriented.16 
The mentioned academic works in Europeanisation and EU external 
governance have also faced tough empirical and methodological choices between 
taking a broad perspective at the level of polity or politics and hence failing to 
evaluate the performance of specific types of TG cooperation, or studying a very 
narrow level of specific institutions while risking to omit broader important contexts 
and cross-sectional impacts. In addition, the great number of actors involved in a 
specific country and policy area often makes it difficult to disentangle the EU’s 
impact from that by other stakeholders, which is the case with studies looking at EU 
                                                          
11 Lavenex, “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe’”; Freyburg, Skripka, and Wetzel, “Democracy between 
the Lines? EU Promotion of Democratic Governance via Sector-Specific Co-Operation”; Sasse, “The European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours.” 
12  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood; Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional 
Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic 
Governance.” 
13  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood; Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union 
in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine”; Buzogány, “Selective Adoption of EU Environmental Norms in 
Ukraine. Convergence Á La Carte.” 
14 Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral 
Economic Interests?” 
15  Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning 
Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania”; Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: 
Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ EU Member States and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech 
Republic”; Tulmets, “The Management of New Forms of Governance by Former Accession Countries of the 
European Union: Institutional Twinning in Estonia and Hungary.” 
16 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report”; Tulmets, “Institution-Building Instruments in the Eastern 
Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement?” 
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TG cooperation in other countries from a wide, all-inclusive perspective. In 
investigating the effectiveness of EU TG projects in Ukraine, we perform a balancing 
act in that we focus on a single, albeit one of the most important, case of EU TG 
cooperation – Twinning – and trace its contribution to a wide variety of policy sectors 
within the country. In such a way, we can more readily establish the EU’s ownership 
behind a specific improvement if it has facilitated by the project. Therefore, 
analysing Twinning programs offers a fresh look at predominantly pessimistic 
theoretical expectations concerning norm adoption and application under the ENP. 
Twinning has been selected amongst other current EU TG tools and 
instruments like TAIEX, Sigma, or Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) because 
it stands the closest to the classic definition of TG cooperation17 owing to its 
emphasis on cross-border links between public servants and a relatively long 
duration (up to 36 months). Twinning exercise is also governed by strict contractual 
documents committing both sides to the achievement of so called mandatory 
results, which usually involve legal and institutional reforms in the target country 
and policy sector. The relatively long duration and emphasis of the Twinning 
projects on institutionalised peer-to-peer partnerships make Twinning more likely to 
be effective than other EU TG tools under the ENP. 
3. Effectiveness of Twinning cooperation 
Twinning effectiveness is conceptualised as either legal or institutional 
convergence with EU policy recommendations that happened in the beneficiary 
institution or policy sector as the result of a Twinning project.  
Legal convergence refers to the passage by the beneficiary country of a new 
law, secondary legislation, relevant amendments or decrees that draw on EU acquis 
and bilateral agreements between the EU and the ENP country (Action Plans, 
DCFTA). Legal convergence is often an explicit objective of the legal component in 
a typical Twinning project, which generally involves recommendations from MS 
experts on the current state of domestic legislation in the area of project interest, 
including legal research, presentation of proposed amendments to laws, draft laws, 
or sometimes limited lobbying activities in support of proposed legislative 
innovations. Although adoption of a new law is rarely an explicit target of 
cooperation (because of a voluntary nature of Twinning cooperation under the ENP), 
such an outcome is normally encouraged by a majority of Twinning projects and 
may testify to the project’s overall performance. In some cases, the legal component 
was not part of the Twinning project and such cases were noted during the analysis 
of legal convergence. 
                                                          
17 See Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations.” 
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Institutional convergence stands for organisational or policy changes in the 
beneficiary institution or policy sector in line with EU policy recommendations, as 
incorporated in a given Twinning project. Sometimes, institutional convergence 
happens as the result of legal convergence, that is, the adoption and then the 
implementation of a new law or regulation. However, in most cases, Twinning 
projects contain a designated institutional component, which seeks to make the 
beneficiary institution more efficient, transparent, and aligned with EU best 
administrative practices. For example, it enhances the organisational structure of 
the beneficiary institution, optimises distribution of responsibility and authority, or 
introduces innovations such as e-governance, improved accounting methods, 
databases, and better HRM techniques. In many cases, these organisational 
changes do not require a separate law but may be initiated through internal 
organisational statutes or relevant decrees by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 
An indicator of institutional convergence would also be the country’s membership in 
a related EU professional association, like Eurostat, or certain segments of the Single 
Market, following project completion. 
Our conceptualisation of legal and institutional convergence appears related to 
the existing notions of norm (rule) adoption and application, as conceived by the 
EU external governance literature.18 At the same time, it challenges the traditional 
approaches to norm application 19  as a stage that follows norm adoption and, 
according to some observers, precedes norm internalisation.20 Because legal and 
institutional convergence in the case of Twinning are usually not part of a sequence 
or a cycle, as is the case with norm adoption and application, we will stick with our 
own usage of the terms.  
3.1. Conditions of Twinning effectiveness 
With the help of the scholarly literature, EU official documents, and interviews, 
we identified four potential conditions behind the (in)effectiveness of Twinning 
projects: sector politicisation, EU sectoral conditionality, policy fit, and quality of 
communication. While most of these conditions have been mentioned in the relevant 
literature on EU TG cooperation or Twinning, there have been no systematic studies 
of their conjunctural causation in relation to the Twinning effectiveness. The 
conjunctural, or configurational causation implies that the causal path consists of a 
                                                          
18 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European 
Politics.” 
19  Ibid.; Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood; Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union 
in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine.” 
20 Morlino and Magen, “Methods of Influence, Layers of Impact, Cycles of Change: A Framework for Analysis.” 
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combination of conditions, in contrast to the probabilistic causation, where normally 
one most probable condition, or variable, takes precedence over the others.21 
3.1.1. Sector politicisation 
Scholars of European integration have argued that convergence with EU 
policies would be more encompassing in non-politicised areas of “low politics”, such 
as metrology or statistics, rather than in the politicised areas of “high politics”, such 
as the judiciary or civil service.22 In that vein, we define sector politicisation as the 
degree of vulnerability of a particular policy sector to a political or commercial 
conflict of interest. Our understanding is also in line with de Wilde’s concept of 
politicisation of decision-making, referring to the elevated influence of elected or 
appointed politicians in sectoral decision-making at the expense of bureaucrats, 
experts, and other specialised personnel. 23  Elsewhere in the literature, sector 
politicisation intersects with such concepts as policy area securitisation,24 domestic 
costs of policy adoption,25 presence of powerful veto players,26 presence of adverse 
sectoral interests,27 or sensitivity of the policy area.28 
In the context of Twinning cooperation, a high politicisation of the policy sector 
would mean that specific objectives of Twinning cooperation are perceived to 
threaten the power base of the incumbent government or cause interference with 
existing informal arrangements, including rent-seeking loopholes. Moreover, 
politicised sectors often witness a relatively high number of veto players powerful 
enough to block project recommendations from materialising into a law or 
administrative practice. Therefore, we would expect the legal and institutional 
convergence to dwindle with high sector politicisation. In contrast, the low 
politicisation of a policy sector should make a consensus over the need for legal and 
institutional changes promulgated by a Twinning project more likely and easier to 
achieve.  
                                                          
21 Rihoux and Ragin, Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related 
Techniques, 8. 
22  Langbein and Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European Union’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood”; Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: 
Compromised by Sectoral Economic Interests?”; Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and 
International Organization. 
23 De Wilde, “No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of European Integration,” 
561. 
24 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis; Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: 
Functionalism and International Organization. 
25 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe.” 
26 Dimitrova, “The New Member States of the EU in the Aftermath of Enlargement: Do New European Rules 
Remain Empty Shells?” 
27 Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral 
Economic Interests?” 
28  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood. 
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3.1.2. EU sectoral conditionality 
As recent Europeanisation studies have shown, adoption of EU laws and 
technical standards in the absence of membership perspective is not uniform across 
different policy sectors and may be conditional upon a set of rewards or sanctions 
that the EU attaches to reform progress in a given policy area.29 Under the ENP, 
these rewards may entail cheaper or easier access of the partner country’s exports 
to the EU single market, visa liberalisation, or membership in EU technical regulation 
bodies. Uniform measurement of the degree and credibility of the rewards the EU 
attaches to each policy area seems near impossible given the wide span of Twinning 
projects analysed (which are stretched in time and across a multitude of policy 
sectors). For that reason, we understand conditionality as the salience of reform in 
a specific policy area for the EU, as judged by references in relevant EU-Ukraine 
agreements, such as the DCFTA and visa liberalisation roadmaps.  
3.1.3. Policy fit 
Studies of EU external governance and Europeanisation also pointed out the 
importance of fit or compatibility of EU recommendations with the administrative 
traditions, technical capacities, and current needs of the recipient.30 Whereas some 
amount of misfit is important for a policy diffusion to occur in the first place,31 
sometimes the nature or magnitude of proposed changes makes them not feasible 
given the cultural or organisational specifics of domestic administrative structures.32 
In the context of Twinning, the operationalisation of policy fit stems from the quality 
and relevance of a project design for the current needs and capacities of the 
beneficiary institution. 
Despite the heavy presence of the beneficiary institution during most stages 
of Twinning project design,33 which is generally meant to ensure a high policy fit, 
reasons for a low policy fit may still take place. First, it normally takes up to two 
years (sometimes longer) between the time the project is conceived and the actual 
start of the project. In the meantime, objectives and priorities that were deemed 
                                                          
29 Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union in the 
Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine”; Delcour, “Multiple External Influences, Policy Conditionality and 
Domestic Change: The Case of Food Safety”; Langbein and Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in 
the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood”; Julia Langbein, “European Union Governance towards the 
Eastern Neigbourhood: Transcending or Redrawing Europe’s East-West Divide?,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 52, no. 1 (2014): 157–74. 
30 Hille and Knill, “‘It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid’: The Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in EU 
Candidate Countries, 1999-2003”; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing 
External Governance in European Politics.” 
31 Börzel and Risse, “From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction.” 
32 Hille and Knill, “‘It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid’: The Implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in EU 
Candidate Countries, 1999-2003.” 
33 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual,” 11. 
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relevant by the beneficiary country two years ago may not be so anymore. Given 
an extremely cumbersome process of amending the Twinning project contract, the 
Twins risk being stuck with an outdated agenda and objectives that do not fit the 
needs of the beneficiary country any longer.34 Second, a low fit may ensue from a 
poor quality of project design. In order to draft the Terms of References and a 
Twinning fiche, baseline documents for a future Twinning project, the European 
Commission often hires external experts with sometimes little knowledge of the 
domestic environment and peculiarities in a specific beneficiary institution. 35 
Alternatively, the fiche may have been poorly written by the representatives of the 
beneficiary institution, who turned out to be not well versed with the state of the 
art and the strategic requirements of a given policy area. 36  Under such 
circumstances, a favourable project outcome may be in doubt, save for its long-
term effectiveness. 
3.1.4. Quality of communication 
The quality of communication among Twinning participants has been 
considered by the existing literature as one of the vital factors during project 
implementation.37 The length of a typical Twinning project may be up to 36 months, 
which involves daily interaction and coordination between Resident Twinning 
Advisor and short-term experts from EU member states on the one side and the civil 
servants and experts from the beneficiary institution on the other side. Therefore, 
for the project to trigger a lasting change, it appears very important for participating 
civil servants to be able to reach consensus regarding the project’s activities and 
tasks on a daily basis. This also means that the contacts built among project 
participants will continue into the future, which makes sustainable change more 
likely. 
Possible sources of communication difficulties vary. They include personalities 
of project participants, local cultural contexts, and language barriers. However, 
major communication difficulties happened due to the personalities of the RTA38 
and beneficiary civil servants.39 In certain instances, as it happened to a Twinning 
project in Ukraine on competition policy, the project was suspended due to 
                                                          
34 Int. 28 with French civil servant, 23 March 2016. 
35 Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016. 
36 Int. 21 with Ukrainian civil servant, 10 March 2016. 
37 Königová, Tulmets, and Tomalová, “Twinning Projects: Analysing the Experience of ‘Old’ EU Member States 
and Evaluating Benefits of Twinning Out for the Czech Republic”; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 
“Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in 
Romania”; Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries 
Covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report”; BMUB, “Germany and the EU Twinning 
Instrument.” 
38 Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016; Int. 40 with Ukrainian expert, 21 April 2016. 
39 Int. 31 with French civil servants, 06 April 2016; Int. 41 with Ukrainian civil servants, 22 April, 2016. 
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mounting difficulties in communication between the parties and the RTA had to be 
replaced.40 In a project in the telecommunications sector, five RTAs and several 
project coordinators have changed because of irreconcilable difficulties in 
communication with their Ukrainian RTA counterpart and Project Leader.41 In most 
projects with severe communication difficulties, however, like the one in multimodal 
transport and administrative justice, participants still managed to carry the project 
through, yet not without detrimental consequences for project quality.42 
3.1.5. Alternative conditions 
After analysing interview data and relevant documents, we decided to exclude 
participation of new member states as a condition of effectiveness of the Twinning 
instrument in Ukraine from further analysis. This was done due to a lack of any 
apparent relationships either with legal or institutional convergence in respective 
projects. That showed that, contrary to some scholarly expectations,43 the recent 
transition experience and the closer cultural ties of some new member states with 
Ukraine apparently did not materialise in a TG cooperation that is more effective. In 
a similar fashion, the year of project implementation did not seem to be related with 
effectiveness and hence also dropped from the empirical analysis. 
4. Data and methods 
For the empirical analysis, we managed to pool sufficient information on 32 
out of 40 Twinning projects implemented in Ukraine between 2007 and 2016. The 
bulk of primary data came from 45 semi-structured interviews with Twinning 
participants and experts from Ukraine, the European Commission, and EU member 
states. We located our respondents through relevant Twinning documentation, open 
web sources, and a “snowball sampling approach”, using existing connections.44 
Interviews were conducted in several rounds of fieldwork in Ukraine and the EU 
between November 2014 and May 2016. For each project, we triangulated the 
interview data against relevant literature, official documents from EU and Ukrainian 
governmental websites, Twinning reports and press releases. The eight Twinning 
projects we could not find data on did not seem to display systematic differences 
with the Twinning projects for which we had sufficient data. 
                                                          
40 Akulenko, “Initial Results of the Twinning Instrument Implementation in Ukraine: Problems and Solutions.” 
41 Int. 40 with Ukrainian civil servant, 21 April 2016. 
42 Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016; Int. 40 with Ukrainian civil servant, 21 April 2016. 
43 Petrova, “The New Role of Central and Eastern Europe in International Democracy Support”; Pospieszna, 
Democracy Assistance from the Third Wave: Polish Engagement in Belarus and Ukraine. 
44 Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics. 
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In the process of the empirical analysis, legal and institutional convergence are 
coded as two independent outcomes of Twinning effectiveness. In assessing the 
effectiveness of each Twinning project, we take into consideration all project 
components and their subsequent impact on the beneficiary country and 
administration until up to two years after project completion. This period was 
arbitrarily selected in order to capture the procedural or other delays associated 
with adoption and implementation of specific policy solutions of Twinning. We 
assume that project-relevant changes that took place after the period of two years 
cannot be traced back to the project or are not relevant anymore. Therefore, a 
Twinning project is considered effective (1), or successful, if it has succeeded in 
triggering either legal or institutional convergence in the beneficiary institution or 
policy sector within the given period of time. If no such legal or institutional 
convergence occurred, the project is considered ineffective (0). With this time-span, 
we also included more recent projects (which have not passed the two-year 
threshold yet), as they may also show interesting dynamics, though some of them 
may necessitate more time to trigger legal or institutional convergence. 
As it was nearly impossible to trace all Twinning project components (which 
may be five or more) several years down the line, we picked out only the most 
important ones as seen from original Twinning documents and interviewees’ 
opinions. That task was made easier, because usually only a limited number of initial 
project intentions ended up making an impact and that the interviewees could 
readily recollect. It is also important to note here that we do not claim that Twinning 
projects will be exclusively responsible for a particular change that we will find in 
the legal or institutional landscape of Ukraine and that happens to relate to a 
particular Twinning project. Instead, legal and institutional convergence should be 
understood as a product of broader political and administrative processes in a 
specific policy area, of which Twinning is only a part, albeit an important one. 
As regards the conditions behind legal and institutional convergence, they were 
also coded on a dichotomous scale as 0 (no, mostly no, or low) and 1 (yes, high, or 
mostly high). The process of operationalisation and dichotomisation proceeded with 
close reference to the scholarly literature, interview data, and relevant official 
documents for each project analysed (Table 10, sources behind the 
operationalisation of outcomes and conditions are listed in Table 24 in the appendix, 
p. 194). In order to mitigate possible measurement error and preference bias, we 
also triangulated our measurements with several sources.45 
 
 
 
                                                          
45  Simon Hug, “Qualitative Comparative Analysis: How Inductive Use and Measurement Error Lead to 
Problematic Inference,” Political Analysis 21, no. 2 (2013): 252–65. 
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Table 10. Operationalisation of conditions behind Twinning effectiveness 
CONDITION CATEGORIES 
Sector 
politicisation 
0 {polit} – Policy area or institution involved in the project was relatively 
isolated from political and commercial conflict of interest 
 1 {POLIT} – Policy area or institution involved in the project was 
susceptible to political or commercial conflict of interest 
EU sectoral 
conditionality 
 
0 {cond} – EU placed limited emphasis on the country’s approximation 
in a given policy area, as judged by respective references in EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement or visa liberalisation roadmap 
 1 {COND} – EU placed strong emphasis on the country’s approximation 
in a given policy area, as judged by respective references in EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement or visa liberalisation roadmap 
Policy fit 0 {fit} – project goals and objectives did not match the current needs 
and capacities of the beneficiary institution  
 1 {FIT} – project goals and objectives matched the current needs and 
capacities of the beneficiary institution 
Communication 
quality 
0 {comun} – Twinning participants reported major interpersonal 
communication problems throughout the project 
 1 {COMUN} – Twinning participants reported no major interpersonal 
communication problems throughout the project 
 
In order to explore which conditions or their combinations lead to effective 
Twinning projects, we use a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Because QCA 
assumes multiple conjunctural causation, it successfully mitigates problems peculiar 
for statistical methods, such as assumptions of multicollinearity and causal 
symmetry. 46  In addition, the proponents of QCA over traditional quantitative 
methods emphasise its capacity to deal with a larger number of factors while staying 
in close connection with individual cases. Since QCA seeks to maintain an analytical 
rigour of comparison, its results are more likely to be replicated and generalised for 
other related phenomena of interest.47 
The QCA analysis distinguishes between sufficient and necessary conditions or 
configurations for an outcome to occur. A condition or configuration is considered 
necessary if it is always present when the outcome is present; otherwise, the 
outcome cannot occur. In contrast, a condition or configuration is considered 
sufficient if the outcome always occurs when the condition is present. However, the 
same outcome may also be a result of other (sufficient) conditions.48 Because legal 
and institutional convergence present as dichotomous outcomes, we are using the 
                                                          
46 Berg-Schlosser et al., “Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as an Approach,” 9. 
47 Ibid., 14. 
48 Rihoux and Ragin, Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related 
Techniques, xix. 
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crisp-set variant of QCA, or csQCA.49 The csQCA generates so-called “truth-tables”, 
listing configurations of conditions and outcomes, which may be either True (1) or 
False (0). After the coding of the outcome and conditions was complete, we 
performed a QCA of our data for necessity and sufficiency with the help of the “Kirq” 
application.50 
5. Discussion and findings 
5.1. How effective are Twinning projects in Ukraine? 
Following the process of data collection and preliminary analysis, we found that 
16 out of 32 (or 50%) Twinning projects in Ukraine to date have succeeded in 
facilitating a degree of legal or institutional convergence in their respective 
institutions and policy areas.51 Out of that number, 10 projects (31%) have resulted 
in legal convergence, 12 projects (38%) – in institutional, and seven projects (22%) 
resulted in both legal and institutional convergence in the respective policy sectors 
in Ukraine. The remaining 16 (50%) projects have not yet triggered any legal or 
institutional changes in Ukraine. 
In addition to data in Table 24 in the appendix, it should be noted that the 
timeline of legal convergence varied for different projects. For example, project Rail 
managed to have relevant revisions to the law on rail transport passed by the 
parliament before the official closing ceremony for the project.52 Similarly, projects 
Bank, Space, Accred, NERC1, and NERC2 were also quick to facilitate legal 
convergence in their respective policy sectors. 53  Other Twinning projects, like 
ServDev, FoodSafety, and Standardiz took somewhat longer to result in news law 
and regulations. 54  That means lawmakers requested the recommendations 
produced by those projects only later or, alternatively, they solicited follow-up 
assistance from former Twinning experts, as was the case with ServDev and the 
now functioning Law on Civil Service in Ukraine.55 In some cases, the project 
resulted in legal convergence in the policy area beyond its contractual scope, like it 
                                                          
49 Schneider and Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for the Social Sciences: A Guide to Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis, 277. 
50 Christopher Reichert and Claude Rubinson, “Kirq [Computer Program]” (Houston, TX: University of Houston-
Downtown, 2014), http://grundrisse.org/qca/download/. 
51 See Table 24 in the appendix. 
52 Int. 40 with Ukrainian civil servant, 21 April 2016; Int. 42 with Ukrainian expert, 07 May 2016. 
53 Int. 23 with European Commission official, 16 March 2016; Int. 24 with Polish civil servant, 20 March 2016; 
Int. 28 with French civil servant, 23 March 2016. 
54 Int. 12 with Polish civil servant, 02 April 2015; Int. 27 with Danish civil servant, 23 March 2016; Int. 33 with 
Ukrainian civil servant, 18 April 2016; Int. 34 with Ukrainian civil servant, 19 April 2016. 
55 Int. 12 with Polish civil servant, 02 April 2015. 
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happened with projects Troops and Accred, which produced amendments to the 
laws that were not part of these projects’ original intentions.56 
Interestingly, most cases of institutional convergence were not linked to legal 
convergence. For example, in projects AdmCourts, Bank, Rail, FoodSafety, and 
Satellite, Ukrainian civil servants adopted new skills and organisational procedures 
in line with EU best practices without needing a separate law. 57  The Higher 
Administrative Court of Ukraine, thanks to the AdmCourts project, introduced 
innovative methods of case management and reporting in its daily work.58 The three 
other Twinning projects – Statistics1, Statistics2, and Statistics3 – allowed the State 
Statistical Service of Ukraine to jump start to the latest registers and methodologies 
practiced by Denmark, France, and other EU member states.59 In some other cases, 
institutional convergence resulted in the recognition of Ukrainian institutions by EU 
public bodies. For example, several years after the FoodSafety project, Ukraine was 
allowed to export poultry to the EU60 and, similarly, the National Accreditation 
Agency of Ukraine was recognised by the European Cooperation for Accreditation 
after the Accred project.61 Unfortunately, however, the beneficiary institution could 
often not embrace major policy or organisational changes without relevant 
legislative amendments in the Parliament.62 In other cases, the newly adopted laws 
were not adequately implemented.63 
Overall, these data indicate that that Twinning projects in Ukraine have a 
moderate degree of effectiveness. Nevertheless, the line between effective and 
ineffective projects may be rather thin. For example, most of the Twinning projects 
we classified as ineffective have still propelled useful policy recommendations and 
skills base, which could potentially be used by the beneficiary at some point in the 
future, although their impact seems limited or unclear at the moment. Some 
interviewees backed this point by expressing the confidence that, once the demand 
arises in the political system, Ukrainian policymakers may go back to Twinning 
recommendations and reports for inspiration.64 Likewise, most Twinning projects 
that have been regarded as effective have capitalised on a limited number of their 
                                                          
56 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report.”; Int. 40 with Ukrainian civil servant, 21 April 2016. 
57 Int. 24 with Polish civil servant, 20 March 2016; 27, Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016; Int. 
42 with Ukrainian expert, 07 May 2016. 
58 Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016. 
59 Int. 7 with Danish civil servant, 01 December 2014; Int. 11 with Danish civil servant, 26 March 2015; Int. 15 
with Danish civil servant, 05 May 2015. 
60 Int. 27 with Danish civil servant, 23 March 2016. 
61 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report.” 
62 Int. 25 with Dutch civil servant, 21 March 2016; Int. 38 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016; Int. 40 
with Ukrainian civil servant, 21 April 2016. 
63 Int. 33 with Ukrainian civil servant, 18 April 2016. 
64 Int. 25 with Dutch civil servant, 21 March 2016; Int. 26 with Ukrainian civil servant, 22 March 2016; Int. 33 
with Ukrainian civil servant, 18 April 2016. 
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original intentions (one or two components out of five or more). There has been no 
Twinning project to date in Ukraine that has reached all of its objectives and made 
all the planned changes in the beneficiary administration.  
 
Table 11. Analysis of sufficiency (parsimonious solutions, incl. logical remainders) 
Outcome Cons. Raw 
cov. 
Uniq 
cov. 
Case IDs 
Effectiveness 
FIT 0.93 0.78 0.56 Accred, AdmCourts, Bank, FoodSafety, NERC2, 
Police, Rail, RoadSafety, Satellite, ServDev, 
Standardiz, Statistics1,Statistics2, Statistics3, 
Troops 
Solution total 1.00 1.00 n/a n/a 
NO effectiveness 
 fit 1.00 0.17 0.11 Audit, Aviation, Competition, Copyright, Debt,  
Efficiency, FDI, Judges, KRU, Multimodal, NERC1, 
Phytosan, ServTrain, Social, Telecomms 
Solution total 1.00 1.00 n/a n/a 
Legal convergence 
COND*FIT 1.00 0.78 0.56 Accred, NERC2, Standardiz, Bank, Rail, 
FoodSafety, ServDev 
polit*FIT 1.00 0.44 0.22 Bank, Rail, RoadSafety, Troops 
Solution total 1.00 1.00 n/a n/a 
NO legal convergence 
fit 1.00 0.81 0.56 Audit, Aviation, Competition, Copyright, Debt, 
Efficiency, FDI, Judges, KRU, Land, Multimodal, 
NERC1, Phytosan, Police, Social, Telecomms 
POLIT*cond 1.00 0.44 0.19 AdmCourts, Audit, Copyright, Judges, KRU, Land, 
Police 
Solution total 1.00 1.00 n/a n/a 
Institutional convergence 
FIT 1.00 1.00 1.00 Accred, AdmCourts, Bank, FoodSafety, Police, 
Rail, RoadSafety, Satellite, Standardiz, Statistics1, 
Statistics2, Statistics3, Troops 
Solution total 1.00 1.00 n/a n/a 
NO institutional convergence 
fit 1.00 1.00 1.00 Audit, Aviation, Competition, Debt, Efficiency,  
FDI, Judges, KRU, Multimodal, NERC1, Phytosan, 
ServTrain, Social, Space, Telecomms 
Solution total 1.00 1.00 n/a n/a 
NOTE: In presenting the results of QCA, we use the standard notation and Boolean expressions according to 
Ragin and Rihoux (2009). Capitalised labels (POLIT) refer to true (1) values and the low-case labels (polit) refer 
to false (0) values on respective conditions. Boolean expressions AND and OR are represented by signs * and 
+, respectively. Consistency and coverage measure the degree of fit of the formula (solution) to the data. 
Consistency measures the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in 
displaying the outcome. Coverage indicates how much of the outcome is explained by the solution. Thereby, 
“raw coverage” shows which share of the outcome is explained by a certain alternative path and “unique 
coverage” indicates which share of the outcome is exclusively explained by a certain alternative path.1 Solution 
coverage summarises coverage values for all alternative paths in an analysis of sufficiency. 
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5.1. What determines effectiveness of Twinning 
projects in Ukraine? 
Because legal and institutional convergence, as well as effectiveness, are 
treated as analytically distinct categories, we performed separate QCAs on each of 
them and on their negations. The following paragraphs present the results of the 
necessity and sufficiency analyses of our data, including parsimonious solution 
formulae, which maximally reflect causal mechanisms at play.65  
The analysis of necessity (Table 23 in the appendix, p. 193), returned one 
necessary condition behind Twinning effectiveness – policy fit. The separate 
analyses of necessity for legal and institutional convergence produced similar 
results, with an exception of legal convergence, which occurred in 75% of projects 
with a good policy fit. That still suggests that nearly every single Twinning project 
in Ukraine that resulted in either legal or institutional convergence boasted of a 
good project design and compatibility with the needs and technical capacities of the 
beneficiary institution. The analysis of sufficiency mainly confirms those results in 
that condition FIT is present in every alternative path (Table 11). That finding 
resonates with one of our respondents, who said:  
The effectiveness of Twinning projects depends on how technical objectives have 
been spelled out. If they have been formulated correctly, especially as regards our 
needs, desired results, and necessary experts, then the project will be successful. If 
you approach a project in a sort of general way, it will not be successful.66 
At the same time, policy fit is the necessary but not sufficient condition for 
legal convergence. In a clear majority of cases, a good policy fit needs to be 
reinforced by EU sectoral conditionality to result in legal convergence. An 
alternative causal path, where such conditionality is absent, requires instead a 
combination of good policy fit with low sector politicisation for the project to lead 
to legal convergence. In contrast to legal convergence, institutional convergence 
ensued solely because of a good policy fit of the project, notwithstanding 
politicisation or communication problems, especially as was the case with 
AdmCourts. An interviewee from that project corroborated this finding:  
We asked Twinning experts to specify clearly their intended contributions prior to 
coming to Ukraine. I think this clarity of objectives in project design and the 
understanding by Twinning experts of the administrative justice system in Ukraine 
was the main reason for project effectiveness.67  
That also brings us to the conclusion that institutional convergence still 
happens in sectors considered politicised and bypassed by EU sectoral conditionality. 
                                                          
65 Michael Baumgartner, “Parsimony and Causality,” Quality and Quantity 49, no. 2 (2014): 839. 
66 Int. 6 with Ukrainian civil servant, 28 November 2014. 
67 Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016. 
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After learning what sets of conditions lead to Twinning projects being effective, 
it would be worthwhile to discover more about Twinning projects that resulted in 
neither legal nor institutional convergence. The analysis of necessity for negation 
outcomes almost mirrored that for the positive outcomes. It revealed that the low 
fit of project objectives with the administrative needs and capacities of the 
beneficiary institution was the main culprit behind all ineffective Twinning projects 
in Ukraine.68 The analysis of sufficiency, while confirming those results, also pointed 
to some variety in causal paths leading to no legal convergence (Table 22 in the 
appendix). For example, several “politicised” projects, overlooked by EU sectoral 
conditionality, failed to result in legislative change in spite of the good policy fit. 
6. Conclusions 
This article offered the first theoretically informed evaluation of EU TG 
cooperation under the ENP by using Twinning projects in Ukraine as cases. Under 
effectiveness we understood the fact of legal or institutional convergence that 
occurred in aftermath of a Twinning project in a respective policy sector or 
institution in Ukraine. Upon analysis of 45 interviews and official documents, we 
found that around half of all Twinning projects analysed in Ukraine have facilitated 
some degree of legal or institutional convergence to date. On the one hand, that 
speaks of a rather modest degree of Twinning effectiveness in the country. On the 
other hand, because most of effective Twinning projects resulted in institutional 
convergence of the beneficiary administration, we cannot agree with the existing 
scholarly accounts suggesting the limited implementation of EU norms in the ENP 
countries.69  Our findings in the case of Ukraine reveal that the rates of legal 
convergence (norm adoption) roughly correspond to those of institutional 
convergence (norm application). In that sense, we do not agree with the scholars 
of Europeanisation who point to a large gap between norm adoption and application 
in the ENP countries as the result of EU TG cooperation.70 
By applying insights of configurational (conjunctural) causality, we also 
performed a QCA on four major conditions, which could possibly make or break a 
Twinning project – sectoral politicisation, EU sectoral conditionality, policy fit, and 
quality of communication. We found policy fit to be the only necessary condition of 
Twinning effectiveness. That basically means that Twinning projects in politicised 
policy sectors, with low conditionality through visa or trade-related agreements with 
                                                          
68 See Table 23 in the appendix, p. 182. 
69  Freyburg et al., Democracy Promotion by Functional Cooperation: The European Union and Its 
Neighbourhood; Langbein and Wolczuk, “Convergence without Membership? The Impact of the European Union 
in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine.” 
70 Ibid. 
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the EU, and experiencing communication difficulties may still be effective. They only 
need to be properly customised to the administrative realities of the beneficiary in 
the project inception stage.  
The analysis of legal convergence shows that a good policy fit of the project is 
necessary, but not in itself sufficient to produce legislative change. Instead, it has 
to be combined either with EU sectoral conditionality or with low sectoral 
politicisation. In cases of successful institutional convergence, it is only a good policy 
fit that mattered. Lower dependence on EU sectoral conditionality in the cases of 
institutional convergence may be explained by the very nature of sectoral change 
via Twinning, whereby Ukrainian civil servants could embrace best EU practices in 
their daily work without necessarily having to pass a law. Twinning projects resulting 
in neither legal nor institutional convergence most frequently suffered from a poor 
fit of objectives with the current needs and technical capacities of the beneficiary 
institution. In a few other cases, the lack of EU conditionality and politicisation may 
have become a stumbling block.  
To sum up, the success of Twinning projects in Ukraine seems to be a result 
of complex interactions between various conditions, both domestic and EU-related. 
The likely favourite in the explanatory power of Twinning effectiveness – policy fit 
– also has multiple facets to it. On the one hand, the EU should pay more attention 
to how it designs its Twinning projects, making sure there is an intimate 
understanding of the administrative traditions and needs on the ground.71 For that 
reason, the choice of experts, both those drafting the project fiche and those 
actually delivering expertise, is of pivotal importance. Because the ENP country 
assumes a leading role in the design of the project fiche, part of the responsibility 
for ensuring the accuracy and relevance of Twinning objectives lies on the 
beneficiary. Unfortunately, an excellent project design does not make it immune to 
unexpected organisational shifts and changes of policy priorities or even 
disappearance of a would-be beneficiary, as it is often the case in Ukraine.72 Under 
those circumstances, it also is essential that the EU cut back on project preparation 
times (which currently may run up to two years), thus mitigating to a degree the 
deleterious effects of an unstable political and institutional environment.73 The EU 
must also provide more room for last-minute changes to project objectives, should 
                                                          
71 Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014; Int. 6 with Ukrainian civil servant, 28 November 2014; 
Int. 18 with Twinning experts, 11 August 2015;  Int. 21 with Ukrainian civil servant, 10 March 2016;  Int. 24 
with Polish civil servant, 20 March 2016; Int. 29 with Swedish civil servant, 24 March 2016; Int. 30 with French 
expert, 05 April 2016; Int. 37 with Ukrainian civil servant, 20 April 2016. 
72 Int. 1 with Ukrainian expert, 15 November 2014; Int. 22 with Austrian civil servant, 11 March 2016; Int. 30 
with French expert, 05 April 2016; Int. 32 with German civil servant, 11 April 2016; Int. 40 with Ukrainian civil 
servant, 21 April 2016. 
73 Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014; Int. 11 with Danish civil servant, 26 March 2015, Int. 
42 with Ukrainian expert, 07 May 2016. 
134  ARTICLE 4 
the need arise.74 Finally, before considering a Twinning project in Ukraine, the EU 
needs to make sure it attaches a right amount of stick and carrots to reform in that 
policy area in the EU’s bilateral agreements with the country.75 
Another factor possibly affecting the odds of success of EU Twinning in some 
sectors in Ukraine is a Russian aggressive foreign policy in the region. For example, 
in some projects and policy areas, like Space and FoodSafety, the Russian factor 
may arguably have pushed Ukraine towards the EU’s market.76 In earlier Twinning 
projects, like NERC1 and NERC2 in the field of energy and gas regulation, the 
Russian pressure may have prevented Ukrainian authorities from implementing the 
EU’s Second Energy Package, as promulgated by these projects.77 Nowadays, with 
Ukraine desperately securing alternative sources of energy supplies, mainly from 
the EU, the situation may see an about-turn. That will take more time and research 
to gain better understanding of Ukraine-EU-Russia interdependencies in those 
particular sectors. Yet in all other Twinning projects analysed in Ukraine, the Russian 
factor did not seem significant. 
Although the methodology of this study allows for replication and modest levels 
of generalisation, domestic conditions in Ukraine appear quite different from those 
in other ENP or even Eastern neighbourhood countries. For example, the 
institutional environment in Ukraine is rigid, characterised by the hierarchical 
structures of decision-making, and at the same time very fluid, experiencing 
frequent rotations of staff and political perturbations. As the European Commission 
reported, Twinning in Ukraine has never been high on the political agenda, unlike 
in most other ENP countries.78 For example, from the outset, we discovered that 
virtually all Twinning projects in the country suffered from a lack of political 
commitment and high public personnel turnovers in the beneficiary institution, 
which undermined institutional memory and, by extension, project sustainability in 
the long term.79 Nonetheless, the good news is that many Twinning projects in 
Ukraine were effective despite those daunting background problems. It gives us 
some optimism about the performance of Twinning cooperation in other ENP 
countries with relatively more stable political and institutional environments than 
                                                          
74 Int. 4 with Ukrainian civil servant, 25 November 2014; Int. 18 with Twinning experts, 11 August 2015; Int. 
22 with Austrian civil servant, 11 March 2016; Int. 26 with Ukrainian civil servant, 22 March 2016; Int. 28 with 
French civil servant, 23 March 2016; Int. 35 with Swedish civil servant, 19 April 2016; Int. 41 with Ukrainian 
civil servants, 22 April, 2016. 
75 Int. 15 with Danish civil servant, 05 May 2015; Int. 21 with Ukrainian civil servant, 10 March 2016; Int. 30 
with French expert, 05 April 2016. 
76 Int. 28 with French civil servant, 23 March 2016; Julia Langbein, “Unpacking the Russian and EU Impact on 
Policy Change in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The Case of Ukraine’s Telecommunications and Food Safety,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 4 (2013): 652. 
77 Ademmer, Delcour, and Wolczuk, “Beyond Geopolitics: An Introduction to the Impact of the EU and Russia 
in the ‘contested Neighborhood.’” 
78 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by 
the European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report,” 42. 
79 Those conditions were excluded from the QCA due to an almost zero variation. 
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Ukraine’s.  
Comparative studies of Twinning and other EU TG projects in the Eastern and 
Southern neighbourhoods, as well as in accession candidates, may provide 
additional clues about the conditions we examined here, and perhaps be able to 
reflect more on the importance of EU membership prospects and aspirations for 
convergence with EU norms in the case of Twinning and EU TG cooperation overall. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The following sections summarise the main findings of the study, embed them in a 
broader discussion of the relevant literature, explain the limitations, provide avenues 
for further research, and offer policy-relevant recommendations. 
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1. Main findings 
Following the big-bang enlargement in early 2000s, the EU found itself 
searching for more effective tools of engagement with a dozen of new neighbours 
in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood without committing to further 
enlargement. As a result, the EU launched the ENP in 2004 in order to encourage 
its new neighbours to undertake political and institutional reforms in line with the 
EU’s standards. In response, the EU promised those countries a more humble than 
during accession set of incentives, such as prospects of visa liberalisation and 
greater access to the EU Single Market. For that reason, the EU’s ability to exert 
influence on the ENP countries has come across a barrage of criticism from 
observers, mainly because of the lack of membership perspective and also because 
the existing rewards have been too modest, vague, or undefined.  
Under such circumstances, scholars of Europeanisation and EU external 
governance have pointed out the horizontal nature of EU TG cooperation as being 
capable of facilitating the transfer of EU democratic and regulatory standards to the 
ENP countries. In this way, those authors seek to deviate from the hierarchical 
governance of the accession conditionality in explaining EU relations with other 
countries. Despite a currently growing interest in TG cooperation among EU scholars 
and practitioners, its functioning under the ENP still has many unchartered areas, 
some of which I aimed to be address with this dissertation.1 In particular, the four 
articles included here shed more light on the democratic substance, the MS 
dimension, and the overall effectiveness of EU TG cooperation under the ENP, while 
using the Twinning instrument in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood countries as an 
empirical case (Table 12). 
 
                                                          
1 More info in Sections 1-3 of the introduction. 
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1.1. Democratic substance of EU TG cooperation: The 
buck stops home 
Before scrutinising the democratic governance substance of EU TG 
cooperation, I provided a general overview of the literature on EU democracy 
promotion in the neighbourhood (Article 1). In such a way, I presented EU TG 
cooperation as a promising tool of EU democracy promotion in the absence of a 
membership perspective.1 On surveying a range of relevant research, I found that 
EU democracy promotion policy under the ENP was often inconsistent and reactive 
towards democratic violations in the neighbourhood. Oftentimes, the EU followed 
suit of other players, for example the U.S., in framing its democracy promotion 
policy. In other cases, EU democracy promotion was not successful because of 
Russia’s geopolitical interests in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. One of the most 
oft-cited sources of inconsistency in EU democracy promotion is a conflict between 
the normative ideals of democracy, on the one side, and strategic, commercial or 
geopolitical interests, on the other. Perhaps, a more vivid manifestation of the 
limited role of the EU is a relative consensus in the literature that the recent 
democratic uprisings in the neighbourhood, like the Colour Revolutions, the Arab 
Spring, and more recently the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, have mainly been 
the result of domestic factors in countries concerned. Even though the pro-EU 
aspirations may have exceptionally triggered the Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, 
domestic forces inside the country actually led to a change of leadership. Therefore, 
despite the EU’s claim for responsibility in the neighbourhood, it should be noted 
that one needs to be cautious while establishing the EU’s effectiveness versus that 
by other domestic and international actors. 
The EU has adopted a variety of instruments in its democracy promotion policy 
in the neighbourhood, some of which are more successful, some less. One of the 
most debated and reportedly successful instruments in the context of the EU’s 
Eastern enlargement was accession conditionality, whereby an EU membership was 
contingent upon a set of pre-agreed democratic and legislative reform targets, 
which aspiring candidates had to meet. After the enlargement, the EU became 
reluctant to expand further East, and hence the EU’s leverage over the ENP 
countries diminished. The tools of the EU’s linkage, referring to the support of 
grassroots organisations in other countries, have also reportedly brought little bang 
for the buck. Scholars suggested that the governance model of democracy 
promotion might be an answer to the absence of the main carrot of membership. 
By diffusing the norms of democratic governance at the sectoral level via TG 
                                                          
1  Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Democracy Promotion in the Neighbourhood: From Leverage to 
Governance?” 
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cooperation, they argued, the EU could get another chance to succeed in democracy 
promotion in the ENP countries. 
After contextualising TG cooperation in the broader literature on EU democracy 
promotion, I took a closer look at the democratic governance substance of EU TG 
cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood (Article 2). The available literature did 
not produce systematic evaluations of the democratic governance substance of EU 
TG cooperation, having limited itself to its general impacts and the underlying 
processes of socialisation as concerns promotion of democratic governance. It was 
not clear, for example, to what extent democratic governance norms of 
transparency, accountability, and participation were present in the specific instances 
of EU TG cooperation under the ENP and what factors could explain the variation of 
those norms across different projects, policy sectors, and countries.  
Using a sample of 117 Twinning project fiches from the Eastern neighbourhood 
between 2006 and 2015, I classify the democratic governance substance of EU TG 
programmes according to its configuration and magnitude. Thus, a majority of 
Twinning projects in the region displays mixed democratic governance substance, 
whereby no single democratic governance norm prevails. Transparency-oriented 
projects are runner-ups, followed by accountability- and participation-oriented 
projects, which are somewhat lagging behind. As for the magnitude, most Twinning 
projects in the Eastern neighbourhood display a medium level of democratic 
governance substance, which generally stays the same among the different 
countries analysed. As regards the specific sectors, Twinning projects in the 
environmental sector show the highest average values for the democratic 
governance substance and its three categories, whereas those in transport and 
statistics – the lowest. In further exploring this variation, I tested several EU-related 
and domestic structure explanations. I hypothesised that the democratic 
governance substance of EU TG projects would vary with the level of the beneficiary 
country’s political liberalisation, sectoral politicisation, sector technical complexity, 
and the EU’s sectoral conditionality. 
Statistical analysis reveals that, first, Twinning projects in more politically 
liberalised countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine tend to include more 
democratic governance substance than Twinning projects in democratic laggards 
like Armenia and Azerbaijan. That is especially so for the average values for 
accountability and participation, whereas the average for transparency did not vary 
considerably across the countries. According to my operationalisation, the Twinning 
objectives pertaining to accountability and participation presumed concrete 
obligations on the part of the beneficiary institution, for example, to involve non-
state actors and reformat its organisational structure in order to strengthen vertical 
and horizontal accountability. For that reason, perhaps, embracing transparency as 
a normative point of reference in TG cooperation with the EU is easier for the less 
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democratic Eastern neighbourhood countries than embracing the other, apparently 
more demanding dimensions of democratic governance substance. The 
unexpectedly lower democratic governance substance of Twinning projects in 
Ukraine suggests, in line with some of my interviewees’ opinions, that this country, 
while being more liberalised at the political level, remains relatively closed to change 
at the sectoral level of public administration. 
Second, opposite to my original hypothesis, with an increase in the level of 
sector politicisation, I actually observed an increase in the democratic governance 
substance of Twinning projects. Besides hinting at the common sense that it is the 
politicised sectors that need to be democratised most, this finding also suggests 
that the EU may enjoy a greater leverage versus the beneficiary country in deciding 
whether or not to include provisions for democratic governance in Twinning 
cooperation. That goes somewhat against the hypothesis, found for example in 
Anne Wetzel’s study of EU sectoral governance in the Eastern neighbourhood,2 that 
the EU will water down its emphasis on participatory governance in policy sectors 
susceptible to a conflict of political or commercial interest. Nevertheless, I should 
admit, this relationship between politicisation and democratic governance substance 
does not seem to hold in Azerbaijan. That may be explained by the generally low 
interest of Azerbaijan in EU integration and, as the result, reduced EU’s leverage in 
promoting democratic governance in “politicised” Twinning projects in the country. 
Third, I provide evidence for the claim in the public administration literature 
that policy fields requiring an advanced level of scientific expertise (calculus skills, 
economic models, or lab testing in natural sciences) are less likely to embrace the 
norms of democratic governance. The analysis of Twinning fiches on the individual 
dimensions of democratic governance substance reveals that it is especially so in 
the case of participation, whereby contributions by non-state actors are hardly ever 
encouraged in technically complex policy areas.  
Lastly, I uncover no conclusive empirical support for the hypothesis that the 
EU’s sectoral conditionality (bargaining power) is related to a change in the 
democratic governance substance and its indicators in the sample of Twinning 
projects analysed.3 That points us in two directions. First, the EU’s “carrots” of visa 
liberalisation or facilitation of trade (which influence the EU’s bargaining power) play 
a decisive role neither in the EU’s capacity/willingness to include more democratic 
governance substance in EU TG cooperation, nor in the beneficiary’s institution 
propensity to make such substance a contractual obligation for Twinning. 
Alternatively, clauses relating to trade or visa liberalisation in the context of EU 
                                                          
2 Wetzel, “The Promotion of Participatory Governance in the EU’s External Policies: Compromised by Sectoral 
Economic Interests?” 
3 The t-tests on separate countries, however, supplied inconclusive evidence of such relationship in the category 
“participation”, which may be positively related to the presence of EU sectoral conditionality in respective 
Twinning projects. 
CONCLUSIONS  143 
 
relations with the ENP region may be less about the promoting of democratic 
governance and more about the removing of technical barriers and the 
implementation of the trade-related acquis. 
In sum, the regression analysis tipped the scales towards the country’s political 
liberalisation, sector technical complexity, and sector politicisation as explaining the 
greatest variation in the dependent variable. It can be concluded then with some 
caution (see Section 2 below for limitations) that the domestic variables in the 
Eastern neighbourhood are mainly responsible for variation of democratic 
governance substance in EU TG cooperation in the countries concerned. That 
conclusion is roughly in line with the EU’s commitment to the domestic ownership 
of Twinning projects by the beneficiary administration.4 
1.2. CEECs and old MS: Comparing apples and 
oranges? 
Whilst the promotion of democracy and democratic governance through EU 
TG cooperation had some theoretical background, available academic studies almost 
completely overlooked the role of MS in EU TG cooperation. Based on 40 semi-
structured interviews with Twinning officials and experts, I investigated the added 
value that CEECs and the older MS brought for EU Twinning projects in the cases of 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine (Article 3). An added value was conceptualised as the 
combined comparative advantages of a group of MS, as perceived by Twinning 
stakeholders.  
I find that the participation of CEECs does offer a specific added value for 
Twinning cooperation, mainly because of their country-specific comparative 
advantages. Those are the recent transition and accession experience, socio-
linguistic similarities, and shared historical legacies with the EU’s Eastern 
neighbours. The transition and accession experience of CEECs seems very important 
for Twinning partners from the Eastern neighbourhood. It is believed to provide 
more legitimacy and credibility for civil servants from CEECs, most of whom can 
personally relate to the thorny path of reforms in their home countries before EU 
accession. Their comparative advantage is also reinforced by the fact of CEECs’ 
participation in Twinning projects as beneficiaries during their EU accession. 
Furthermore, many CEECs have been preferred partners owing to their geopolitical, 
cultural, and historical proximity with Azerbaijan and Ukraine. In that respect, the 
Baltic states proved to be best placed since they were also part of the Soviet Union. 
My interviewees also concur that the cultural and linguistic similarities (e.g., 
                                                          
4 European Commission, “Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies: Common Twinning 
Manual,” 11. 
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command of the Russian language) make partners from CEECs preferable to those 
from the older MS.  
As for the older MS, they are also found to offer an added value for EU TG 
cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood, yet mostly at the sectoral level rather 
than at the country level. The sector-specific comparative advantages of the older 
MS consist in their institutional experience, existing sectoral networks, sectoral fit 
with the beneficiary, and prior history of Twinning cooperation. First, their 
institutional experience is rooted in their long history of trial-and-error in public 
administration reforms and solid international reputation in particular sectors. 
Second, older MS often have an advantage of sectoral compatibility with the 
administrative styles and structures in the Eastern neighbourhood countries. For 
instance, Ukraine prefers to work with France in the area of statistics owing to the 
similar regional structure of collecting and processing of statistical information in 
the two countries. Third, some older MS are already engaged in bilateral cooperation 
at the sectoral level with the Eastern neighbourhood countries. As the result, 
beneficiary administrations in Azerbaijan and Ukraine have often preferred Twinning 
partners from the older MS so as to carry on existing cooperation or acquire useful 
connections for the future. That is usually not the case with CEECs. Finally, both the 
older MS and CEECs boast of a significant track record of Twinning cooperation in 
the past, which enables them to avoid common pitfalls during project 
implementation. However, in the case of the older MS, this comparative advantage 
comes from a prior Twinning experience in different countries on the sending side, 
whereas CEECs mostly were Twinning recipients during their accession negotiations.  
My analysis also confirms the hypothesis that the country-specific comparative 
advantages by CEECs and the sector-specific comparative advantages by the older 
MS will be complementary. For that reason, perhaps, most Twinning projects 
analysed in Azerbaijan and Ukraine have included a consortium of partners from 
both CEECs and the older MS. A vast majority of interviewees also regard the joint 
participation of civil servants and experts from those groups of MS as “a perfect 
match”. 
1.3. Effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine:  
To fit or not to fit 
Although Twinning has been the most important EU TG instrument for 
institution-building during the accession and then in the ENP, its effectiveness has 
received scarce coverage among the EU scholars. In a bid to alleviate this gap, I 
sought to identify to what extent Twinning projects in Ukraine have been effective 
in fostering legal or institutional convergence in corresponding policy sectors. I 
singled out a set of conditions potentially leading to the (in)effectiveness of 
Twinning projects. My analysis of 45 interviews, triangulated through official 
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documents, demonstrates that 50% of all Twinning projects in Ukraine have induced 
a degree of legal or institutional convergence in the beneficiary institution and policy 
sector. That speaks of a moderate degree of Twinning effectiveness in the country. 
Interestingly, due to the sectoral character of TG cooperation, instances of legal and 
institutional convergence have occurred in parallel, not consecutive to each other. 
In addition, institutional convergence has been more prevalent than legal. 
In order to explain which conditions lead to the (in)effectiveness of Twinning 
projects in Ukraine, I applied the configurational logic of a QCA to four major 
conditions, identified through the available literature and interviews: sectoral 
politicisation, EU sectoral conditionality, policy fit, and quality of communication. 
The QCA showed that policy fit was the single necessary condition of Twinning 
effectiveness. That means that all effective Twinning projects in Ukraine must fit 
well with the administrative traditions, current needs, and capacities of the 
respective beneficiary institution. The QCA of conditions behind the Twinning 
ineffectiveness points to a lack of such fit as a culprit behind the failure of Twinning 
projects to result in legal or institutional convergence. 
The subsequent analysis of sufficiency shows that policy fit is also the sufficient 
condition in all cases of institutional convergence and Twinning effectiveness 
overall. However, in a separate QCA of conditions behind legal convergence, policy 
fit was found to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the outcome to occur. 
Indeed, legal convergence presents only in Twinning projects where policy fit 
combines either with EU sectoral conditionality or low sector politicisation. 
Therefore, along with the policy fit, attaching Twinning policy objectives to a stake 
in the EU Single Market (e.g., through the DCFTA) or launching Twining projects in 
non-politicised policy fields makes a good recipe for a successful legal convergence. 
On the other hand, the reduced importance of EU sectoral conditionality for 
institutional convergence may be explained by the technocratic nature and relative 
autonomy of middle-level bureaucracies from the central leadership. Also, in many 
cases, the beneficiary administration could embrace new administrative practices 
without having to pass a new law. The insignificance of sector politicisation for 
institutional convergence may also be construed in a similar fashion. 
Surprisingly, the quality of communication, while being central to the network 
philosophy of TG cooperation, appears to have no bearing on the ultimate 
effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine. In the preliminary stages of the QCA, 
I found no link between the participation by CEECs and Twinning effectiveness. 
Apparently, the above-mentioned added value of CEECs, stemming from their 
transition experience, socio-linguistic and historical commonalities with the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries, may not materialise in the greater effectiveness of EU TG 
cooperation on the ground. 
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2. Broader research implications 
Owing to my narrow focus on the functioning of EU TG cooperation in the 
Eastern neighbourhood and a dearth of pre-existing theoretical research on the 
subject matter, my area of contribution is mainly empirical. My intention was to 
explore EU TG cooperation from multiple standpoints by relying on interdisciplinary 
theoretical frameworks and, in such a way, prepare the ground for further 
hypotheses, including more advanced theorisation of the EU’s involvement in the 
neighbourhood via TG channels. At a more modest scale, I aspired to benefit select 
debates in international relations, EU external governance, Europeanisation, and 
public administration scholarship by filling relevant gaps or refining current ways of 
thinking about EU TG cooperation under the ENP. 
For example, how can we look in a new light at the debate on TG cooperation 
in the international relations literature, discussed at some length in the introduction? 
(Section 3). First, what becomes noticeable is a somewhat asymmetric nature of EU 
TG cooperation. Whereas the ENP, and Twinning cooperation in particular, profess 
a voluntary approach to cooperation between the EU and the partner country, it is 
actually the EU’s laws and standards that need to be adopted by the beneficiary 
country, and not the other way around. Formally, of course, the actual participation 
of an ENP country in EU TG programmes is elective; however, once it chooses to 
engage, it faces some sticks and carrots from the EU, albeit less powerful than the 
ones under the accession frameworks. Because of that, it is hard to agree with the 
Europeanisation scholars considering EU technical assistance, of which TG 
cooperation is a part, a phenomenon of network governance.5 While being not a 
hierarchical mode of governance in a strict sense either, EU TG cooperation has 
these unidirectional dynamics, which put it in some contrast with the prevailing 
understanding of TG cooperation partners as equals. Second, my data on Twinning 
also show that the three-pronged typology of TG cooperation – embracing 
information, regulatory, and harmonisation networks – becomes somewhat blurred 
in reality.6 A typical Twinning project fosters exchange of information and best 
practices, transfer of regulatory standards, and harmonisation of the third country’s 
legislation with EU’s – all three occurring simultaneously. 
In its communication on a harmonised approach to development aid, the 
European Commission called on integration of the concept of democratic 
governance “into each and every sectoral programme” in the neighbourhood 
                                                          
5 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in European 
Politics,” 897. 
6 Slaughter, A New World Order; Lavenex, “A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Integration beyond Conditionality?,” 943. 
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countries and beyond.7 My findings show that the Commission has actually delivered 
on this pledge in the case of Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood. In 
order to systematically investigate to what extent EU TG cooperation or other 
instances of EU foreign policy include democratic governance, I introduced the 
concept of democratic governance substance and mapped out its ideal types 
according to the presence and configuration of transparency, accountability, and 
participation. Perhaps, one may argue that this is “just another concept” that further 
complicates the field already burdened with thick and often overlapping 
terminology. On the other hand, this concept pinpoints well the normative substance 
of what the EU is doing about democratic governance promotion and boasts of 
rather clear conceptual boundaries, permitting application in further studies. Finally, 
I was also inspired by the kindred applications of substance in other EU research 
programmes, such as those on EU democracy, good governance, and rule of law 
promotion.8 
Another relevant addition to the studies of EU external governance and public 
administration literature is that the democratic governance substance of TG 
cooperation tends to vary with the technical complexity of the policy field. The more 
specialised the policy area is – the less of democratic governance substance is 
included in the relevant instance of EU TG cooperation. On the one hand, it points 
to some measure of incompatibility of democratic governance norms with the 
functional essence of TG cooperation in some policy sectors. On the other, it 
supports the sentiment found in the Europeanisation literature that increasing 
administrative capacity does not necessarily result in a more democratic 
government. 9  Some interviewees to this study also concurred that narrow, 
technically complex policy fields might be less interesting for non-state actors and 
civil society to contribute. 
My comparison of the added value by CEECs and the older MS might also be 
useful for the students of Europeanisation, EU development cooperation, and MS 
foreign policy. For example, I observe that different MS feature various comparative 
advantages and that EU TG cooperation offers a platform through which they can 
be realised and studied. The country- and sector-specific comparative advantages 
of CEECs and of the older MS influence perceptions of civil servants in the Eastern 
neighbourhood and often result in Twinning contracts. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
earlier, the actual impact by CEECs on the outcome of EU TG programmes in the 
Eastern neighbourhood remains contested. In studying the effectiveness of 
                                                          
7 European Commission, “Governance in the European Consensus on Development: Towards a Harmonized 
Approach within the European Union,” 6. 
8 Wetzel and Orbie, The Substance of EU Democracy Promotion: Concepts and Cases (Governance and Limited 
Statehood); Burlyuk, “Variation in EU External Policies as a Virtue: EU Rule of Law”; Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn, 
“The European Union and the Promotion of Good Governance in Its Near Abroad. One Size Fits All?” 
9 Youngs, “Democracy Promotion as External Governance?,” 902. 
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Twinning projects in Ukraine, I find no evidence to support the claim that Twinning 
projects with the participation of CEECs are more effective than the projects 
including partners from the older MS only. Here I should also concur with Szent-
Iványi and Tétényi, who argue that the new MS are “yet to capitalise” on their 
comparative advantages.10 
In contrast to a majority of works, which view norm adoption and application 
(implementation) as two consecutive processes, my study shows that EU TG 
cooperation is capable of achieving legal and institutional convergence in parallel. 
Even more so, the cases of institutional convergence seem to be more than those 
of legal convergence. The necessary condition of policy fit hints that the EU may be 
effective despite the multiple setbacks, if only it properly factored in the 
administrative needs and specifics of the beneficiary administration. Even though I 
could not undertake a comprehensive comparative study of the EU’s influence on 
the neighbourhood with and without a membership perspective, the analysis of TG 
cooperation under the ENP and my personal observations point to many similar 
problems with such cooperation during accession and then under the ENP. Those 
problems include lack of political commitment by the domestic authorities, a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to different partner countries, and the mere incompatibility of 
institutional templates in MS and those in the beneficiary administration. 
Nonetheless, convergence with EU norms as a result of TG cooperation does occur 
even without a membership perspective, which makes me question whether such 
perspective is necessary in the first place. 
While the existing studies of Twinning have covered to some extent the period 
of the EU’s Eastern enlargement, when the accession conditionality was strong, they 
did not provide a satisfactory answer to the question, “How effective are Twinning 
projects?” The literature on the ENP, including policy studies mandated by the 
European Commission, has also failed to produce the satisfactory answer. Owing to 
the thick empirical data I gathered on Twinning projects in Ukraine and the 
methodological approach capturing only the most practical aspects of effectiveness, 
I find that Twinning projects in Ukraine have been effective 50% of the time. That 
means every second Twinning project in Ukraine has resulted in the legal or 
institutional convergence of the respective policy sector with the EU’s norms. 
Given a lack of studies employing the same methodological lens, it is hard to 
say if this number is low or high, as compared to the performance of Twinning 
projects in other EU’s neighbours or under alternative EU’s foreign policy 
frameworks. Yet, in light of the general scepticism over the ENP’s ambitions and the 
lack of membership perspective for the EU’s Eastern neighbours, I view that figure 
with reserved optimism. As said above, legal and institutional convergence occurred 
                                                          
10 Szent-Iványi and Tétényi, “Transition and Foreign Aid Policies in the Visegrád Countries: A Path Dependant 
Approach,” 582. 
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in every second case despite the missing membership perspective, thanks to a good 
policy fit of the Twinning agenda with the needs and capacities on the ground. 
Finally, because the literature on Twinning during the accession period reported 
many similar shortcomings to those we find under the ENP, i.e., lack of political 
commitment, communication difficulties, or high politicisation,11  the role of EU 
membership perspective in the EU’s ability to bring about change in the 
neighbourhood becomes less obvious. In light of the relatively effective 
implementation of Twinning in Ukraine and its potential to carry norms of 
democratic governance, it may serve as another EU tool to advance its democratic 
values in the neighbourhood, in addition to its main goal of technical approximation. 
Speaking of the methodological contribution, this work brings together 
multiple analytical viewpoints on a single empirical phenomenon and constructs 
bridges between the deterministic and probabilistic methods of causal inquiry. This 
inclusive approach also means to contribute to the growth of quantitative and mixed 
methodologies in EU studies, which are currently skewed heavily towards the 
qualitative analysis. In addition, I also attempted to address the problem of 
Eurocentrism and excessive reliance on the EU’s frames of reference in modern EU 
scholarship.12 Particularly beneficial in that regard were my personal experiences 
growing up in the post-Soviet political and cultural context, as well as the command 
of the Ukrainian and Russian languages. Those advantages have granted me access 
to a wealth of data and people not readily available for outsiders. Moreover, the use 
of probabilistic (statistical) methods, more common on the North American 
campuses, may have contributed to the alleviation of Eurocentrism in terms of data 
analysis techniques. 
3. Limitations and space for development 
As any other research, this also has its limitations, which relate to the 
theoretical, methodological, and empirical aspects of inquiry. First, at the theoretical 
level, owing to the nature of my research objectives, I am neither testing nor 
devising an overarching theoretical framework explaining EU TG cooperation in the 
neighbourhood, which limits the general theoretical contribution of the study. 
Instead, I am enriching a set of theoretical debates pertaining to the specific facets 
                                                          
11 Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Exporting Europeanization to the Wider Europe: The Twinning Exercise and 
Administrative Reform in the Candidate Countries and Beyond”; Tulmets, “The Introduction of the Open Method 
of Coordination in the European Enlargement Policy: Analysing the Impact of the New PHARE/Twinning 
Instrument”; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, “Europeanization, Conditionality and Domestic Change: The 
Twinning Exercise and Administrative Reform in Romania.” 
12 Hamid Dabashi, “Can Non-Europeans Think? What Happens with Thinkers Who Operate Outside the European 
Philosophical ‘pedigree,’” Al-Jazeera English, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013114142638797542.html. 
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of such cooperation, i.e., democratic governance promotion, MS participation, and 
effectiveness of norm transfer. Nonetheless, I do hope that this study offers a 
stepping stone to such a framework in future research.  
Second, there may be problems with the current theoretical frameworks 
covering the specific research questions of this study. For example, with democratic 
governance substance, it is still not clear whether the inclusion of democratic 
governance norms in Twinning cooperation happens reflexively as the result of the 
EU’s explicit commitment to it, or as an unintended consequence of EU internal 
governance and its reflection in EU external governance.13 While the domestic 
structure variables explain well the variation in the democratic governance 
substance of Twinning projects in the Eastern neighbourhood, they shed little light 
on how exactly those norms transpire into specific Twinning fiches. I thus cannot 
rule out the possibility that a micro-level analysis of Twinning instrument, especially 
at the preparation stage, will not produce more explanatory factors behind the 
variation of the democratic governance substance of Twinning projects concerned. 
In addition, I believe there should be a way to measure uniformly the democratic 
governance substance of the EU acquis and of other EU legal sources, which inform 
the content of TG cooperation in the neighbourhood. That is something I could not 
accomplish within the confines of this work. Other possible factors, such as the initial 
levels of adoption of democratic governance norms by the ENP country, pro-
Europeanness of political elites and public personnel, or effects by other actors like 
Russia may also be interesting points for exploration. 
Before engaging in further theorising, it would also be worthwhile to check 
how well my theoretical framework explains variation in the democratic governance 
substance of EU TG projects in the countries of the Southern neighbourhood under 
the ENP or the Balkan states under the IPA. In the same vein, future studies should 
evaluate the democratic governance substance in other EU TG instruments, such as 
TAIEX or CIB, and draw parallels with Twinning projects. That also applies to my 
analyses of MS comparative advantages and of the overall effectiveness of EU TG 
cooperation, both of which could benefit from a broader landscape of data, and not 
only from the selected countries of the Eastern neighbourhood. On the other hand, 
factoring in the full extent of differences among the Eastern neighbourhood 
countries themselves, including their political and institutional dynamics, is also 
something I could not capture with this work.  
Methodologically, the use of probabilistic tests of group differences based on 
the measures of central tendency may have introduced biases relating to the 
presence of outliers and the non-normal distribution of data on most variables 
analysed. Moreover, the relatively small number of cases (117) and four 
                                                          
13 Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: An Historical Insitutionalist Analysis,” Comparative Political 
Studies, 1996, 129. 
CONCLUSIONS  151 
 
independent variables (plus nine control variables), as is the case in Article 2, may 
have some implications for the generalisability of findings to other regions under 
the ENP. Some caution is also due in explaining the variation of democratic 
governance substance of Twinning along the sector-based independent variables 
within one country. The fact that the relationship between sector politicisation and 
democratic governance substance does not hold in less liberalised countries may 
have to do with a lack of cases to establish such relationship, their non-normal 
distribution, or unaccounted effects by other, unknown variables. With the smaller 
number of Twinning fiches in some countries and policy sectors (20 or fewer), I also 
run a greater risk to incur a Type II error. That means that there could have been 
some omitted effects or that the existing effects could be stronger if the sample size 
for the specific variable categories of Twinning fiches were to be increased. 
My presentation of an added value by CEECs and the older MS also needs to 
be treated with some reservations. The broad focus on these two groups may omit 
the inter-country differences among CEECs and the older MS in their sector- and 
country-specific comparative advantages. In that regard, I could not yet locate 
sufficient data to systematise comparative advantages of MS in relation to each 
other and build “country dossiers”. In addition, the question of why exactly certain 
MS are selected for Twinning projects by the beneficiary extends beyond the scope 
of this dissertation and also remains subject to further research. The division 
between the country- and sector-specific comparative advantages, mainly used as 
an heuristic tool for structuring the theorised storyline and the empirical section in 
Article 3, may also pose some theoretical hindrances. The reason being, some types 
of comparative advantages, like transition experience or country’s size, manifest the 
attributes of both country- and sector-specific comparative advantages. Added to 
this, the framing of interview questions and the level of rapport between the 
researcher and interviewees may have introduced a degree of preference bias to 
the results, which was partially offset through triangulation with other sources. 
The similar type of bias may pose a problem in the analysis of the effectiveness 
of EU TG cooperation in Ukraine, whereby I also rely on extensive interview data. 
Additionally, while judging whether a particular Twinning project was effective or 
not, I did not consider impacts by other programmes by the EU or by other actors 
in a particular policy sector. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier advised, adoption 
of EU norms by the country may coincide with the adoption of similar domestic 
norms and not be the direct results of the EU influence. Similarly, the domestic 
authorities may comply with the requirements of other international actors 
promoting similar to the EU norms. In both cases, it is difficult to establish formal 
ownership of the norms. 14 This limitation is somewhat mediated by the fact that 
                                                          
14 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 9. 
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Twinning is one of the most important tools of EU TG cooperation and targets very 
specific domains of public policymaking, normally not covered by the overlapping 
programmes. Besides, in many instances, specific laws adopted by Ukraine referred 
to EU policy requirements that could be traced back to given Twinning projects. 
One of the specific methodological problems related to the use of 
configurational methods like QCA is that they do not allow the researcher to deal 
properly with “hard-to-capture” or “big” events. In my case, it may be the Russian 
factor and the influence of the Russian aggressive foreign policy in the context of 
Twinning cooperation. Luckily, the number of policy sectors in Ukraine that were 
directly affected by the Russian factor has been rather low, yet a more systematic 
analysis of its implications with regard to my research questions would also be 
welcome. Another methodological concern is that the crisp-set variant of QCA and 
the associated process of dichotomisation may lead to some cases being 
underrepresented or other irregularities, especially in measuring unclear or 
borderline cases. I tried to address this problem by consistently applying 
operationalisation guidelines for conditions and outcomes and doing so in close 
reference to the theoretical literature and interview data. 
4. Policy recommendations 
In March 2015, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s foreign affairs chief, and 
Johannes Hahn, Neighbourhood Commissioner, presented the joint consultation 
paper “Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, which challenges virtually 
every aspect of the ENP. 15  Yet, has the EU really failed to transform its 
neighbourhood? I believe it may be too early to throw in the towel and devise a 
totally new framework. Based on the findings of this study, I have singled out 
several possible steps the EU may take to make its involvement under the ENP, and 
the Eastern neighbourhood in particular, more impactful. 
Although the Twinning instrument was originally not designed to promote norms 
of democratic governance, my study demonstrates that the EU may well exploit the 
democratising potential of Twinning projects by streamlining transparency, 
accountability, and participation on project agenda in a more systematic manner. 
For example, the EU should try to include more provisions for transparent and 
participatory governance, especially in policy sectors of relevance for EU-third 
country trade or visa regime. Visible successes of Twinning projects in Ukraine give 
hope that this instrument may be effectively used to diffuse norms of democracy 
and democratic governance in the EU’s neighbourhood. Moreover, a typical 
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Twinning project fiche already includes a section dedicated to cross-cutting issues, 
such as democracy and human rights, environmental sustainability, gender equality, 
and HIV/AIDS. The European Consensus for Development stipulates that those 
cross-cutting issues be integrated into all areas of donor programmes and be 
addressed in all political dialogue and development.16 Therefore, the European 
Commission, can expand the list of cross-cutting issues by including specific 
requirements for democratic governance during the implementation of Twinning 
projects and as an explicit objective thereof. 
The EU should also consider creating country dossiers, listing comparative 
advantages of each MS in the policy sectors covered by EU development or TG 
cooperation in the neighbourhood. Such dossiers need to contain the country- and 
sector-specific comparative advantages of MS in relation to the ENP countries or 
other EU’s partners. They may be modelled, for example, after the European 
Transition Compendium, with the self-reported comparative advantages by CEECs.17 
At the same time, these dossiers could rely on the systematic research of MS 
participation and concrete accomplishments in the given sector at home and as part 
of EU development and TG programmes abroad. In such a way, the process of MS 
selection and participation in EU TG programmes would be more informed and the 
complementarities between the various MS maximised. 
Finally, the EU should continue linking DCFTA- and visa-related conditionality 
with specific Twinning objectives in the target country, as such conditionality is 
important in fostering legal convergence of the beneficiary administration. The main 
challenge is, however, to design Twinning interventions with an utmost 
consideration of the needs and capacities on the ground. Because of a great political 
volatility and institutional instability in some ENP countries, like Ukraine, the EU 
should consider making its Twinning projects more flexible. That would include, 
among other things, cutting back significantly on the average preparation time and 
making it easier to fine-tune the objectives after the project has begun. 
 
                                                          
16 European Commission, “The European Consensus on Development,” Official Journal of the European Union, 
2006, 46, http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf. 
17 European Commission, “European Transition Compendium.” 
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List of interviews 
 
Table 13. List of interviews 
Int. 
no. 
Respondent Organization Location of 
respondent 
Date 
Int. 1  Ukrainian 
expert 
Ministry of Social 
Policy 
Kyiv 15 November 2014 
Int. 2  Ukrainian civil 
servant 
State Ecology 
Academy 
Kyiv 18 November 2014 
Int. 3  Ukrainian civil 
servant 
Ministry of 
Infrastructure 
Kyiv 20 November 2014 
Int. 4  Ukrainian 
expert 
Centre for 
Adaptation of the 
Civil Service 
Kyiv 25 November 2014 
Int. 5  Ukrainian 
expert 
State Agency on 
Energy Efficiency 
and Energy Saving of 
Ukraine 
Kyiv 27 November 2014 
Int. 6  Ukrainian civil 
servant 
Ministry of 
Infrastructure 
Kyiv 28 November 2014 
Int. 7  Danish civil 
servant 
Statistics Denmark Kyiv 01 December 2014 
Int. 8  Ukrainian 
expert 
Delegation of the 
European Union to 
Ukraine 
Kyiv 09 December 2014 
Int. 9  German 
expert 
Central European 
University 
Budapest 24 March 2015 
Int. 10 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
State Ecology 
Academy 
Kyiv 25 March 2015 
Int. 11 Danish civil 
servant 
Statistics Denmark Kyiv 26 March 2015 
Int. 12 Polish civil 
servant 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Warsaw 02 April 2015 
Int. 13 Dutch expert Dutch Institute for 
Public Administration 
The Hague 03 April 2015 
Int. 14 Dutch expert Dutch Institute for 
Public Administration 
The Hague* 08 April 2015 
Int. 15 Danish civil 
servant 
Statistics Denmark Kyiv 05 May 2015 
Int. 16 EU 
Commission 
official 
DG NEAR Brussels* 02 June 2015 
Int. 17 EU 
Commission 
official 
DG NEAR Brussels* 11 June 2015 
Int. 18 Twinning 
experts 
SIGMA (OECD) Paris 11 August 2015 
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Int. 19 Lithuanian 
expert 
University of 
Amsterdam 
Amsterdam 18 January 2016 
Int. 20 Latvian civil 
servant 
State Plant 
Protection Service 
Riga 08 March 2016 
Int. 21 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
Ministry of Ecology 
and Natural 
Resources 
Kyiv 10 March 2016 
Int. 22 Austrian civil 
servant 
Regional Court 
Wiener Neustadt 
Vienna 11 March 2016 
Int. 23 EU 
Commission 
official 
Delegation of the 
European Union to 
Nigeria 
Abuja 16 March 2016 
Int. 24 Polish expert National Bank of 
Poland 
Kyiv 20 March 2016 
Int. 25 Dutch civil 
servant 
Netherlands 
Enterprise Agency 
Kyiv 21 March 2016 
Int. 26 Ukrainian 
expert 
State Aviation 
Administration of 
Ukraine 
Kyiv 22 March 2016 
Int. 27 Danish civil 
servant 
Danish Veterinary 
and Food 
Administration 
Copenhagen 23 March 2016 
Int. 28 French civil 
servant 
Centre National 
d’Etudes Spatiales 
Moscow 23 March 2016 
Int. 29 Swedish civil 
servant 
The Swedish 
National Financial 
Management 
Authority 
Stockholm 24 March 2016 
Int. 30 French expert ADECRI Paris 05 April 2016 
Int. 31 French civil 
servants 
SNCF Paris* 06 April 2016 
Int. 32 German civil 
servant 
Ministry of 
Economics and 
Technology of 
Germany 
Berlin 11 April 2016 
Int. 33 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
The State Committee 
for Technical 
Regulation and 
Consumer Policy of 
Ukraine 
Kyiv 18 April 2016 
Int. 34 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
The State Committee 
for Technical 
Regulation and 
Consumer Policy of 
Ukraine 
Kyiv 19 April 2016 
Int. 35 Swedish civil 
servant 
Swedish National 
Debt Office 
Stockholm 19 April 2016 
Int. 36 Ukrainian 
expert 
State Agency on 
Energy Efficiency 
Kyiv* 19 April 2016 
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and Energy Saving of 
Ukraine 
Int. 37 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
Higher 
Administrative Court 
of Ukraine 
Kyiv* 20 April 2016 
Int. 38 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
State Service of 
Ukraine on Food 
Safety and Consumer 
Protection 
Kyiv* 20 April 2016 
Int. 39 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
Anti-Monopoly 
Committee of 
Ukraine 
Kyiv 21 April 2016 
Int. 40 Ukrainian 
expert 
State Service of 
Intellectual Property 
Rights of Ukraine 
Kyiv* 21 April 2016 
Int. 41 Ukrainian civil 
servants 
Ministry of Finance 
of Ukraine 
Kyiv* 22 April 2016 
Int. 42 Ukrainian 
expert 
Ministry of 
Infrastructure of 
Ukraine 
Hong Kong 07 May 2016 
Int. 43 Spanish 
expert 
Instituto Nacional de 
Técnica Aeroespacial 
Madrid 10 May 2016 
Int. 44 Ukrainian civil 
servant 
State Service of 
Ukraine for Geodesy, 
Cartography and 
Cadastre 
Kyiv 11 May 2016 
Int. 45 French expert Université de 
Versailles 
Iasi* 19 May 2016 
 
* in-person interviews (the rest were conducted over Skype or telephone) 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This policy brief evaluates the implementation of the Twinning instrument in the Eastern 
neighbourhood. To do so, it presents a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) 
analysis of EU Twinning projects in Ukraine, relying on insights from over 50 interviews with 
Twinning stakeholders from EU member states, the European Commission, the European 
External Action Service, and Ukraine. The article argues that Twinning projects, while being 
relatively effective, have generally punched below their weight due to systemic issues related 
to the internal setup of Twinning cooperation and constraining factors ensuing from local 
realities. Under effectiveness, we understand the extent to which there is legal and/or 
institutional convergence of the beneficiary institution or policy sector with relevant EU 
practices and standards as a direct or indirect result of participation in EU Twinning projects. 
In order to increase chances for the effectiveness of Twinning projects, the EU should take 
steps to ensure a better policy fit of the project policy agenda with the local needs and realities 
of the beneficiary administration. The EU should also make Twinning projects more flexible to 
change, both content-wise and time-wise. 
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TWINNING OVERVIEW 
Twinning has been a unique institution-building and transgovernmental 
cooperation instrument linking the EU member states and the ENP countries, including 
the EaP region and Ukraine. This instrument is unique because it encourages direct 
cross-border links between public agencies from the EU and those in the EaP countries 
in different policy sectors. Compared to the other EU’s institution-building tools, like 
TAIEX or SIGMA, Twinning emphasises the long-term character of such relationship. 
A typical Twinning project in the EaP region may last up to three years from the signing 
of the contract until the last expert departs. Every project involves a peer-to-peer 
cooperation between a delegated permanent expert (Resident Twinning Adviser, or 
RTA) and dozens of short-term experts on the EU side, and the beneficiary country’s 
officials on the EaP side. This personal, two-way character of Twinning cooperation 
makes it distinct from the other EU’s instruments, e.g., Comprehensive Institution 
Building (CIB) programme, boosting institutions through targeted budget support, yet 
creating few opportunities for exchange of administrative experiences face-to-face.   
Twinning boasts of an extensive reach in different policy sectors, a 
comprehensive design, and formal commitment at the highest level of EU-ENP country 
agreements. Each project has a budget of approximately one million euros, entailing 
generous support for short- and long-term experts from EU MS, who are available and 
willing to share their expertise abroad. Twinning programming under the ENP builds 
significantly on the Twinning experience with CEECs during the pre-accession phase, 
as well as with the current candidate countries in the Balkans, financed under the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). The objectives of Twinning projects 
under the ENP draw on a joint EU-beneficiary country agenda, contained in bilateral 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Action Plans, and more recently Association 
Agreements (AAs) and DCFTAs. In applying for Twinning projects, the beneficiary 
countries also often rely on priorities from the National Indicative Programmes, 
Country Strategy Papers, and other domestic initiatives relevant for approximation with 
the EU’s laws and regulatory standards. 
 
TWINNING IN UKRAINE 
Since the introduction of the Twinning instrument under the ENP, Ukraine has 
implemented over 40 EU Twinning projects between 2007 and 2016 (Figure 6). That 
places the country at the top in the EU’s neighbourhood by the number of projects 
completed. The sectoral distribution of Twinning projects in Ukraine is also rather wide, 
spanning a dozen different sectors in the country (Figure 7).  
Our previous analysis has shown that around half of EU Twinning projects in 
Ukraine have resulted in or paved the way for institutional and/or legal change in the 
respective beneficiary organisations or policy sectors.570 In other words, every other 
                                                          
570 Dmytro Panchuk, Fabienne Bossuyt, and Jan Orbie, “Effectiveness of EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the 
Neighbourhood: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Twinning Projects in Ukraine,” 2017. 
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EU Twinning project in the country has been able to foster legal or institutional 
convergence of the beneficiary institution and policy sector with EU regulatory 
standards. Given that Ukraine undertakes harmonisation with the EU’s legislation in 
response to a more modest set of rewards than those that the candidate countries are 
offered, this is not such a bad outcome. Among the effective Twinning projects in 
Ukraine, 63% resulted in legal convergence (law adoption or amendment), 75% led 
to institutional convergence (successful implementation of a new law or a new 
administrative practice in the beneficiary institution), and 44% accomplished both. 
Thus, a significant number of EU Twinning projects have succeeded in encouraging 
the Ukrainian  to adopt and implement pro-EU laws, associated secondary legislation, 
and best administrative practices from EU MS. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Twinning projects in the ENP region, by country, 2007-2016571 
 
 
                                                          
571 Estimated based on European Commission, “Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA within the ENPI. Activity Report,” 
2013, and publicly available new data on the Twinning instrument. 
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Figure 7. Twinning projects in Ukraine by policy sector, 2007-2016 
 
UNDERTAKING A SWOT ANALYSIS 
In order to evaluate the Twinning instrument in the EaP region, the policy brief 
relies on a SWOT analysis of EU Twinning projects in Ukraine (Table 14). The 
strengths reflect the aspects of Twinning projects that are largely viewed as 
successful by the stakeholders, and which may have contributed to the effectiveness 
of the projects. The weaknesses, in contrast, refer to the perceived problems of 
Twinning projects, which may have prevented them from resulting in legal or 
institutional convergence in Ukraine. While the strengths and weaknesses refer mainly 
to the endogenous characteristics of Twinning projects, opportunities and threats, in 
turn, reflect the exogenous dimension of Twinning projects. This external dimension 
is manifested through the institutional characteristics of the sending and the receiving 
side, as well as the domestic (political) environment surrounding the project. The 
threats, for example, refer to the political and institutional dynamics in Ukraine and 
the EU, which may endanger the effective implementation of Twinning projects. The 
opportunities are the opposite of threats and refer to the political and institutional 
dynamics that may facilitate the implementation of Twinning projects. Based on the 
analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, the policy brief provides 
a series of recommendations for the EU on how to improve the implementation of 
Twinning projects in Ukraine and, by extension, in the other EaP countries. 
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Table 14. Overview of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats of Twinning 
projects in Ukraine 
Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats 
? Learning and 
socialisation 
forum 
? Deepening of 
professional 
ties between 
MS and 
Ukraine’s 
administrations  
? Enriching 
personal 
experience for 
Twinning 
participants 
 
 
 
 
? Long 
preparation 
times 
? Low flexibility in 
adopting 
changes 
? Low level of 
financial 
incentives for 
the beneficiary 
side 
? Lack of strong 
sectoral 
conditionality 
? No membership 
perspective 
? Lack of proper 
policy planning 
and political 
analysis 
? Low visibility 
 
? High public support 
for EU integration 
of Ukraine and 
signing of the AA 
? Ukraine’s search 
for alternative 
markets for energy 
imports and 
industrial exports 
? Extensive 
experience of 
previous Twinning 
cooperation  
? Diverse added 
value by the new 
and the old MS 
? Coordination with 
other foreign actors 
and domestic civil 
society in the 
country and policy 
sector 
? Turnover of public 
personnel at the 
senior and middle 
levels 
? Red-tape and strong 
bureaucratic hierarchy 
? Unexpected changes 
in the organisational 
structure of the 
beneficiary 
? Low morale among 
participating public 
servants 
? Security concerns over 
the conflict in the east 
of the country  
? Low quality or 
compatibility of 
experts 
? Cross-cultural 
communication 
barriers 
 
 
STRENGTHS 
The Twinning instrument offers a number of strengths that contribute to the legal 
and institutional convergence of the EaP countries and institutions with the EU acquis. 
First, besides working towards a set of mandatory results agreed upon by the parties, 
Twinning projects provide a socialisation platform, where participants can exchange 
valuable day-to-day experience of public administration and best sectoral practices. 
Very often, merely transposing EU directives or regulations may not be enough without 
having an actual learning curve in the process of their implementation. The invaluable 
experience of MS on  that count makes Twinning a great tool for helping the beneficiary 
countries not only formally adopt EU acquis and best practices in government but also 
efficiently implement them without repeating past mistakes. Twinning projects 
normally attract MS experts with over 10 years of professional experience in their 
respective policy areas. Therefore, Twinning offers a great opportunity for the 
beneficiary country’s officials, who in their majority only have a remote idea of the EU’s 
regulatory landscape, to learn first-hand about the EU’s ways of doing things. 
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Another benefit of Twinning cooperation are interpersonal ties forged at the level 
of ministries from EU MS and Ukraine. Such cooperation, for example, contributes to 
strengthening partnerships between organisations and individuals involved. In the long 
run, this may bring about more opportunities for cooperation, which includes grants, 
study visits, or future exchange of experience. It is also common that successful 
Twinning projects are followed a couple of years later by a new project involving the 
same team. Sometimes, MS experts offering expertise within a Twinning project are 
later invited by the Ukrainian side to contribute to related reform projects in the 
country. Finally, such informal networks between MS and Ukraine have contributed to 
widening a spectrum of bilateral cooperation to other policy areas and institutions 
between the countries. Studies have even shown that the socialisation networks 
associated with Twinning may soften the attitudes of officials involved towards 
democratic governance in their institutions, hence contributing to the EU’s democracy 
promotion agenda in the near abroad.572 
Finally, Twinning has been a very fulfilling personal experience for many 
participating MS officials that we interviewed. Participation in a Twinning projects has 
allowed them to spend several years in another country, learn about its people and 
culture, as well as take a fresh look at their own professional experience from the 
prospective of a different administrative system. Friendships forged during Twinning 
cooperation have often been lasting and productive, extending in time well over the 
allocated time for the project. Some Twins have even found partners for life during 
their stay abroad. 
 
WEAKNESSES 
Along with their strengths, Twinning projects have also manifested several 
systemic weaknesses, related to the process of implementation but also the 
preparation phase. Based on our analysis, we can distinguish seven weaknesses. First, 
an average preparation time for a typical Twinning project may exceed two years, 
starting with formulation of the terms of reference and the fiche to the day the project 
is launched. This long period can be explained by a significant number of actors 
involved in the process of project preparation (up to 20 people).573 Such a lag between 
the formulation of Twinning objectives and their implementation may invalidate initially 
relevant policy priorities for the beneficiary institution or for the EU itself. Under such 
circumstances, the administrative and financial management of Twinning projects may 
also become cumbersome, especially in view of securing the continued commitment 
of the beneficiary and the availability of project experts several years down the line.  
                                                          
572 Freyburg, “Transgovernmental Networks as Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with 
Arab Authoritarian Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance.” 
573 Bouscharain and Moreau, “Evaluation of the Institutional Twinning Instrument in the Countries Covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Final Report,” 188. 
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Second, the problem of the long preparation times is exacerbated by some rigidity 
of the instrument itself. Once the original objectives have been formulated, it is very 
problematic and time-consuming to change them after the project has begun. For 
example, once the mandatory results become part of a Twinning fiche, they may not 
be changed during project implementation.574 The MS and the beneficiary may jointly 
request certain modifications during project implementation by means of side letters 
and addenda. However, these modifications mostly concern adjustments to the work 
plan, activities, deadlines, or budgetary matters, but may hardly contest the mandatory 
results agreed upon in the Twinning contract. Such inflexibility has often resulted in 
project participants being stuck with outdated and irrelevant agenda, hindering the 
project from reaching its goals. 
Third, Twinning participants, especially on the beneficiary side, have often 
complained about an insufficient level of financial incentives offered by the Twinning 
instrument. Almost entire Twinning budget covers the salaries of MS experts and 
organisation of relevant activities (workshops, seminars, conferences, language 
services) in the beneficiary country. The domestic civil servants are expected to commit 
to the project in their overtime and on a voluntary basis, in addition to their already 
heavy workload at a public agency. The Ukrainian public sector is also infamous for its 
extremely low salaries, barely enough for one to survive, given the current level of 
prices (hence one of the reasons behind widespread political corruption in the country). 
This problem of underfinancing of the Ukrainian public sector becomes particularly 
acute at the interpersonal level, whereby the Resident Twinning Advisor and other MS 
experts earn more money per diem than a Ukrainian civil servant per month! That 
disparity in earnings has often led to tensions, implicit or explicit, between the Twins 
over the course of the project.  
Furthermore, the beneficiary side is expected to provide MS experts with office 
space and necessary equipment (computers, copy machines, phones, etc.), as well as 
to pay for domestic travel of local experts to and from Twinning events. Its failure to 
do so has also become a stumbling block for some projects in Ukraine and resulted in 
delays during project implementation or in a low turnout of Ukrainian experts for 
project events. In some cases, the project could not start for several months because 
the beneficiary institution designated no office space or failed to provide internet or 
phone connection. Since Twinning budgets normally do not cover those costs, 
Twinning participants often had to look for workarounds or even pay out of their own 
pockets. 
Fourth, Twinning projects in virtually all policy sectors in Ukraine have suffered 
from a low level of political commitment at the highest state level. While partly 
attributable to the volatility of the Ukrainian political system, widespread conflicts of 
interest, and low financial support by the state, this lack of commitment may also be 
                                                          
574 Ibid., 37. 
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traced to the EU’s insufficient or ineffective conditionality in some sectors of Twinning 
cooperation. Both in the Action Plan and, more recently, in the AA and the DCFTA with 
Ukraine, some policy sectors have received less attention and fewer “sticks and 
carrots” from the EU. For example, EU-Ukraine commitments in sectors such as social 
affairs, education, or environment have been less clear than those in more trade-
related fields, such as trade, industry, energy, and finance. Consequently, Twinning 
projects in the latter sectors have tended to be more effective in terms of legal and 
institutional convergence. Fixing this shortcoming would require bringing the policy 
agenda of future Twinning projects more in line with the high-priority areas of 
cooperation in the AAs and DCFTAs for the EaP region. 
Fifth, Twinning cooperation in the ENP has formally been modelled on accession 
conditionality, inspired by the EU’s Eastern enlargement 10 years ago575. Because EU 
membership is not in the books for the ENP countries yet, the beneficiary country may 
not be particularly keen on the costly process of transposing the EU acquis or adopting 
MS administrative experience if the “main carrot” of EU membership is missing. This 
strategic shortcoming was also confirmed in our interviews with Twinning experts, who 
worked in the ENP, IPA, or Eastern enlargement framework and who could compare 
the differences.  
Sixth, some observers have pointed out the lack of proper political analysis and 
planning that precede a Twinning project. Many projects have been planned and 
implemented without first ascertaining solid commitment at the highest political level 
and gaining sufficient awareness of all underwater currents. The limited expertise of 
certain experts drafting a project fiche has also resulted in difficulties accommodating 
original project objectives to the actual needs and capacities on the ground. This 
problem seems to be exacerbated by a lack of methodological tools to undertake a 
local needs analysis in a more precise and uniform manner across different countries 
and policy sectors. 
And seventh, our interviewees suggested that the level of visibility of current 
Twinning projects was rather low. That manifests itself in low awareness on the part 
of Ukrainian civil servants of the benefits and expectations of Twinning cooperation. 
While the situation is somewhat better in policy areas related to the private sector 
(e.g., trade and industry, transport, or statistics), Twinning projects in policy sectors 
related exclusively to the public sector (e.g., justice and home affairs) are not very 
widely known and understood outside of their hosting institutions. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Based on our analysis, we can identify five opportunities for EU Twinning in 
Ukraine. A first opportunity is the current government’s favourable stance towards EU 
integration. In fact, one of the main triggers behind the Euromaidan protests in 2013 
                                                          
575 Tulmets, “Institution-Building Instruments in the Eastern Partnership: Still Drawing on Enlargement?” 
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was the refusal of the then Yanukovych leadership to sign a landmark AA with the EU. 
After the agreement was signed by the Poroshenko administration in May 2014, 
Ukraine undertook additional commitments related to the approximation of the 
country’s regulatory standards to the EU’s, along with implementation of the ongoing 
visa liberalisation roadmap. Many of those commitments have been covered by past 
and current Twinning projects, helping Ukraine and other EaP countries remove 
barriers to trade with the EU and improve their systems of governance. Existing studies 
on Europeanisation have shown that the adoption of EU laws and technical standards 
in the absence of membership perspective is not uniform across different policy sectors 
and may be conditional upon a set of rewards or sanctions that the EU attaches to 
reform progress in a given policy area.576 Thus, by explicitly linking the policy agenda 
of Twinning projects with the sectoral priorities from the AA and the DCFTA, the EU 
may accomplish yet better convergence of Ukrainian institutions with the EU structures 
and practices. 
Another opportunity for Twinning, ensuing from the standoff between Ukraine 
and Russia, consists in Ukraine looking for alternatives to the Russian market and, by 
extension, closer integration with the EU.577 For instance, Twinning projects in areas 
such as energy, veterinary and phytosanitary regulation, and transport (once flogging 
a dead horse) may get a second wind, as Ukraine is moving away from the Russia-led 
customs union towards the EU’s single market. Identifying those market niches where 
Ukraine may be more interested in the EU than in other players should be a priority of 
policymakers planning Twinning projects in the country. That also applies to Twinning 
projects in other EaP countries, seeking to reduce their dependence on Russia and 
diversify their energy and export markets. 
As mentioned above, Twinning has already recorded nearly two decades of 
implementation history, first in the accession candidates from CEECs and then as part 
of the ENPI and IPA frameworks. That presents Twinning policymakers with ample 
opportunities for exchange of experience and further improvement of the instrument. 
Twinning partners from MS with some prior Twinning experience have already been in 
higher demand than those without such experience. That applies to the forming of 
consortia between MS in the process of bidding, and also to the selection preferences 
by the ENP beneficiaries concerning their future Twinning partners. Developing a pool 
of Twinning implementation experience from different countries and regions may also 
lead to better Twinning programming in the future and help avoid the past errors. 
With the EU’s enlargement to the East, the EU received another advantage for 
Twinning cooperation under the EaP. Most new member states, by way of their recent 
transition experience and historical and socio-linguistic commonalities with the EaP 
                                                          
576 Ademmer, Delcour, and Wolczuk, “Beyond Geopolitics: An Introduction to the Impact of the EU and Russia in 
the ‘contested Neighborhood’”; Langbein and Börzel, “Introduction: Explaining Policy Change in the European 
Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood.” 
577 Delcour and Kostanyan, “Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and Their 
Consequences for the Area That Lies in between,” 7. 
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neighbours, offer an added value to Twinning projects as compared to the older 
member states.578 The memories of reforms in their home countries are still fresh in 
the minds of civil servants from CEECs, as they often participated personally in the 
transitioning of their countries to the EU’s standards of democracy and market 
economy (including being Twinning beneficiaries themselves). At the same time, many 
older MS have at their disposal an experience of running well-established and reputable 
administrative and economic systems. Therefore, by identifying the comparative 
advantages of CEECs and the older MS and their points of complementarity, the EU 
may further improve the effectiveness of Twinning projects in Ukraine and the EaP. 
 
 
Figure 8. MS Participation in Twinning Projects in Ukraine, 2007-2016 
 
Finally, Twinning projects in Ukraine and other EaP countries may benefit from a 
more coordinated and consistent interface with the other programmes by the EU, EU 
member states, and other international and domestic actors. Players such as the IMF 
and the US, for example, have already recorded progress in the anti-corruption effort 
and the macro-economic stabilisation of Ukraine. The Twinning instrument can uphold 
and deepen this progress through consistent and coordinated technical assistance to 
policy areas such as finance, justice and home affairs, and public administration. Apart 
from the international actors, domestic civil society organisations promoting political 
reform in Ukraine have also been on the rise. The EU can therefore adopt a more 
                                                          
578 Fabienne Bossuyt and Dmytro Panchuk, “The Participation of CEECs in EU Twinning Projects: Offering Specific 
Added Value for EU Transgovernmental Cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood?,” 2017. 
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inclusive approach by factoring in the experiences of those different networks in 
respective policy areas in the process of Twinning implementation. 
 
THREATS 
Our analysis has revealed a number of threats for the effective implementation 
of Twinning in Ukraine, both on the EU and Ukrainian side. Among the most common 
threats are perpetuating institutional instability, weak autonomy of public servants, low 
transparency of Ukraine’s public sector, and unclear security situation, associated with 
a war in the east of the country. On the EU side, these threats consist in the varying 
quality of Twinning experts and possible incompatibilities between the administrative 
systems of partners. 
Although Twinning projects are planned and implemented in a relative autonomy 
from the incumbent leadership, public institutions hosting such projects in Ukraine 
have often been vulnerable to changes in the political weather on the top. Most senior 
civil servants, heads of ministries, departments, or agencies hosting a Twinning 
project, are politically influenced appointees. With every change of government or 
President (and such changes seem frequent in Ukraine), the leadership of the 
institution is replaced, jeopardising the previous achievements of Twinning projects in 
that institution. New department heads that come instead are often disinterested or 
even dismissive of what their predecessors have done. For example, a Twinning project 
in agricultural land market in 2013-2015 sought to prepare the legal and institutional 
ground for lifting a moratorium on agricultural land sales in Ukraine. While securing 
initial support from the authorities, the project endured a change of political leadership 
and the appointment of a new department head, whose political party was rallying 
strongly against lifting this moratorium. As the result, a seemingly successful project 
fell short of its purpose and goals. 
In another example, when the department head leaves, their personal assistant, 
head of staff, and other personnel may follow behind, posing bureaucratic 
complications for the remaining project team. In more extreme cases, such 
transformations have resulted in public personnel who participated in Twinning being 
laid off. Given the highly hierarchical system of public administration in Ukraine, it 
takes a lot of effort for the RTA to bring the project back on track once the chain of 
command is broken at the top. In light of that, some RTAs complained of the limited 
autonomy of middle-range public servants in Ukraine when it came to making even 
routine decisions without obtaining approval from higher-standing officials. Such prior 
approvals may be problematic and time-consuming, which results in unnecessary 
delays over the course of the project. 
Similarly to changes in beneficiary personnel, Twinning projects are threatened 
by unexpected and far-reaching organisational shifts in the beneficiary institution. With 
nearly any change of leadership in Ukraine, various public agencies are renamed, re-
organised, or liquidated. As a result, Twinning projects tailor-made for one institution 
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become irrelevant after that institution ceases to exist or changes its scope of activities. 
Such unexpected shifts have wreaked havoc on many Twinning projects Ukraine, both 
in the preparation and implementation stage. Sometimes, a new institution, where the 
Twinning project is re-assigned, did not participate in the initial stages of project 
implementation and hence shows no interest in continuing it. It also comes as no 
surprise that such institutions have often been slow to provide office space or 
additional resources, as requested by the Twins. 
Another threat to Twinning operations in Ukraine is generally low morale among 
civil servants (see also section “weaknesses”), who have to spend their extra working 
time on Twinning commitments. The bonus of participating in study visits to a 
partnering MS (and getting to keep the per diem money), may not be sufficient and 
appropriate motivator for Ukrainian bureaucrats tasked with the daily implementation 
of the project. With the taxing range of their other commitments, Ukrainian civil 
servants often do not appreciate the benefits of Twinning and work half-heartedly as 
the result. To add insult to injury, under the circumstances of continuing institutional 
instability, many civil servants in Ukraine experience an anxiety about the possibility of 
losing their job. 
The Euromaidan protests and ongoing Russian aggression in the east of the 
country have also had their toll on Twinning cooperation in Ukraine. Several projects 
running during the tumultuous winter of 2013-2014 were suspended for several 
months due to security concerns of project partners from the EU. The change of 
political leadership in aftermath of the Euromaidan affected the institutional landscape 
in Ukraine and had a rather detrimental effect on some Twinning projects. Our 
interviewee also reported that some of their male Ukrainian colleagues were drafted 
into the army during project implementation – something that further dampened the 
morale of their colleagues. While the political and security situation in the country has 
recently stabilised somewhat and the military action being geographically far from most 
Twinning hosts in Kyiv, it is still premature to predict how the situation will unfold in 
coming years and whether it will have further adverse impacts on Twinning projects 
there.  
As for the EU side, respondents referred to the lack of qualification by some 
Twinning experts, mostly short-term, as potentially weakening the effectiveness of 
Twinning projects. There may be several reasons for that. First, due to disparities 
between the Ukrainian system of public administration and that of some MS, the 
experience of some MS public agencies may simply be irrelevant or incompatible with 
the Ukrainian realities. Second, MS experts may be not motivated to learn about the 
local specifics of the beneficiary country and often do just enough to get the next 
contract abroad. Third, the process of selection of short-term experts is often driven 
by personal recommendations and acquaintances of the RTA, Project Leader, or 
National Contact Point and may be less based on the experts’ qualifications. A similar 
issue is also present in the setup of Twinning consortiums, whereby the lead MS 
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partners may abuse their status by nominating their experts to spearhead particular 
components within a project while not necessarily offering superior expertise 
compared to the junior partners. 
Among less critical threats to Twinning projects are linguistic and intercultural 
barriers, occurring when people from different countries work together on a daily basis. 
Some Twinning projects to date have suffered from interpersonal communication 
difficulties as well. Some of these difficulties have been resolved or tolerated, while 
others have led to significant delays and, in more extreme cases, to rotations of RTAs 
and other staff. Under those circumstances, it appears important for the EU to second 
more experts with the understanding of the local situation, for example by encouraging 
more expertise from CEECs during project implementation. 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Twinning is a sophisticated institution-building programme, aiming to not only 
approximate the regulatory environment of the ENP countries with EU standards but 
also to build transgovernmental and personal ties between civil servants across the 
borders. Based on the SWOT analysis of Twinning projects in the case of Ukraine, we 
put forward several policy recommendations, which could help the European 
Commission improve this instrument and boost its effectiveness in the short and long 
run. While being particularly relevant for Ukraine, these recommendations can also 
further improve Twinning projects in other partner countries of the EaP and the ENP 
more broadly.  
? Reconceptualise Twinning as a flexible toolkit, rather than a rigid instrument, by 
allowing for more flexibility in adjusting and updating project’s objectives during 
planning and implementation stages. 
? Cut down on the project preparation times by reducing the number of actors 
involved in the process of project approval and by speeding up the overall 
procedure. 
? Step up financial support to the beneficiary, which should involve domestic travel 
grants for local experts and cash bonuses for civil servants in accordance with 
the time invested in the project. 
? Adopt a customised approach to each policy sector, as based on a rigorous 
analysis of policy background and current leadership’s priorities in reform. The 
European Commission may consider instituting grants for researchers with local 
knowledge, who will perform a gap analysis of existing legislation and domestic 
needs by analysing first-hand data and consulting with domestic stakeholders 
and experts. 
? Attempt more visibility measures, effectively communicating the objectives and 
benefits of Twinning cooperation to a broader swath of stakeholders in the 
beneficiary country. 
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? Make Twinning contracts and performance reports more accessible to the general 
public and research community in order to elicit a wider range of feedback on the 
benefits and shortcomings of the projects. 
? Align the policy agenda of Twinning projects with AA priorities, especially in low-
key sectors (e.g., education and social care) and in sectors  where the EU enjoys 
a bargaining power (e.g., trade and industry). A clear and credible EU 
membership perspective will also likely improve the track record of future 
Twinning projects in Ukraine and other EaP countries. 
? Perform a more thorough analysis of past Twinning projects in a given policy area 
so as to draw lessons and make subsequent projects more efficient. 
? Encourage the joint involvement of older MS and newer MS - especially those 
from Central and Eastern Europe - in Twinning projects. 
? Provide more institutionalised avenues for coordination between the Twinning 
programmes and other initiatives by the EU and other international actors in a 
particular policy sector. This coordination should also include domestic civil 
society organisations pushing for EU-related reforms in relevant sectors. 
? Make the process of selection of Twinning short-term experts more rigorous by 
creating EU-wide expert databases in particular subject areas, as has been done 
in the TAIEX programme. 
 
 Article 2. Supplement 
 
Table 15. Democratic governance substance matrix for content analysis of Twinning project 
fiches 
 High – 2 Medium – 1 Low – 0 
Transparency Project encourages free 
access to and sharing of 
information related to 
the beneficiary 
institution, policy sector, 
and/or project itself for 
domestic civil society, 
media, EU and/or other 
international 
stakeholders. This also 
includes anti-corruption 
initiatives 
Project foresees 
discretionary access 
to and sharing of 
information related to 
the beneficiary 
institution, policy 
sector, and/or project 
itself for a limited 
number of external 
stakeholders, usually 
within the policy 
sector or institution 
Project contains no 
explicit references to 
access to and sharing 
of information related 
to the beneficiary 
institution, policy 
sector, and/or project 
itself for external 
stakeholders 
Accountability Project seeks to 
enhance the 
organisational structure 
and patterns of 
subordination within the 
beneficiary institution or 
the relevant sector, as 
well as to create 
avenues for redress of 
grievances and 
monitoring by civil 
society, authorised 
public entities, EU or 
other international 
stakeholders 
Project seeks to 
enhance the 
organisational 
structure and patterns 
of subordination 
within the beneficiary 
institution or the 
relevant sector, but 
creates limited 
avenues for redress of 
grievances and 
monitoring by few or 
none of external 
actors 
Project neither 
foresees changes of 
the organisational 
structure and patterns 
of subordination 
within the beneficiary 
institution or the 
relevant sector, nor 
offers any avenues for 
redress of grievances 
and monitoring by 
external actors 
Participation Project encourages 
participation and 
feedback from civil 
society and media both 
in project activities and 
in the everyday activity 
of the beneficiary 
institution or the 
relevant sector 
Project encourages 
participation and/or 
feedback from civil 
society or media in 
project activities 
ONLY, but not in the 
everyday activity of 
the beneficiary 
institution or the 
relevant sector 
Project fiche contains 
NO references to 
participation and/or 
feedback from civil 
society and media in 
project activities and 
in the everyday 
activity of the 
beneficiary institution 
or the relevant sector 
Democratic 
governance 
substance 
An average of 
transparency, 
accountability, and 
participation is  
[2.0-1.4] 
An average of 
transparency, 
accountability, and 
participation is  
[1.3-0.7] 
An average of 
transparency, 
accountability, and 
participation is  
[0.6-0.0] 
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Table 16. Coding matrix for sector politicisation 
 Politicised – 2  Non-politicised – 0  
Sector 
politicisation 
Majority of project policy objectives 
are likely to expose political or 
commercial conflict of interest, 
including corruption, in the 
beneficiary institution or policy 
sector. Most politicised projects 
originate in sectors such as energy, 
finance, trade and industry, and 
justice and home affairs 
Majority of project policy objectives are 
NOT likely to expose political or 
commercial conflict of interest, 
including corruption, in the beneficiary 
institution or policy sector. Most non-
politicised projects originate in sectors 
such as environment, employment, 
statistics, and transport 
 
 
 
 
Table 17. Coding matrix for sector technical complexity 
 Technically complex – 1 Regular – 0 
Sector 
technical 
complexity 
Project policy sector requires an 
advanced knowledge of calculus, 
econometric models, or laboratory 
testing skills in its daily functioning. 
Most technically complex projects 
originate in the sectors of finance, 
health and consumer protection, 
statistics, trade and industry, and 
transport 
Project policy sector does NOT require 
an advanced knowledge of calculus, 
econometric models, or laboratory 
testing skills in its daily functioning. 
Most regular projects originate in the 
sectors of justice and home affairs, 
employment, social affairs, and 
environment 
 
 
 
 
Table 18. Coding matrix for EU sectoral conditionality 
 High – 1 Low – 0  
EU sectoral 
conditionality 
Project policy objectives deal with 
the facilitation of trade with the EU 
or visa liberalisation roadmaps in 
respective beneficiary countries. 
Most projects with high EU sectoral 
conditionality belong to sectors 
such as finance, energy, trade and 
industry, health and consumer 
protection. 
Project policy objectives are NOT 
related to the facilitation of trade with 
the EU or visa liberalisation roadmaps 
in respective beneficiary countries. 
Most projects with low EU sectoral 
conditionality belong to sectors such 
as employment and social affairs, 
environment, justice and home affairs, 
transport, and statistics. 
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Example of operationalisation 
To illustrate the application of the coding matrices from Tables above, let me 
take an example of the Twinning project “Support to the Academy of Judges of 
Ukraine”, implemented by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice between 2009 and 
2011. This project sought to introduce a unified, transparent, and anonymous 
examination of future Ukrainian judges as one of its mandatory results and stressed 
the need to address corruption in the judiciary. Therefore, this project was ranked 
“High” [2] in the category “transparency”. The project scored “Medium” [1] in the 
category “accountability”, because it sought to ensure impartiality of Ukrainian judges 
through specialised training and curriculum, yet it did not elaborate how exactly future 
judges would be more accountable to the general public and monitoring institutions. 
Finally, the project was ranked “Low” [0] for participation, as it did not foresee any 
provisions for participation and feedback by civil society. In terms of configuration of 
substance, this is a transparency-oriented (TO) project, because the transparency 
score dominates the others. An average score of 1.0 places this project into a medium 
type of democratic governance substance by magnitude.  
As for the independent variables, this project scored 50 according to the World 
Bank’s VA index for Ukraine in 2008, when the project fiche was drafted. The area of 
the judiciary of Ukraine, where the project operated, is infamous for its lack of political 
independence and transparency, and hence considered “politicised” [1]. According to 
sector technical complexity, this project is considered “regular” [0], because 
functioning of the judiciary, while requiring a degree of specialised knowledge, 
normally does not deal with calculus, econometric modelling, or laboratory testing. 
Finally, this policy sector, while being important for the EU rule of law promotion, is 
not so much relevant for trade between the EU and Ukraine. That is why it was rated 
“low” [0] for EU sectoral conditionality. 
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 Article 4. Supplement 
Table 20. Boolean configurations for legal convergence 
CaseID legal polit cond fit comun 
Troops vs. [Satellite] C* 0 0 1 1 
Space vs [Aviation, Social] C 0 0 0 1 
FoodSafety, ServDev 1 1 1 1 0 
Accred, NERC2, Standardiz 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank, Rail 1 0 1 1 1 
RoadSafety 1 0 0 1 0 
Troops 1 0 0 1 1 
Multimodal, Telecomms 0 0 0 0 0 
Land, Police 0 1 0 1 1 
Efficiency 0 0 1 0 1 
Debt, Phytosan 0 1 1 0 1 
Copyright, Judges, KRU 0 1 0 0 1 
Competition, NERC1 0 1 1 0 0 
Audit 0 1 0 0 0 
AdmCourts 0 1 0 1 0 
1 – condition or outcome positive   0 – condition or outcome negative  C –?contradictory configuration 
Parentheses [ … ] contain cases with negative outcome in contradictory configurations 
* Before obtaining a parsimonious formula for legal convergence, it was necessary to eliminate contradictory 
configurations (C). In the first instance, project [Satellite] clashed with project Troops because the latter contributed 
to a new law in Ukraine, while the former did not. This conflict was possible to resolve by taking a closer look at 
the outcomes of these cases. The law proposed by the [Satellite] project has not passed the Parliament yet and it 
is also below the 2-year “grace period” of effectiveness. Therefore, during the minimisation procedure, project 
[Satellite] was removed. In the second contradictory configuration, project Space conflicted with projects [Aviation] 
and [Social]. Although project Space resulted in a new law and offered two more draft laws, its original design was 
poorly conceived (Int. 28). According to the interviewee, it was effective only because of an unusual flexibility of 
the Commission in that particular project, as well as individual efforts of the RTA and the Ukrainian team that they 
managed to have that law passed (ibid.). There was also a Russian factor. Ukraine started looking up to European 
space markets because Russia reneged on some of its previous trade agreements with Ukraine in that sector (ibid.). 
While recognising the importance of this case, we had to exclude it from the QCA to resolve the contradiction. 
NOTE: projects containing no legal component (i.e., FDI, ServTrain, Statistics1, Statistics2, Statistics3 – as based 
on Table 24 – were also excluded from the analysis of legal convergence. 
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Table 21. Boolean configurations for institutional convergence 
CaseID instit polit cond fit comun 
Accred, Standardis vs [NERC2] C* 1 1 1 1 
Police vs [Land] C 1 0 1 1 
FoodSafety vs [ServDev] C 1 1 1 0 
AdmCourts 1 1 0 1 0 
Satellite, Statistics1, Statistics2, 
Statistics3, Troops 
1 0 0 1 1 
Bank, Rail 1 0 1 1 1 
Aviation, Social, Space 0 0 0 0 1 
RoadSafety 0 0 0 1 0 
Multimodal, Telecomms 0 0 0 0 0 
Efficiency 0 0 1 0 1 
Debt, Phytosan 0 1 1 0 1 
Copyright, Judges, KRU 0 1 0 0 1 
Competition, NERC1 0 1 1 0 0 
Audit, FDI, ServTrain 0 1 0 0 0 
1 – condition or outcome positive   0 – condition or outcome negative  C – contradictory configuration 
Parentheses [ … ] contain cases with negative outcome in contradictory configurations 
 
* Truth-Table 21 for institutional convergence contained three contradictory configurations, which we resolved by 
removing some of the cases that caused conflict. For example, project [NERC2] with the National Electricity 
Regulatory Commission of Ukraine operated in the sector of energy, which exhibited strong dependence on Russia 
in those years. We believe the Russian factor, while probably explaining lack of institutional convergence in 
[NERC2], cannot be captured by our analytical framework. That is why the case [NERC2] was dropped from the 
minimisation procedure. Cases [Land] and [ServDev] were also removed because they did not pass the two-year 
“grace period” of effectiveness. 
 
 
Table 22. Boolean configurations for Twinning effectiveness 
CaseID effect polit cond fit comun 
Space vs [Aviation, Social] C* 0 0 0 1 
Police vs [Land] C* 1 0 1 1 
Audit, FDI, ServTrain 1 1 0 0 0 
Competition, NERC1 1 1 1 0 0 
Copyright, Judges, KRU 1 1 0 0 1 
Debt, Phytosan 1 1 1 0 1 
Efficiency 1 0 1 0 1 
Multimodal, Telecomms 1 0 0 0 0 
RoadSafety 1 0 0 1 0 
Accred, NERC2, Standardiz 0 1 1 1 1 
AdmCourts 0 1 0 1 0 
Bank, Rail 0 0 1 1 1 
FoodSafety, ServDev 0 1 1 1 0 
Satellite, Statistics1, Statistics2, 
Statistics3, Troops 
0 0 0 1 1 
1 – condition or outcome positive   0 – condition or outcome negative  C –?contradictory configuration 
Parentheses [ … ] contain cases with negative outcome in contradictory configurations 
 
* These contradictory configurations were resolved by removing the conflicting cases with a negative outcome, as 
described in Table 20 and Table 21. 
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Table 23. Analysis of necessity for Twinning effectiveness (coverage threshold 0.75) 
Outcomes Cons. Cov. Case IDs 
Legal convergence 
FIT 1.00 0.75 Accred, Bank, FoodSafety, NERC2, Rail, RoadSafety, ServDev, 
Standardiz, Troops 
NO legal convergence 
cond+fit 1.00 0.89 AdmCourts, Audit, Aviation, Competition, Copyright, Debt, 
Efficiency, Judges, KRU, Land, Multimodal, NERC1, Phytosan, 
Police, Social, Telecomms 
POLIT+fit 1.00 0.77 AdmCourts, Audit, Aviation, Competition, Copyright, Debt, 
Efficiency, Judges, KRU, Land, Multimodal, NERC1, Phytosan, 
Police, Social, Telecomms 
Institutional convergence 
FIT 1.00 1.00 AdmCourts, Accred, Bank, FoodSafety, Police, Rail, 
RoadSafety, Satellite, Standardiz, Statistics1, Statistics2, 
Statistics3, Troops 
NO institutional convergence 
fit 1.00 1.00 Audit, Aviation, Competition, Debt, Efficiency,  
FDI, Judges, KRU, Multimodal, NERC1, Phytosan, ServTrain, 
SocialSpace, Telecomms 
Effectiveness 
FIT 1.00 1.00 AdmCourts, Bank, Rail, NERC2, Accred, Standardiz, Police, 
RoadSafety, Satellite, Statistics1,Statistics2, Statistics3, 
Troops, ServDev, FoodSafety 
NO effectiveness 
fit 1.00 1.00 Audit, Aviation, Competition, Copyright, Debt,  
Efficiency, FDI, Judges, KRU, Multimodal, NERC1, Phytosan, 
ServTrain, Social, Telecomms 
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Table 26. Pilot survey on Twinning effectiveness 
Questions answers 
1. Can you rate on a scale from 1 (none) to 10 (all), to what extent did 
this project accomplish its mandatory results?  
 
2. Did the project result in a new or adapted system, a process or a 
procedure in policymaking that continued functioning after project 
completion? Yes (Y)- No (N) 
 
3. How can you describe the commitment of the Ukrainian beneficiary 
administration to project goals and activities? (1- extremely poor ~ 
10-excellent) 
 
4. How favourable and conducive to accomplishing your project results 
and activities was overall political environment in Ukraine? (1-
prohibitive ~ 10-totally favourable) 
 
5. Did you experience any major organisational changes or staff 
turnovers throughout the duration of the project? Yes (Y)- No (N) 
 
6. Did you become aware of any conflict of interest, political or 
commercial, in the work of the beneficiary institution over the course 
of your involvement with the project?  Yes (Y)- No (N) 
 
7. Please rate the process of coordination between different institutions 
involved in this Twinning project (EU Delegation, PAO, your home 
institution and the beneficiary institution) (1- extremely poor ~ 10-
excellent) 
 
8. How equally and fairly were different tasks and responsibilities 
divided between partners during project implementation? (1-
extremely unfairly ~ 10-totally fairly) 
 
9. Did your immediate Ukrainian counterparts have any previous 
experience of international cooperation with EU’s or other 
institutions? Yes (Y)- No (N) 
 
10. How would you evaluate the quality of communication with your 
counterparts in Ukraine? (1-extremely poor ~ 10-excellent) 
 
11. Did your RTA speak or understand Russian/Ukrainian?  
Yes (Y)- No (N) 
 
12. How relevant was the expertise of short-term experts to Ukrainian 
recipients? (1-totally irrelevant ~ 10-perfectly relevant) 
 
13. To what extent did the project design fit the needs and capacities 
of the beneficiary institution? (1-no fit ~ 10-perfect fit) 
 
14. In your opinion, how well-defined and realistic were project 
objectives? (1-overly ambitious ~ 10-perfectly realistic) 
 
15. To your knowledge, did the EU attach any significant rewards for 
reform in the policy area covered by the project? Yes (Y)- No (N) 
 
16. Did your beneficiary institution encourage participation of civil 
society in project activities? Yes (Y)- No (N) 
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Typical interview questions 
 
Table 27. Typical interview questions 
1. Did you encourage Ukrainian partners to disclose internal information to the 
citizens and work in close contact with independent media?  
2. Did your project involve any other provisions for transparency as part of the work 
plan or the mandatory results? What were they? 
3. Did your project include any anti-corruption measures? If so, which were they? 
4. Did your project involve any provisions for accountability as part of the work plan 
or the mandatory results? 
5. Did your project emphasise the civil society’s participation in the work of your 
institution? If so, in what ways? 
6. Speaking of the selection process for this Twinning project, did you have any 
competitors from other MS? Why do you think your consortium was selected? 
7. What comparative advantage/added value did the participating MS offer for their 
ENP counterparts? 
8. Your project invited experts from both the older MS and CEECs, which joined the 
EU after 2004. Did you notice any difference in approaches to the objectives of 
the project by representatives from new and old MS? 
9. What specific characteristics or best practices of your administrative system were 
you trying to implement through your Twinning project with Ukraine? 
10. Do you think the recent transition experience of your country helped you be more 
effective throughout the project? 
11. Did you highlight any cross-cutting issues related to democracy and human rights 
through the Twinning project? Were they relevant? 
12. What was the most challenging aspect of your Twinning project? 
13. Do you think Twinning projects in this sector have been effective overall? 
14. Do you have any recommendations how to improve future Twinning projects? 
 
 

